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0/  Executive Summary 
This report presents the results of a study of the provision of public telecommunications 
services in the context of Open Network Provision (ONP).  The focus  of the study has 
been on the development of  the concept of  universal service in telecoms to ensure that the 
social as  well as  the  economic objectives of the European Union are  supported by the 
liberalisation of  telecoms markets. 
The study was undertaken between December 1995 and December 1996 by Analysys Ltd on 
behalf of  the European Commission Directorate General XIII.  The findings form the basis 
of a series of policy recommendations on the future development of universal service in 
European telecoms which we present to the Commission in this report. 
The views expressed in this report are those of  Analysys Ltd or of  organisations interviewed 
in the course of  the work; they are not necessarily the views of  the Commission. 
0.1  Background 
Universal service has become an important issue in the European telecoms sector in recent 
years.  This is a direct result of the measures to  liberalise the European telecoms market 
which have been implemented by the Commission and the Member States of  the European 
Union (EU).  Liberalisation has rendered unworkable the traditional relationship between a 
monopoly provider of telecoms services and the government of the country in which it 
operates,  whereby  the  telecoms  operator  (TO)  offered  basic  telephony  services  to  all 
citizens at the same price irrespective of their location in the country, in return for the 
State's protection of  its monopoly. 
The perception that monopoly TOs have delivered something approximating to universal 
service in most European countries has led to widespread discussion of what will happen 
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to provision of  universal telephony service in competitive markets following liberalisation 
in 1998.  There is a great deal of  activity in the Member States of  the EU to ensure that the 
provision of universal service will continue after the liberalisation of telecommunications 
markets.  There  is  already  agreement  at  an  EU  level  of the  costing  and  financing  of 
universal service.  In addition the Commission is  due to  report on the level quality and 
affordability of universal service at the end of 1997;  this study is a contribution to  that 
review process.  Table 0.1  on the following pages summarises the position of universal 
service in each Member State at the time of  writing (December 1996). 
0.2  Study Approach 
A two-stage approach was taken to the study: 
•  a series of interviews was carried out with parties with interests and expertise in the 
development of  universal service 
•  possible  demand  scenarios  were  constructed  for  technologies  which  could  be 
considered for inclusion in universal service in the future. 
Interviews were carried out with a wide variety of organisations in the EU and other parts 
of the  world which have  an  interest  in  the  development of the  telecoms  sector:  these 
included National Regulatory Authorities,  incumbent telecoms operators,  new telecoms 
operators, consumer associations, user associations, regional development agencies, trade 
unions,  social groups and organisations representing the disabled.  Their views were an 
important  input  to  the  conclusions  drawn  by Analysys  and  the  recommendations  put 
forward to the Commission.  In addition, we also  spoke to  organisations active in other 
sectors where universal service is an issue (electricity, gas, water and postal services).  The 
experience of  these sectors provide some valuable lessons for the telecoms sector. 
The  objective of developing  technology  and  demand  scenarios  for  emerging  telecoms 
services was to determine whether emerging services are likely to penetrate the residential 
market to  an extent which would qualify them for  inclusion in universal service before 
2005.  The scenarios  examined the possible penetration of the residential market (as  a 
proportion of  households) of  cellular telephone and ISDN services.  In addition, the study 
assessed  the  costs  of extending  universal  service  to  include  ISDN  access  to  schools, 
hospitals and public libraries. 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~ly~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE  Page iii 
TABLE 0.1:  Summary of  Universal Service Components in the EU 
NBED  wp 84 
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0.3  Conclusions from the Interviews 
The interviews enabled Analysys to identify some fundamental principles for the develop-
ment  of universal  service  on  which  there  is  broad  agreement  among  the  interested 
organisations. The most important of  these principles are summarised below. 
Principles underlying universal service 
•  Universal service is concerned with ensuring access to essential telecoms services for 
citizens of the European Union.  All reasonable steps should be taken to  ensure that 
each  household  should  have  access  to  these  services  irrespective  of  financial 
circumstances, geographical location or disability. 
•  The purpose of universal service is to  ensure that part of the population which would 
not receive essential telecoms services under normal market conditions has access to 
those services.  Most citizens  can afford to  pay for  telephone  services  delivered at 
prices which reflect the costs of  providing those services.  Universal service provision 
is required only to cover those citizens who cannot afford essential telecoms services 
at cost-based prices. 
•  While  intervention  in  the  telecoms  market  to  stimulate  the  deployment  of new 
technologies or services may be a laudable objective, it is inappropriate for universal 
service to be used as the mechanism for achieving it.  Indeed, while universal service 
is  necessary  to  prevent  major  inequalities  in  opportunities  to  participate  in  the 
Information Society, it is not a mechanism which should used to drive the Information 
Society forward. 
Criteria for inclusion of  new services within universal service 
•  Universal service is concerned with the provision of services to citizens.  Provision of 
services to business customers is outside universal service.  Therefore the provision of 
mandatory services such as  leased lines to meet the needs of business customers is a 
separate issue from universal service.  However, business customers will benefit from 
the universal service requirements which improve overall service levels - particularly 
in those countries which qualify for  assistance  from  the European Union Cohesion 
Funds.  There is no requirement that prices for mandatory services such as leased lines 
be affordable, just that they be cost-related. 
_Analy_sys ___________________  _ I 
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•  Any service included in the definition of universal service should be essential, that is: 
it should have a high penetration among the population (penetration of at least 75% 
was suggested by a number of interviewees);  and being without that service would 
constitute a social or economic disadvantage. 
•  Currently  only  basic  telephone  services  qualify  as  universal  services,  as  they  are 
regarded  as  essential  for  full  participation in modem European  society.  However, 
there are a number of services associated with basic telephony which are necessary for 
customers to be able to make full use of the service: directory enquiries, information 
about  services  and  their  prices,  and  provision  of public  payphones.  Moreover, 
itemised  billing,  call  barring  and  malicious  call  control  services  are  necessary  in 
addition to the basic services so that customers have information on their expenditure, 
can control exposure to large telephone bills and can filter out undesirable calls.
1  The 
social benefit from universal free  access to emergency services via the telephone are 
self-evident and such access should be part of  universal service. 
Affordability and tariffing measures 
•  With  the  introduction  of competition,  the  widespread  practice  of  geographical 
averaging of tariffs in Member States will become unsustainable.  Tariffs will reflect, 
on a regional basis, the costs of  providing the service to that region. 
•  The concept of affordability cannot be defined in a meaningful way for populations 
either at a European level or at the level of the Member States.  However, customers' 
willingness to  subscribe to  services can be enhanced by flexibility of payment terms 
through measures such as  credit limits,  frequent billing,  flexible  tariffs,  and moving 
from deposits to more standard forms of  credit control. 
•  Lessons from other sectors show how the numbers of disconnections from service can 
be  dramatically  reduced  by introducing  'soft  access'  to  the  service.  Prepayment 
schemes for telecoms customers could have a similar effect on customer disconnec-
tions in the telecoms sector. 
All of  these elements, with the exception of  filtering services for malicious calls, are either currently within the scope of  universal 
service as  set out in  the  Voice Telephony Directive (95/62/EC), or are  found  in  the  current proposal to  amend  that directive 
(COM(96) 419). 
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Provision of  public access 
•  Providing telecoms  services to  schools,  hospitals  and  other public institutions  as  a 
means of  ensuring public access is outside the scope of  universal service. 
Lessons from other sectors 
Some  lessons  on  universal  service  were  learned  by  interviewing  players  from  the 
electricity, gas, water and postal services in a number of  different countries: 
•  Soft access reduces the barrier to  taking up  a service for  those customers who may 
have difficulties paying for the service. 
2  It eliminates the possibility of the customer 
getting into problems with debt, by ensuring that the customer only has access to the 
service when it is already paid for. 
•  Business  customers  are  deemed  to  require  significantly  less  protection  and  fewer 
guarantees of  service than residential customers.  This attitude is particularly visible in 
the UK gas  and electricity sectors,  and is  founded  on the belief that there is  more 
competition for business customers. 
•  An essential  service  such  as  water  supply  can  have  different  prices  for  different 
regions of  the country, depending on the cost of  providing those services.  The prices 
which water companies in England and Wales charge domestic customers for water 
supply vary from one part of  the country to another, with prices reflecting the costs of 
providing the water supply. 
0.4  Conclusions from the Technology and Demand Scenarios 
One of  the fundamental reasons for including a service in universal service is because the 
service has been widely taken up by private citizens.  (The  other major reason is  that 
individuals who desire the service but are unable to subscribe to it would suffer significant 
disadvantage  i.e.  it  is  an  'essential  service'.)  In  looking  at  services  which  may  be 
considered for  inclusion in universal  service  in the  future,  it  is  therefore  important to 
consider their penetration of  the residential market.  Analysys thus forecast the penetration 
2  Soft access describes an arrangement where a customer pays for a service in advance - access to the service depends on pre-
payment, and without this the service is unavailable. 
Analy...sy:s ___________________  _ I 
I 
Page viii  Analysys Final Report  for DGXIIIIAJ 
of  mobile telephony and basic rate ISDN to see if it is likely that they will reach levels of 
penetration of  the residential market by 2005 to warrant inclusion in universal service. 
The technology and demand scenarios conclude that it is possible that mobile telephony 
might reach a sufficiently high level of penetration in the residential telecoms market by 
2005 that it could be considered for inclusion in universal service, if it were considered to 
be an essential service.  In this case, action would need to be taken to ensure affordable 
access for citizens who could not afford mobile services at cost-related tariffs.  Extending 
geographical coverage of mobile networks to  ensure  100% geographical coverage could 
also be required if  mobile telephony is included in universal service. 
Analysys' s findings  indicate that mobile telephony could be considered for  inclusion in 
universal service because it is likely to reach 7  5% penetration of the residential market by 
2005.  An estimate of the cost of including mobile telephony in universal service in 2005 
puts  it  at  ECU520 million per annum.  This  amounts  to  slightly less  than  1%  of the 
expected total mobile revenues ofECU60 billion in 2005. 
ISDN services do not approach the levels of  penetration of  the residential telecoms market 
in any  scenario  that  would indicate  that  ISDN  should  be  considered  for  inclusion  in 
universal service. 
Access to telecoms services for schools, hospitals and other public institutions has become 
intertwined  with  universal  service.  However  such  services  have  nothing  to  do  with 
universal service in the sense of action to  extend services to a small proportion of private 
individuals who are unable to afford the services at cost-related prices.  However, there is 
a great deal  of political importance  attached to  the  provision of 'public  access'.  The 
European  Parliament  has  recently  called  for  a  strategy  for  such  public  access  in  its 
resolution on universal service in a liberalised environment, 
3 and  similar proposals have 
been made in the  USA.
4  In order to  assess  the  cost of such public  access  provision, 
Analysys made provisional estimates of  the cost of  providing basic rate ISDN access to all 
schools  in the  EU and  primary rate  ISDN  access  to  all  hospitals  and public  libraries. 
These estimates are based on published tariffs rather than underlying costs and so should 
be viewed as a proxy for the actual cost of  providing these services. 
A4-0389/96 Resolution on the communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on  universal service for telecommunications in the perspective of a fully 
liberalised environment- an essential element of  the information society (COM(96)0073- C4-0205/96) 
FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Services 'Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Establishing Joint Board', CC 
Docket No. 96-45 8 March 1996. Source http;//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Notices/fcc96093.txt 
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•  Provision of basic rate  ISDN to  schools  throughout  the  EU was  estimated to  cost 
almost  ECUl billion per annum.  This  figure  includes  rental  for  the  ISDN  lines, 
Internet access and annualised equipment costs over five years.  However, it does not 
include connection costs or any usage charges which might be levied in addition to the 
fixed charges. 
•  The  cost  of providing  primary  rate  ISDN  access  to  all  hospitals  in  the  EU was 
estimated  at  ECU280 million  in  connection  charges  plus  annual  rental  costs  of 
ECU62 million;  the  annual  charge  is  likely to  be small  in comparison with usage 
charges.  A similar calculation to estimate the cost of a primary rate ISDN connection 
to each public library in the EU yielded a connection cost of  ECU527 million with an 
annual rental cost of  ECU118 million.  In addition to the costs described above, usage 
is again likely to be a very significant cost. 
However, no account is taken in the above calculations of  the revenues generated by these 
services and so the net cost of  provision will be significantly lower. 
Finally, it is important to note that penetration of  PSTN services in the future will begin to 
fall, as some households move away from fixed telephony to mobile telephony or to more 
advanced ISDN services.  This may have implications for universal service in the future. 
0.5  Recommendations 
Analysys's recommendations on the future development of  universal service, based on the 
insight gained from the consultation and scenario analysis are as follows: 
Recommendation 1: The Nature of  Universal Service 
Universal service is only concerned with access to  essential services for that minority of 
potential residential users who want, and have not yet secured, access to the network under 
normal commercial conditions. 
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Recommendation 2: Treatment of  Business Customers 
Universal service should not be used to  ensure provision of telecommunications services 
of higher quality or specification to  business customers.  The essential requirement that 
services be affordable applies only to residential customers. 
Recommendation 3: Service Penetration 
Universal service should not be used as a means of initiating the roll-out of new services 
which have yet to  find wide market acceptance.  We recommend that, for a service to be 
considered for inclusion in the universal service obligation, it ought to have already grown 
to an 75% market penetration under normal market conditions. 
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Recommendation 4: Components of  a Basic Telephone Service 
Universal service  should be limited for  the moment to  the provision of basic telecoms 
services.  Basic telecoms services should include basic voice telephony at a defined level 
of quality (in terms of speed of connection, speech quality, frequency of failure and time 
to  repair),  payphones,  free  access  to  emergency  services,  operator  services,  directory 
enquiries, malicious call complaints services.  Itemised billing and selective call barring 
should be available to all customers at no additional charge above the basic tariff. 
Recommendation 5: New Technologies 
The  initial  support of new technologies  could be embraced within  a policy on public 
access which would create awareness and stimulate demand for new telecommunications 
technologies for very limited periods prior to their widespread acceptance by the market. 
In contrast to universal service policies, public access policies should be characterised by 
the  diversity  of the  services  supported  and  the  limited  period  of support,  and  where 
possible should be achieved through a public-private partnership. 
Recommendation 6: Regulatory Restrictions on Technologies Used 
Where  a  telecoms  operator  has  an  obligation  to  provide  universal  service  then  that 
operator should be  free  to  offer the  service in the  most economically efficient manner 
subject to constraints such as radio spectrum availability. 
Recommendation 7: Review of  Services Covered by Universal Service Obligations 
The services which are covered by universal service should be subject to periodic review 
to  assess  whether additional  services  should be added,  based on the criteria of market 
penetration and economic disadvantage. 
Recommendation 8:  Tariff  Packages 
A wide range of tariff packages which reduce the effect of prices as a barrier to entry for 
the un-telephoned should be available as a right. 
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Recommendation 9: Credit Control vs Deposits 
The telecoms industry should adopt a range of standard forms  of credit control used in 
most  other  competitive  consumer  markets,  specifically  the  adoption  of finance-based 
credit limits calculated on the basis of the customer's ability to pay and payment history. 
Deposits should not be required from customers. 
Recommendation 10: Billing Frequency 
Customers should be offered the option of being billed at  the frequency which is  most 
appropriate for their individual circumstances. 
Recommendation 11:  'Soft' Network Access 
Customers  should  have  the  option  of soft  access  to  the  network  through  the  use  of 
prepayment for telephone usage. 
Recommendation 12: Responses to Non-Payment of  Bills 
'Soft' disconnection should be the initial stage for the removal of service from a customer 
for non payment of  a bill.  Soft disconnection should be implemented for the billing period 
after that which a debt has been incurred. 
Recommendation 13: Disabled Users 
Universal service should compensate disabled users for the additional costs imposed on 
their use of the telephone  service by their disability.  This  recommendation should be 
supported by the monitoring and dissemination of  best practice within the EU. 
Recommendation 14: Public Access 
Public access policies targeted at providing new services to schools and hospitals are not 
part  of a  broader  universal  service  policy  debate  and  as  such  should  have  distinct 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~Iy~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN  EUROPE  Page xiii 
characteristics; in particular, such policies should encourage a diversity of technical and 
service offerings and be relatively short-lived. 
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1/  Introduction 
Analysys Ltd is pleased to present this final report on "The Future of  Universal Service in 
Telecommunications in Europe" to DG XIIIA/1 of  the European Commission.  This report 
is  the  culmination  of a  study  which  began  in  December  1995  and  which  involved 
Analysys in substantial research into the area of universal service as well as  an extensive 
interview programme with parties interested in universal service. 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
Universal service has become an important issue in the European telecoms sector in recent 
years.  This is a direct result of the measures to liberalise the European telecoms market 
which have been implemented by the Commission and the Member States of  the European 
Union (EU).  Liberalisation has rendered unworkable the traditional relationship between 
a monopoly provider of telecoms services and the government of the country in which it 
operates,  whereby  the  telecoms  operator  (TO)  offered  basic  telephony  services  to  all 
citizens at the  same price irrespective of their location in the country,  in return for  the 
State's protection of its monopoly.  The perception that monopoly TOs have delivered 
something  approximating  to  universal  service  in  most  European  countries  has  led  to 
widespread discussion of what will happen to provision of universal telephony service in 
competitive markets following liberalisation in 1998. 
Two issues have been particularly important strands of Commission policy in creating a 
regulatory structure for a competitive European telecoms market: 
•  cost-related tariffing 
•  non-discrimination. 
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Cost-related tariff rebalancing and non-discrimination have important implications for the 
future  of universal  service.  Tariff rebalancing  affects  the  affordability  of services 
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by removing traditional subsidies on local calls and access charges.  The principle of  non-
discrimination requires that the burden of universal service be shared between the players 
in the industry rather than placed on one incumbent operator. 
However,  when determining  the  future  shape  of universal  service,  telecoms  regulators 
must take account of broader technological and social trends.  Recent developments in 
technology and services indicate that businesses and individuals are on the brink of  radical 
changes in the way they use information technology and telecoms.  Increasing computing 
power  and  the  explosive  growth  of the  Internet  promise  to  revolutionise  access  to 
information and the ability to process that information when accessed. 
These and similar developments are the first steps towards the creation of  the 'Information 
Society', in which computers and telecoms play an increasingly important role in the lives 
of  European citizens.  However, the approach of  the Information Society is also generating 
debate about the risks of creating a gulf between information 'haves' and 'have-nots': a 
sizeable portion of society could be marginalised by an  inability to  access  information 
available to the majority over information networks.  Thus there is a need to identify the 
fundamental  criteria  which  define  whether  a  service  should  be  included  in  universal 
service provision and to apply these criteria to new services other than telephony to see if 
they warrant inclusion.  Finally, in order to ensure widespread access to the services which 
individuals  require  to  participate in  the  Information  Society,  it  is  necessary that  these 
services are not only universally available but also affordable. 
The purpose of this study is to advance thinking on these topics to assist the Commission 
in its role of  defining the future for universal service in European telecoms.  The study has 
not been concerned with the issue of  costing of  universal service, as this is the subject of a 
parallel study. 
1.2  Major Themes from the Literature on Universal Service 
This report seeks to address some of  the fundamental issues surrounding the development 
of universal service, and to  provide a detailed account of the status of universal service 
throughout the European Union. 
This introduction summarises the key issues at the centre of the universal service debate, 
namely affordability,  public  access  and  the  evolution of universal  service.  A  detailed 
discussion of  the literature which examines these issues is provided in Annex C. 
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Affordability 
The affordability of telecoms services is inseparable from more general issues on pricing 
policy.  The  general  picture  which  emerges  from  our  survey  of National  Regulatory 
Authority (NRAs) is that the affordability of  telecoms services improves when the general 
level of  tariffs is reduced at a faster rate than changes in general price indices. 
While  there  is  little  serious  debate  which  seeks  to  link  the  affordability  of telecoms 
services to levels of income, the literature does include discussion of the extent to which 
changes in tariff levels affect the economic welfare of individual households, particularly 
low-income households.  For example,  in the case of US  households, Perl (1986)
1  has 
argued that the poorest 30% of households are actually worse off when cost-based tariffs 
are introduced.  More recently Wolak (1994)
2 has refined these arguments, and points out 
that although tariff rebalancing may result in a net gain to the majority of households, the 
cost  increases  from  rebalancing  fall  disproportionately  on  low-income  households 
(particularly  those  occupied  by  the  elderly  or  in  rural  areas).  Nevertheless,  Wolak 
concludes that the burden from price changes is unlikely to be sufficiently large to  drive 
these households from the network. 
From our survey of NRAs and other groups concerned with universal service, it is clear 
that  the  debate over affordability has  focused  on  'controllability', that is  the ability of 
individuals  to  control their expenditure  on telecoms.  In  particular it  is  vital  for  low-
income households to be able to control their expenditure; the unlimited liability faced by 
households subscribing to telephone services is a major source of  concern, and it is also an 
inhibiting factor for those households which do not yet have a telephone.  This problem 
has been recognised by a number of  the NRAs, which are either seeking to introduce low-
user schemes or to  encourage  the  provision of novel  tariff packages which give  users 
control over their expenditure. 
Evolution of  the Concept of  Universal Service 
A central issue in the current policy debate is that of extending the concept of universal 
service to include new services.  It is argued that the main focus for the development of 
1  Perl (1986), The Consequences of  Cost-Based Pricing, in Miller, J., Telecommunications and Equity, North Holland. 
Wolak, F.  A., (1994), Can  Universal Service Survive in  a Competitive Telecommunications Environment?  Evidence from  the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of  Stanford, California, USA. 
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universal service should be completing the roll-out of an existing service and creating the 
circumstances which allow  all  households  to  be included within the network and have 
access to  a specified service.  Universal service is not regarded as  a policy designed to 
anticipate market behaviour, rather it is  intended to  correct market  failure.  Given this 
perspective, the definition of new services which might be included within the universal 
service obligation must take into account the diffusion of services across a market.  As a 
result,  market  penetration  rates  become  the  key  measure  used  to  decide  which  new 
services are included in a universal service obligation. 
Within a given service offering, however,  policy measures designed to  give consumers 
greater  control  of expenditure  would  also  be  compatible  with  the  above  rationale  for 
defining  universal  service  obligations.  The  diffusion  of digital  network  technologies 
makes it possible to include new services such as  itemised billing and call barring in the 
definition of  universal service. 
Public Access 
The  debate  over  public  access  has  been  fuelled  by  broader  discussions  about  the 
emergence of an Information Society and the need to avoid widening the gap between the 
'information rich' and the 'information poor'.  Attention has been focused on the rights of 
all individuals (citizens) to have access to  broadband networks  and services such as  the 
Internet.  Public access is now seen as a central issue in the debate over universal service, 
and is also involved in the debate about ISDN access for schools and hospitals. 
It is important to  distinguish the public access debate from the universal service debate. 
For public access the public policy issue is about initiating market-based behaviour and 
attempting to remove some of the first mover problems which exist in markets with rapid 
technological change.  In contrast, universal service addresses the failure of the market to 
provide access  to  basic telecoms  services;  here the  costs of service  and  the benefits of 
consumption are  well  understood.  The  difference between these  two  perspectives was 
elaborated in an article by Eli Noam and is illustrated in Exhibit 1.1. 
To ensure public access, a public policy initiative should be designed to help suppliers and 
consumers make a more accurate and rapid estimate of the costs and benefits associated 
with  a  new  technology  than  might  be possible  under  normal  market  conditions.  By 
definition,  therefore,  these  policies  should be of limited duration  and  targeted towards 
those new technologies which may provide the foundations of  mass-market services (such 
as the Internet).  However, in the case of a system technology, such as Internet, many of 
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the telecoms issues are dwarfed by usage charges and the funding of related technologies 
such as PCs, modems and in-building wiring. 
EXHIBIT 1.1:  Average Cost and Utility of  a Telecoms Network, Plotted Against 
Increasing Numbers of  Subscribers [Source: Noam,  1994] 
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1.3  EU ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
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The exclusion of  citizens from society through poverty is a concern to the European Union 
both because of the  aim of social and  economic  cohesion and because of the threat to 
society posed by disillusion among those who are excluded.  In the Green Paper on social 
policy 
4 the definition of social exclusion covers housing, education, health, and access to 
services as well as insufficient income.  As we look forward to the Information Society, it 
is  clear  that  access  to  services  and  information  is  emerging  as  a  crucial  issue  for 
participation in society. 
3  Noam, E., (1994), "Beyond Liberalization III: reforming Universal Service", Telecommunications Policy 18(9) pps 687-704. 
4  Green Paper on European Social Policy: Options for the Union, COM(93)551, 17 November 1993. 
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When the Green Paper on social policy was being developed, DG XIII of  the Commission 
was consulting interested parties  on the  review of the  situation in the  telecoms  sector, 
following  a communication from  the  Commission to  the  Council of Ministers  and the 
European  Parliament.
5  A  major  theme  of the  consultation  process  was  the  issue  of 
universal  service  for  basic  telecoms  services,  and  how  this  would  be  delivered  in  a 
competitive  telecoms  market.  Indeed,  the  Council  resolution  which  accepted  the 
requirement  for  liberalisation  of all  voice  telephony  as  a  principal  objective  of EU 
telecoms policy added the provision that liberalisation should proceed "whilst maintaining 
universal service". 
6 
The Commission, recognising the importance of universal service, developed a proposal 
for  a  Council resolution  on universal  service principles  in  the  telecoms  sector. 
7  This 
proposal discussed the concept of universal service and the reasons why it has become an 
important issue.  The document raised two key issues:  firstly, the factors which must be 
considered  when  deciding  how  to  fund  universal  service,  and  secondly  the  effect  of 
adjustment  programmes  (e.g.  tariff rebalancing)  on  the  implementation  of universal 
service.  This  proposal provided  a framework  for  the  debate  on universal  service  and 
aroused considerable political interest in the issue at both European and Member State 
level. 
The  Green Paper on the  liberalisation of telecoms  infrastructure
8  further  advanced the 
thinking on universal  service.  It advocated that "transparent schemes  for  the determi-
nation  of the  cost  of universal  service  obligations  and  their  financing  should  be 
established".  It also said that the cost of universal service obligations to operators should 
be calculated as "the net cost of providing the service to uneconomic customers plus any 
cost  associated with the  provision of public  telephones,  emergency  services  and  other 
social  obligations".  The  Green  Paper  also  recommended  that  universal  service  costs 
should be met either through a universal service fund (to which all players in the telecoms 
market  would  contribute)  or  from  access  charges  added  to  interconnection  charges, 
Communication  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  the  Consultation  on  the  Review  of the  Situation  in  the 
Telecommunications Sector, COM(93)159, Aprill993. 
Council Resolution of 22 July  1993 on the review of the  situation in the telecommunications sector and  the need for further 
development in that market 93/C213/0l. 
Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications Sector, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, COM(93)543 final. 
Green Paper on the Liberalisation of  Telecommunications Infrastructures and Cable  Television Networks Part II:  A Common 
Approach to  the Provision of  Infrastructure for Telecommunications  in  the European  Union,  COM(94)682 final,  25  January 
1995. 
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although  a  universal  service  fund  was  the  preferred  option.  The  funding  mechanism 
should be administered by the NRA or by an NRA appointed body.  The Green Paper 
concluded that the Commission and the NRAs should periodically survey main indicators 
of universal service such as  penetration of residential lines, waiting times, provision of 
public  pay-phones  and  the  availability  of targeted  schemes  for  the  needy  and  for 
uneconomic customers. 
The Communication to the Council and the European Parliament following consultation 
on the Green Paper on liberalisation of telecoms infrastructure reported that the industry 
acknowledged the importance of  universal service, but it should not be used as a reason to 
delay liberalisation.  There was general agreement that the current approach of  identifying 
universal service with basic voice telephony was appropriate, but that the concept could 
evolve with changes in technology and market demand.  Market demand was felt to be a 
particularly  important  factor  in  determining  whether  a  service  should  be  covered  by 
universal service. 
The Communication also reported general support for the removal of political constraints 
on flexible  tariffs  and on the speed of tariff rebalancing,  as  these increased the cost of 
providing universal  service.  Among those  consulted,  universal  service  funds  were the 
favoured funding mechanism, with a significant minority in favour of  access charges.  The 
importance  of universal  service  to  the  development  of peripheral  regions  was  also 
asserted.  On the basis of  this consensus, the Common Position on interconnection of  June 
1996 defines universal service as "a defined minimum set of services of specified quality 
which is available to all users independent of  their geographic location and, in the light of 
specific national conditions, at an affordable price".
9 
The Voice Telephony Directive
10  includes  a number of provisions relating to  different 
aspects of  universal service, such as targets for supply time and quality of service (Article 
5), socially useful tariffs for low users or specific social groups (Article 14), provision of 
public  payphones  (Article  1  7),  and  the  publication  of procedures  for  dealing  with 
customers who do  not pay their bills (Article 23).  An amendment to  this Directive has 
now been proposed to clarify further the precise scope and affordability of  voice telephony 
9 
Common Position (EC) No 34/96 adopted by the Council on 18 June 1996 with a view to adopting Directive 96/ /EC of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through the application of  the principles of  open network provision (ONP), OJ C220, 29.7.96. 
10  The Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, 13 December 1995. 
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services.  These proposed changes result from a broad consultation on the Communication 
on universal service for telecoms in a fully liberalised environment. 
The principles for costing and funding universal service obligations were established in 
the Directive on Full Competition and the Common Position on Interconnection, and were 
recalled in the Communication on universal service in a fully  liberalised environment. 
11 
This Communication also considered the issue of affordability of services in more detail 
and  began  to  look  to  the  future  and  how  universal  service  might  evolve  with  the 
development of the Information Society.  The elements which can be funded as  part of 
universal service are identified in the common position on the Interconnection Directive. 
According to the Full Competition Directive, national schemes for universal service must 
be notified to the Commission by 11  January 1997.  In order to facilitate this process, the 
Commission adopted on November 27 1996 a Communication on criteria for the costing 
and financing of  national schemes for universal service and guidelines for the operation of 
such schemes. 
12  As announced in the Communication of 13 March 1996, the Commission 
will publish by 31  December 1997 a monitoring report on the scope, quality,  level and 
affordability of  universal service. 
1.4  OBJECTIVES OF, AND APPROACH TO, THE STUDY 
The objectives of  this study, as agreed with the European Commission, are to provide: 
•  a  clear  picture  of those  public  telecoms  services  for  which  there  are  regulatory 
obligations covering geographical coverage or price in each of  the Member States 
•  a comparison with obligations in other sectors, such as electricity and gas supply, and 
postal services 
•  an  assessment of ways in which the  universal  service  concept for  telecoms  should 
evolve in the future 
•  proposals for possible future instruments and actions at the EU level. 
11  Directive  95/62/EEC  of the  European  Parliament  and  Council  of 13  December  1995  on  the  application  of Open  Network 
Provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ L 321, 30.12.95. 
Universal Service for Telecommunications in  the Perspective of  a Fully Liberalised Environment: An Essential Element of  the 
Information  Society, Communication to  the  European Parliament, the  Council,  The  Economic  and  Social  Committee and the 
Committee of  the Regions, COM(96) 73. 
12  Commission Communication on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in 
Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of such Schemes, COM(96) 608. 
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In order to achieve these objectives we pursued a range of  approaches: 
•  a programme of interviews  with National  Regulatory  Authorities  to  determine  the 
nature of universal service obligations in each EU Member State and to discuss how 
these might develop (Chapter 2) 
•  a programme of interviews with players with interests in the outcome of  the debate on 
universal  service,  including  incumbent  TOs,  competitive  operators,  consumer 
associations,  telecoms user associations,  development agencies,  trade  unions,  social 
organisations and organisations representing the disabled (Chapter 3) 
•  a  programme  of interviews  with  players  in  the  gas,  water,  electricity  and  postal 
sectors to identify how these sectors implement the concept of universal service and 
whether it would be possible to  use their best practice as  an  input to  the debate on 
universal service in telecoms (Chapter 4) 
•  development of  market forecasts for ISDN and mobile telephony services covering the 
period to 2005; these services are currently considered by some players to be potential 
universal services.  In addition we have costed the inclusion of Internet access under 
universal  service  and  special provision for  access  for  schools,  hospitals  and public 
libraries (Chapter 5). 
The results of each of these activities were used as  the basis for  a series of recommen-
dations on the future development of  universal service (Chapter 6).  Annexes to this report 
include a list of the organisations interviewed, a summary overview of the options  for 
funding universal service, and a review of  the literature influencing current thinking on the 
status of  universal service and ideas for its future development. 
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2/ National Regulatory Authorities and Universal Service 
This chapter sets out the terms and conditions under which universal service is delivered 
in the EU and in a number of  other countries.  The data presented in this chapter has been 
derived from  a programme of interviews with National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
undertaken by Analysys,  and  from  a review of documentation provided by NRAs  and 
other relevant literature, including the raw data collected in the survey of NRAs recently 
undertaken by the European Commission. 
1 
The chapter covers three major topics relating to the regulation of  universal service: 
•  the legal status of  universal service 
•  the services covered by universal service agreements, including any quality of service 
measures 
•  tariff issues relating to universal service, such as deposits, low user schemes, special 
tariff packages for the disabled and disconnection. 
The data is presented in two sections, the first covering the environment within the EU 
Member States, and the second covering the countries studied outside the EU. 
2.1  OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 
The survey of the regulators and the review of primary source material makes it evident 
that,  while  universal  service  is  a  common policy  construct  across  the  EU,  there  are 
considerable differences  in the  nature of the policy and in its  detailed  implementation 
between Member States.  In most EU countries a 'social contract' was negotiated between 
1  This survey was carried out by DG XIII in late 1995 and early 1996. 
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the monopoly provider of telecoms services and the political institutions which sustained 
that monopoly position.  Neither the detail of these contracts nor the basis on which the 
contracts were sustained were ever clearly articulated.  Such contracts can be seen as  an 
effective regulatory device that redistributed the monopoly rents earned by the incumbent 
through funding the extension of the network.  However, this process was not necessarily 
always  smooth:  in  some  countries,  broad  inefficiencies  created  by such  a  monopoly 
market structure failed to deliver the extension of  the network, and substantial waiting lists 
for access to the network existed. 
In the emerging competitive multi-service, multi-vendor environment, the inconsistencies 
and lack of  clarity of  national universal service policies are being thrown into stark relief. 
If universal  service  costs  are  to  be  borne  by  more  than  one  operator  in  a  non-
discriminatory fashion, then clear and transparent definitions of universal service and the 
obligations it imposes on operators will be needed.  From an EU perspective it is desirable 
that  some common understanding of universal  service  is  arrived  at  and  applied  in all 
Member States. 
At the time of  writing (December 1996) there is a great deal of  legislative activity relating 
to universal service being undertaken in the Member States.  Every effort has been made 
to ensure the information provided on each Member State is correct.  However, because so 
much new legislation is  under preparation,  it is  possible that  some of the descriptions 
contained here will have been superceded. 
2.1.1  The Nature of  Universal Service 
This discussion of  the nature of  universal service comprises two elements: 
•  the legal status of  universal service, i.e. the basis on which it is provided 
•  the services covered by universal service agreements, including any quality of service 
measures. 
Universal service can be said to exist in law in only two EU Member States-Austria and 
Spain.  In most other countries universal service exists as a condition of the licence under 
which the incumbent and dominant firm  operates.  In five  countries (Germany,  Greece, 
Ireland,  Italy,  and  Luxembourg)  there  is  no  formal  description  of what  is  meant  by 
universal service, although there is usually mention in the incumbent TO's licence of an 
obligation to adequately provide for the telecoms needs of  the State. 
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The Member States display considerable diversity in terms of the actual range of service 
covered universal service and the obligations placed on the operators to ensure quality of 
service.  Both France  and  Sweden  specify  a range  of services  to  be included:  France 
Telecom must offer X25  and leased lines; Telia must offer fax  and data transmission at 
2400  baud.  At  the  other extreme,  there  are  five  countries  where  there  is  no  formal 
agreement as to what service(  s) constitute universal service, as listed above. 
Quality  of service  measures  are  an  important  element  of the  universal  service  debate 
because  they  establish  the  minimum  acceptable  threshold  for  service  delivery.  As 
operators confront increasingly intense competition, quality of service measures are a way 
of ensuring that the  lower prices  charged  for  telecoms  services  do  not result  in  lower 
quality  for  those  services.  Moreover,  for  residential  consumers,  who  have  little 
negotiating  power,  quality  of service  measures  imposed  by  the  regulator  act  as  a 
counterweight to the strength of  the dominant carrier. 
A  country-by-country  description  of the  nature  of universal  servtce  across  the  EU  is 
provided below. 
Austria 
Austrian law places an obligation on the incumbent operator to provide telephony service 
and  access  to  the  public  telephone  network.  This  obligation  is  part  of the  Austrian 
Telecommunications  Act  which  came  into  effect  on  1  April  1994.  Since  that  act, 
legislation governing the privatisation of the incumbent TO established the principle that 
costs borne by an operator in providing universal service should be funded; however, the 
means  by  which  this  funding  is  implemented  are  not  yet  specified.  New  telecoms 
legislation is expected to be enacted by the end of 1996.  This legislation is expected to 
take a lead from the Voice Telephony Directive in its treatment of  universal service. 
Services must be provided to all citizens at a uniform price throughout Austria.  Services 
must be delivered to  wherever they are required on the property of the customer.  The 
criteria for quality of service are laid down in the General Standard Terms and Conditions 
which apply between the Austrian TO  (OPT)  and its customers.  These require OPT to 
maintain an up-to-date network and to provide customers with access to services within a 
reasonable time.  The standard terms and conditions contain penalty clauses to compensate 
customers when OPT fails to meet the required standard of  service. 
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Belgium 
In October 1996 a royal decree on universal service became part of  Belgian telecoms law. 
The decree specifies that universal service includes basic telephony, free emergency calls, 
operator and information services, and public telephones.  It requires that these services be 
made  available  to  all  Belgian citizens  irrespective  of geographical  location  and  at  an 
affordable  price.  The  decree  also  requires  telephony  services  to  be  provided  at  an 
'affordable' price for schools, hospitals and public libraries, although the term affordable 
is  not  defined.  There  is  no  precise  definition  of quality  of service,  but  there  is  a 
requirement  that  data  communication  must  be  possible  using  a  good-quality  modem, 
which the Belgian regulator (IBPT) interprets to mean that data communication at speeds 
higher than 2400bit/s per second is required. 
There is a standard connection tariff for telephones in Belgium, and the telephone line is 
delivered  to  the part of the  property  specified by the  customer.  Rental  charges  vary 
slightly depending on the location of  the customer; customers in large cities pay more than 
those in rural areas, because users in cities can reach many more customers for the price of 
a local call.  Customers have a choice of  a number of  different rental packages which offer 
different levels of  service: 
•  The basic package is Abonnement au service de base, which is the least expensive but 
requires the customer to pay for line repairs. 
•  The comfort package is Abonnement comfort, which costs  16% more than the basic 
package but includes value-added services such as call waiting and call forwarding. 
•  The PRO package (Abonnement PRO) costs about 25% more than the basic package 
and offers the basic package plus a guaranteed repair service. 
•  The PRO-COMFORT package costs 40% more than the basic package and provides a 
combination of  the value-added services plus the guaranteed repair service. 
The basic  and  comfort packages  offers  customers  a  compensation payment of BF826 
(ECU20)  if service  is  interrupted  for  more  than  seven  days.  The  PRO  and  PRO-
COMFORT packages offer compensation ofBF150 (ECU3.8) for each day the service is 
not fully functional.  The Comfort and PRO-Comfort packages are only available on lines 
connected  to  digital  exchanges,  which  currently  make  up  72%  of telephone  lines  in 
Belgium. 
Permanent call barring is available for an installation fee  of BF500 (ECU12.5) plus a bi-
monthly charge of BF250 (ECU6.3).  A limited form of itemised billing is available, in 
which only international calls and calls to special services are itemised. 
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Denmark 
New  telecoms  legislation  came  into  effect  on  1 July  1996  which  established  a  legal 
framework  for  universal  service  in  Denmark.  The  details  of the  framework  law  are 
gradually  being  defined  by the  Ministry  of Technology,  although  the  approach  is  to 
maintain  as  much  flexibility  as  possible.  The  new  legislation  extended  the  scope  of 
universal service to include basic rate ISDN and leased lines (up to 2Mbit/s), in addition to 
basic voice telephony. 
Tariffs vary between the different regions  in Denmark, with the most expensive tariffs 
being in Greater Copenhagen, in part reflecting the large number of users that fall within 
the local call area.  The basic rule for tariffs under the new legislation is that they should 
reflect costs and that consumers should not be worse off than today.  In the future,  the 
regulator will set maximum tariffs from which prices may deviate provided that the new 
tariffs reflect costs 
When Tele Danmark delivers a line to  a customer, the line can be located anywhere on 
that  customer's  property  for  the  uniform  connection  charge.  Under  the  previous 
legislation it was clear that the network terminated in the home of  the customer.  Under the 
1996  legislation,  however,  there  is  now  some  ambiguity  as  to  the  terminating  point, 
especially in blocks of flats where some of the flats are served by a P  ABX and others are 
provided with direct access.  The exact details of the network terminating point are to be 
settled  through  an  executive  order  which  has  yet  to  be  issued  by  the  Ministry  of 
Technology. 
The  new  telecoms  law  requires  the  design  and  implementation of some  basic  quality 
criteria.  Again,  the  detail  of these  quality of service  standards  are  due  to  be  settled 
through an executive order from the Ministry.  There is a scheme to compensate customers 
for interruptions to service, under which subscription charges are reduced in proportion to 
the period of  the fault, provided that the amount exceeds DKr25 (ECU3.4). 
According to  the National Telecoms Agency,  there  is  no  responsibility placed on Tele 
Danmark for the provision of directory enquiry services and payphones and it is not Tele 
Danmark's responsibility to pay for them.  Tele Danmark is able to close any payphone it 
wishes  unless  the  local  authority  is  prepared  to  guarantee  a minimuim  income  which 
makes the payphone cost effective. 
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Finland 
Sections 8 and 9 of  the Finnish Telecommunications Act state that it is the operators' duty 
to provide users with sufficient, secure and safe telecommunications under terms that are 
reasonable and non discriminatory.  However, there is no obligation to provide service at 
the same price to all customers. 
The Finnish government  does  have  some rules  regarding the  quality of service  that  a 
telecoms operator must deliver, but believes that competition produces the best quality of 
service for customers.  The Ministry carries out an annual study of the quality of service 
available from operators, which receives a considerable degree of  publicity in Finland and 
forms a benchmark against which operators are evaluated. 
Call barring and  itemised billing are  available  for  all  customers  connected to  a digital 
exchange, which currently means about 95% of all customers.  Network digitalisation is 
due to be completed by the end of 1996. 
France 
The French Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines universal service as  "the provision 
to the public of  a quality telephone service at an affordable price".  In addition to the basic 
telephone  service  the  Act  defines  universal  service  to  include  information  services, 
directory services (printed and electronic), provision of  payphones in public places and the 
provision of free  calls to  emergency services.  Any subscriber who  requests telephone 
service from an operator with responsibility for universal service should receive it.  The 
Act also  specifies that a landlord may not prevent a tenant from  installing a telephone. 
The Act currently names France Telecom as the operator responsible for universal service, 
although  all  telephone  service  providers  are  obliged  to  carry  emergency  calls  free  of 
charge.  The exact conditions which will be imposed on those operators with responsibility 
for  providing universal  service (at least France Telecom) will be established through a 
State Council Decree after consultation with the Commission Superieure du Service des 
Postes et Telecommunications. 
The cost of universal service will be met by those organisations with licences to operate 
public telephone services (articles 33.1  and 34.1  of the  1996  Telecommunications Act). 
The costs will be measured using an appropriate cost accounting system, to be executed by 
the operators and monitored by the regulator.  Until tariffs are fully rebalanced, there will 
be two mechanisms for compensating operators with universal service responsibilities: 
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•  The costs incurred by operators as a result of unbalanced tariffs and the geographical 
averaging of  prices will be recovered through an additional charge levied in the same 
way as interconnection charges (although the charge will be identified separately). 
•  The cost incurred by operators in providing special tariffs, public payphones, directory 
and  information  services  will be refunded  from  a  universal  service  fund  to  which 
network operators and telephone service providers will contribute. 
As  soon  as  tariffs  are  rebalanced,  and  in  any  case  no  later than  1 January  2001,  the 
mechanism  of additional  interconnection  charges  will  be  abandoned  and  all  costs 
associated with providing universal service (including the remaining cost of geographical 
averaging) will be recovered through the universal service fund. 
In addition to universal service (which relates to  telephony and associated services), the 
1996  Telecommunications  Act  also  specifies  a  set  of mandatory  services,  comprising 
ISDN, leased lines, packet-switched data services, enhanced voice telephony services and 
telex.  Access  to  these  services  must be provided by operators  with universal  service 
responsibilities  (currently  France  Telecom)  to  customers  throughout  France  without 
financial compensation.  The obligation to provide universal services at an affordable price 
does not extend to these services. 
The  1996  Telecommunications  Act  also  institutes  a  review  procedure  for  universal 
services whereby a report is to be submitted to the government and parliament every four 
years, following consultation with interested parties.  Among other things this report will, 
where appropriate,  recommend the  inclusion of new services in the scope of universal 
service and review the list of mandatory services.  These reviews are intended to ensure 
that  the  definition  of universal  and  mandatory  services  keeps  pace  with  market  and 
technology developments. 
Call barring and itemised billing are available to France Telecom's customers, on payment 
of a fee.  Barring of all outgoing calls is subject to  an initial charge of FF80.1  (ECU15) 
and a monthly charge ofFF21.08 (ECU3.5).  Other barring levels are available without an 
initial charge, but are subject to a monthly fee  of FF12.65 (ECU2.4).  Itemised billing is 
available  at  a  charge  of FF13.5  (ECU2.5)  for  the  first  100  numbers  itemised  and  an 
additional  fee  of FF8.43  (ECU1.6)  for  every  additional block of 100  numbers  or part 
thereof per bill. 
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Germany 
The  German  Telecommunications  Act  of 1996  devotes  a  chapter  to  the  subject  of 
universal service.  This new legislation, which does not come into force until  1 January 
1998, is the first time the concept has been formalised in German law.  The law defines 
universal services  as  "a minimum set of telecommunications  services  for  the public  in 
respect of which a particular quality has been defined and to which every user shall have 
access irrespective of  place of  residence or place of  work at an affordable price".  The law 
goes on to  describe who has an obligation to  provide such services:  all  licensees in the 
relevant product market which have a share of at least 4% of the total sales in that market 
shall undertake to  contribute to  providing universal service.  In other words, no  special 
obligations are imposed on Deutsche Telekom.  In the event that no  licensee provides a 
particular universal  service  which  a  customer  requires,  the  regulator  will  decide  who 
should provide the service. 
Where the regulator requires a licensee to  provide a universal service, the licensee may 
claim compensation from a universal service fund  for any long-term costs which are not 
met  by  income  it  receives  by  providing  the  service.  The  universal  service  fund  is 
calculated to be the amount of compensation paid to operators for the losses incurred in 
providing universal service.  Payments made into the fund are proportionate to the market 
share of  those licensees with at least 4% of  total market revenue. 
The  services  covered  by  universal  service  are  the  subject  of an  ordinance  by  the 
government, which specifies the tariffs and service quality at which the services must be 
offered.  A  recent  ordinance  includes  basic  telephony,  directory  enquiries,  public 
telephones and specific types of  digital leased lines. 
Itemised billing is available to all customers connected to a digital exchange for a one-off 
charge, currently DM19 (10ECU).  Most telephone customers do not have access to  call 
barring  services,  which are  only available  to  users  with ISDN access  to  the  telephone 
network.  Many services which are regarded as forming part of standard telephone access 
in other countries are only available to customers with ISDN access in Germany.  70% of 
residential customers are currently connected to  a digital exchange, and it is planned that 
all  exchanges will be digital by the  end of 1997.  Around 2 million of the 40  million 
telephone customers in Germany now have ISDN access to the telephone network. 
When a customer requests a new telephone line from Deutsche Telekom, this is delivered 
to the edge of  the property.  Any additional wiring is subject to additional charges and can 
either be undertaken by Deutsche Telekom or a private contractor. 
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Greece 
There is no explicit legal definition of  universal service in Greek law and it is not defined 
in the OTE licence.  However, OTE is obliged to "meet the telecommunications needs of 
the Greek people" and is perceived to have an obligation to provide basic telephony at the 
same  price  throughout  the  country.  Where  OTE  can  demonstrate  that  provision  of 
infrastructure in remote areas is uneconomic, it is entitled to compensation from the Greek 
state for the losses incurred.  When OTE installs new telephone lines they are delivered to 
the edge of the customer's property.  All further wiring on the customer's premises and 
within buildings must be undertaken by private contractors. 
OTE does not offer call barring services, although it is possible for customers to buy their 
own equipment which offers call barring capability.  Itemised billing is only available to 
customers who are  connected to  digital exchanges;  at present around 50% of telephone 
lines are connected to  digital exchanges.  There is no regulation of OTE's provision of 
payphones in Greece, and although it provides operator and directory enquiry services it 
has no obligation to do so. 
There  are  minimum  quality  of service  standards  which  must  be  met  for  telephone 
customers  throughout  Greece.  Article  22  of the  National  Circular  (24/7 /95)  which 
amended the Telephone Act sets out the basic quality of  service measures for OTE relating 
to fault repair times: as from January 1996, faults are to be repaired within three working 
days.  If  the repair is not completed within this period then "at the request of  the subscriber 
or on the initiative of the OTE,  any basic charges which may have been paid shall be 
refunded." 
Ireland 
The 1983 Telecommunications Act which incorporated Telecom Eireann specifies that the 
operator is responsible for meeting the telecoms requirements of  the State and between the 
State and other countries?  The Act does not impose any explicit obligations on Telecom 
Eireann but is widely interpreted as meaning that Telecom Eireann should provide basic 
telephony, directory services, public payphones and operator services to all customers at a 
uniform price throughout the country.  In a very small number of cases, however, where 
the customer requesting connection lives in a particularly remote area, Telecom Eireann is 
2  Article 14 ofthe Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983. 
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permitted to provide service at some time in the future when it is possible to do  so more 
efficiently than with immediate connection. 
Telecom  Eireann  also  provides  public  telephones  on  an  as-needed  basis.  Directory 
enquiry  services  are  available,  with two  free  enquiries  per customer  each  month,  and 
subsequent calls at  a rate of IR£0.345 per minute.  Call barring and itemised billing are 
available to customers with digital lines (currently about 80% of  customers).  Call barring 
of  premium-rate services is available free of charge.  The barring of calls to other types of 
number (international,  STD,  etc.)  is  subject to  an  initial  fee  of IR£16  with a monthly 
charge per line ofiR£2.  Itemised billing is subject to a surcharge of  £3 per bill. 
Under Article  110 of the  1983  Telecommunications  Act the  minister is  empowered to 
direct  Telecom  Eireann  to  carry  out  Government  policy  decisions.  This  includes 
directives  in  cases  where  the  minister  believes  that  Telecom  Eireann's  practices  are 
unreasonable or against the public interest.  This article has  never been invoked by the 
minister to force Telecom Eireann to provide universal service. 
If,  having directed Telecom Eireann to  carry out a policy decision  through the powers 
invested by Article 110, the minister is satisfied Telecom Eireann has sustained a financial 
loss over a period if 12 months, then Telecom Eireann is  entitled to recover that loss by 
increasing its charges. 
3 
The Department of Transport, Energy and Communications does not impose any quality 
of service  obligations  on  Telecom  Eireann,  although  quality  of service  measures  are 
published from time to time.  Telecom Eireann has introduced a customer charter which 
provides  compensation of IR£20  for  customers  when  it  fails  to  install  lines  within  15 
working days of the request for a line and compensation of IR£ 10 when it fails to clear a 
fault within 2 working days of  the fault being reported.  It is likely that this compensation 
scheme will be formally imposed by the regulator when the Voice Telephony Directive is 
transposed into Irish law. 
Italy 
There is no explicit universal service obligation on Telecom Italia at the moment, but the 
terms of the 1984 licence agreement between SIP  and the Italian government places an 
3  Article 51: Postal and Telecommunications Services Act 1983. 
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obligation on SIP  (and now Telecom  Italia)  to  meet  the  telecoms needs of the  Italian 
people.  Telecom Italia currently provides basic telephony services throughout Italy at the 
same price.  A set of  minimum quality standards for basic telephony services is described 
in Telecom Italia' s licence. 
In  August  1996  the  government  issued  a  provisional  decree  setting  out  a  legislative 
framework  for  the  telecoms  sector.  This  decree  should  be  presented  to  the  Italian 
parliament and come into effect 90 days later, but this process is not yet complete.  The 
provisional  legislative  programme  translates  the  appropriate  European  legislation  and 
directives relating to  ONP  and  interconnection into  Italian law.  In terms  of universal 
service, the legislation will specify voice telephony and leased lines as  'obliged services'. 
Until this law comes into effect Telecom Italia is operating under the terms of  the existing 
legislation. 
Luxembourg 
P&T Luxembourg does not have a licence and currently has no legal obligations relating 
to universal service.  However, the new telecoms legislation is now being drafted which is 
expected to  become law in late  1996 or early  1997.  This law is  expected to  include a 
definition of universal service, although the exact definition is  still a matter of political 
debate. 
Basic telephony,  leased  lines  and  basic  rate  ISDN  are  available  to  all  customers  at  a 
uniform  price  throughout  Luxembourg.  This  is  governed  by commercial  law  which 
prevents providers of any national service from discriminating on the basis of subscriber 
location.  Call barring is available free  of charge to  all telephone subscribers.  Itemised 
billing is also available, for a monthly charge ofLF50.  At present itemised bills list every 
call, but a new system will soon be launched which is expected to allow different levels of 
itemisation.  The Ministry expects that the most basic level of  itemisation will be provided 
free  of charge.  P  &T  Luxembourg  provides  directory  and  operator  services,  although 
without obligation.  The operator regards them as essential aspects of the basic telephone 
service.  Directory  services  have  been outsourced  and  there  is  some  expectation  that 
operator services will also be outsourced to organisations outside the TO. 
The standard connection charge made by P&T Luxembourg is for delivery of a line to the 
edge of  a customer's property.  Extension of  the line into the property incurs an additional 
charge and may either be carried out by the operator or a private contractor. 
Analy_sys ___________________  _ Page 22  Analysys Final Report  for DGXIIIIAJ 
Mandatory  quality  of service  standards  for  connection  and  fault  repair  times  may  be 
specified under the  expected telecoms legislation;  at present no  such standards  are  laid 
down.  However,  the  PTT  currently  expects  to  repair  faults  satisfactorily  within  five 
working days of  notification by the customer.  This quality of service measure is the basis 
of a compensation  scheme  which results  in  the  reimbursement  of the  quarterly  rental 
charge  if requested by the  customer.  The  Ministry does  not  believe  it  is  necessary  to 
impose technical quality standards, as the telephone network is 100% digitalised. 
The Netherlands 
The  1989  Communications  Act  does  not  contain  any  specific  obligations  relating  to 
universal service.  However, the law discusses the notion of concessions which co-exist 
with the  exclusive rights  bestowed on  the  PTT.  The  concessions  require  the  PTT  to 
provide voice  telephony  (including  itemised billing)  at  uniform  tariffs,  and  to  provide 
leased lines.  There is no obligation to provide operator services.  The 1989 Act and the 
1996 Interim Telecommunications Act (passed on 1 July) are subject to revision; a new 
Act  is  likely to  be passed in  July  1997,  to  come  into  effect for  1 January  1998.  It is 
intended that the new act will change the nature of the concessions regime laid down in 
the 1989 Act, and set out clear definitions of  universal service and its funding. 
The PTT defines its own quality of service measures, and has to  report annually to  the 
Concessions Board.  The  main criteria for  quality of service are  expressed in terms of 
repair times and 'delivery' times for new services (with next day connections required for 
new lines). 
Portugal 
Portuguese telecoms  law  (40/95, passed in February  1995)  laid down the basis for  the 
formation of Portugal Telecom from the telephone companies which previously operated 
in Portugal.  This law obliges Portugal Telecom to provide a universal service throughout 
Portugal without preference or discrimination, and covers basic telephony, a national help 
number for  customers,  access  to  information services  and  emergency services,  and the 
publication and distribution of telephone directories for fixed telephone and telex services. 
Article  14 of the law also  stipulates that leased lines  and packet switched data network 
services must be provided when requested.  Other documents relating to universal service 
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are a convention signed on 20 December 1994 on the pricing of telecoms services and an 
agreement on quality standards made between the regulator and Portugal Telecom.
4 
The 1995 law also describes how Portugal Telecom is compensated for the costs it incurs 
in providing universal service.  At present, Portugal Telecom is entitled to recover most of 
its costs from its customers, via the tariffs levied for its services. The law also provides for 
allowances which can be made to Portugal Telecom to reduce the monopoly rents it pays 
to  the Portuguese government.  As part of this process Portugal Telecom is obliged to 
demonstrate its universal service costs to  the regulator.  Article 32 of the law describes 
how, in a future competitive market, the costs of universal service could be borne by all 
players, through the mechanism of a universal service fund.  The law does not describe 
how this should be done. 
The quality of  service targets which Portugal Telecom has agreed with the regulator cover 
network infrastructure improvement as  well as  maximum times  for  installation of main 
lines, percentage of calls successfully completed, frequency of main line faults,  speed of 
fault repair, maximum acceptable levels of billing complaints, and a variety of technical 
indicators relating to  network performance.  The concession contract describes penalties 
for failure to meet the specified quality standards in the form of  maximum price variations 
and  fines.  Quality of service  targets  also  exist  for  telex,  telegraph  and switched data 
services. 
Spain 
Universal service provision in Spain is covered by a number of  administrative documents: 
•  Law  31/1987
5  grants  Telef6nica  monopoly  rights  in  return  for  universal  service 
obligations. 
•  The Telef6nica concession contract of January  1992  sets out quality of service and 
coverage targets. 
•  The  National  Telecommunications  Plan
6  sets  out  investment  programmes  for  the 
development  of telecoms  services  in  rural  areas.  The  current  "Rural  Telephone 
Extension Programme" is planned to be completed by the end of 1996. 
4  Convention signed between the General Directorate of Competition and Prices - Communications Institute of Portugal (ICP), 
Portugal Telecom and Companhia Portuguesa Radio Marconi. 
Ley de Ordenaci6n de Telecomunicaciones [LOT] as amended by Law 3211992. 
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In addition, all special tariff schemes for specific groups of  citizens must be authorised by 
the government.  A consultancy study is currently being conducted which involves a wide-
ranging review of universal service regulations in Spain.  The results of this study should 
be known in 1997. 
Following completion of  the Rural Telephone Extension Programme (planned for the end 
of 1996) Telef6nica will be obliged to provide a line at standard tariffs to any household in 
the Spanish territory.  Telef6nica is obliged to provide leased lines, X25  and ISDN on a 
non-discriminatory basis at standard tariffs and on standard terms and conditions.  In 1993 
Telef6nica  voluntarily  promised  to  provide  itemised  billing  free  of  charge  to  all 
households by 1998; by the end of 1995 itemised billing was available to around 65% of 
all lines.  There are no obligations on Telef6nica to provide call barring, and it has made 
no voluntary announcements on this issue. 
There is  no  explicit funding  mechanism for  universal  service,  with financing  currently 
provided via the cross-subsidy which is implicit in Telef6nica's tariff structure.  The brief 
for the consultancy study referred to earlier implies that the Spanish government currently 
favours  the  use  of a  managed  fund  to  collect  and  distribute  the  net  cost  of universal 
service. 
Until the Rural Telephone Extension Programme is completed, special arrangements apply 
to  non-urban  areas  whereby  Telef6nica  can  levy  a  higher-than-standard  (though  cost-
based)  charge  for  the  installation  and  rental  of a  basic  telephony  line.  Once  the 
Programme is completed, uniform tariffs will apply. 
Telef6nica normally provides a network termination point inside the customer premises, 
and bears the cost of in-building wiring.  This is not a legal obligation, however, and in 
theory Telef6nica could choose to terminate the access line at the edge of the property or 
the edge of  a building. 
The  only  published  quality  standards  are  those  specified  in  Telef6nica's  concession 
contract (in 1995 the mean times achieved were three days for installation of a line and 
seven  hours  to  repair  a  fault).  Where  quality  standards  are  not  met,  compensation 
available for customers includes rental discounts if  Telef6nica fails to repair a fault within 
6  The National Telecommunications Plan (NTP) is the government's planning instrument which forecasts investments to be made 
by Telef6nica in the network.  It is a series of four-year projections.  The NTP should be seen as more of a government planning 
tool than a regulatory edict.  Telef6nica is not bound by the investment parameters outlined in the NTP, nor are there any direct 
enforcement provisions contained in the document. 
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6 days.  If  Telefonica fails to install a line within 20 days then it provides a free telephone 
handset to  the customer.  There are  no  published quality standards  covering clarity of 
speech or speed of  data connection. 
Sweden 
Universal service is not imposed by legislation in Sweden, but is a condition of Telia's 
operating  licence which was  granted in October  1994.  Provision  1.1  states  that  Telia 
"shall on similar conditions provide telephony  services  to  a  fixed  connection point to 
anyone who requests such a service".  As well as the licence there also is a civil agreement 
between the Swedish government and Telia which governs issues such as  a price cap for 
services,  low-user  schemes,  and  provision  of public  payphones.  The  agreement  was 
signed in July  1993  and is  effective until 31  December 1996.  It states that Telia will 
receive no compensation for the costs imposed by universal service and is forbidden from 
including these costs when calculating interconnection charges. 
Annex 1 of Telia's licence relates to quality of service, and states that Telia must provide 
basic  telephony  services  at  a  level  of  quality  sufficient  to  allow  fax  and  data 
communications by modem  to  2400bit/s.  Services  such  as  outgoing  call  barring  and 
itemised  billing  are  available  to  customers  who  are  connected  to  digital  exchanges 
(currently 92% of lines).  Outgoing call barring is currently provided free of charge, and 
itemised billing is available for a small charge each billing period.  The connection charge 
paid by residential customers includes the location of  a telephone point anywhere in a new 
building.  Article 7 ofTelia's licence obliges it to provide directory enquiry services to the 
public.  It also provides operator services, but these are not subject to regulation. 
Telia  has  an  obligation  to  provide  public  payphones  in  Sweden.  An  annex  to  the 
agreement between Telia and the government lists those public payphones which must be 
provided  by  Telia.  There  is  no  procedure  under  the  agreement  for  adding  public 
payphones to  this list.  Telia has actually removed a small number of phones on the list, 
with the agreement of  the regulator. 
The charges for calls in individual call bands are uniform throughout Sweden.  However, 
rental  charges  do  vary  according  to  the  geographical  location of the  customer;  higher 
charges are imposed in the large cities, on the basis that customers can reach a much larger 
number of  users at local call rates.  Connection charges also vary, according to whether the 
line is to a main residence or a second residence: lines to a main residence are subject to a 
standard connection charge, but connection of  second residences can be subject to a higher 
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charge to reflect higher cost incurred by the operator.  Telia is obliged to provide analogue 
and digital leased lines in accordance with the terms of  the Leased Lines Directive. 
Annex  1  of Telia's  licence  contains  several  quality  of service  measures,  the  most 
important of  which are: 
•  Connection time for main lines to the main residence or place of business are not to 
exceed 17 days from the application for connection 
•  The delay between fault reporting and fault repair should not exceed two days,  and 
55% of  reported faults are to be dealt with within eight hours 
•  The rate of successful connections for  calls  during business hours  should normally 
exceed 98o/o, and must never fall below 96% for calls within a single local exchange. 
Under the compensation scheme associated with these quality of service measures, if a 
service quality level is not achieved the customer is entitled to a discount on the quarterly 
fee.  Telia is not obliged to provide compensation; the scheme is a voluntary arrangement 
designed to improve customer relations. 
UK 
Universal service is the subject of Conditions 1 and 2 of the licences issued by the UK 
government  to  BT  and  Kingston  Communications.  These  conditions  state  that  the 
operators must provide basic voice telephone services to all customers at a uniform price 
throughout their areas (according to interpretation of  condition 17), and explicitly confirm 
that this obligation covers rural areas.  The licences  also  impose obligations to  consult 
with the Director General of  Telecommunications on the supply of  telephone apparatus for 
the disabled and the deaf (including the provision of  at least one type of  telephone to assist 
hearing-impaired  people),  the  funding  of a  text  relay  service,  and  the  installation  of 
inductive couplers in all public call boxes (conditions 31 to 33). 
BT residential customers are entitled to compensation equivalent to  a month's rental for 
each day of loss  of service  over an  agreed period up  to  a maximum of £1000.  This 
compensation is available for  installation which is  not completed on the day agreed,  or 
fault repairs which are not completed by the end of the working day following the report 
of  the fault. 
The UK is currently proposing to  revise its definition of universal service,  extending it 
from "affordable access to basic voice telephony or its equivalent for all those reasonably 
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requesting  it  regardless  of  where  they  live"  to  "affordable  access  to  basic 
telecommunications services for all those reasonably requesting it regardless of  where they 
live". 
2.1.2  Affordability Issues 
Affordability of services  is  central to  the  concept of a universal  service.  This  section 
discusses three major issues relating to affordability: 
•  whether an initial deposit is required from the customer 
•  whether  discounts  on  services  are  available  to  people  considered  to  have  'special 
needs' 
•  the  nature  and  speed  of the  disconnection  process  which  comes  into  effect  when 
customers are unable to pay their bills. 
Many operators require a deposit from some or all of  their customers to insure against bad 
debts.  Deposits are requested from customers at the same time as payment of sometimes 
substantial  connection  charges,  and  the  combined  effect  is  to  deter  some  potential 
customers from subscribing to telephone services. 
The Member States and operators vary in their attitude towards tariff packages designed to 
ease the burden of telephone ownership for people who might have difficulty affording 
access to  the network under the same terms as  the majority of the population.  Member 
States can impose the burden of these schemes on the  operator as  part of its  universal 
service  obligations,  or  it  can  be  met  by  the  government  itself through  social  welfare 
budgets.  Occasionally, the operators offer such packages on a voluntary basis.  A variety 
of  special schemes exist: 
•  Low user schemes, where discounts (usually on line rental) are offered to customers 
whose use of the telephone is below a certain threshold.  For instance, a customer in 
France  will  receive  a rebate  on rental  if usage  in  a billing  period is  less  than 26 
telephone units.  These schemes are designed to ensure that the deterrent effect of the 
rental charge is reduced for those who  are not heavy users of the telephone.  These 
schemes may have income thresholds (as in Spain), or may be open to  all telephone 
users regardless of  income (as in the UK and France). 
•  Schemes for the disabled, where allowances are made for the special requirements of 
disabled  customers.  Where  such  schemes  exist,  they  usually  take  the  form  of 
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discounts  on  special  equipment  required,  such  as  teletype  terminals  for  the  deaf. 
Operators can also be required to allow communication between a customer using a 
teletype terminal and a customer with a normal telephone handset.  In the UK, users of 
teletype services receive a 60% discount on the call charge portion of their phone bill 
(up  to  a maximum of £160 per year) to  compensate for  the extra time required for 
communication in this way.  Schemes for visually impaired users include free access 
to directory enquiry services to compensate for their inability to use printed telephone 
directories. 
•  Schemes for  other groups such  as  the elderly or the unemployed, where special 
discounts  are  available  for  elderly  customers  who  live  alone  or families  on a  low 
income.  These schemes are funded from social welfare budgets more often than low-
user schemes or schemes for the disabled. 
The majority of  countries disconnect customers who fail to settle their bills, although there 
are  variations  in the  procedures  triggered  by non-payment  of the  bill  and  the  stages 
towards disconnection.  In Spain, France and Belgium the policy is to  implement  'soft 
disconnection' whereby all outgoing calls are barred until the bill is paid. 
The specific arrangements in each Member State are discussed below: 
Austria 
Affordability 
Billing 
There  is  no  explicit provision relating  to  the  affordability of 
services,  and  no  legal  definition  of affordability.  The  law 
obliges telephony and leased line tariffs to  be cost-orientated. 
In addition all  prices must be  approved by the Minister with 
responsibility for telecoms, who acts on advice from a telecoms 
pricing commission. 
OPT customers are normally billed every two months, although 
it  customers  prefer  they  can  be  billed  every  three  months. 
There is a facility for customers who have a digital line to be 
sent a warning letter when their bill exceeds a certain threshold. 
This  service  is  free  of charge  for  customers  who  accept  the 
default threshold for warning letters (ATSlO 000, ECU715); the 
charge for altering the threshold is ATS20 (ECU1.4). 
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Deposits 
Special tariff 
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Debtors and 
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Belgium 
Affordability 
Customers  are  not  required  to  pay  a  deposit  for  telephone 
servtce. 
There is no  special treatment for low users.  However, there is 
some provision for people on low incomes, such as students and 
the elderly.  It is the customer's responsibility to apply for these 
schemes, which are funded from social welfare budgets. 
A  customer  who  fails  to  pay  a  bill  receives  a  number  of 
reminders.  Eventually,  failure  to  pay  results  in  complete 
disconnection  from  the  network.  A  customer who  has  been 
disconnected  is  entitled  to  reconnection when  all  debts  have 
been  repaid,  with  no  obligation  to  pay  a  deposit  to  insure 
against future bad debts. 
There is  a settlement procedure  for  billing disputes,  although 
this  can  take  some  time  to  complete.  Customers  are  not 
disconnected  while  they  are  disputing  a  bill  with  the  OPT, 
provided  they  pay  a  sum  corresponding  to  their  typical 
telephone  expenditure.  If the  settlement  procedure  fails  to 
produce  a  mutually  acceptable  outcome,  the  dispute  can  be 
taken to the courts. 
Affordability is mentioned in the royal decree of October 1996, 
although only in the context of providing services to  schools, 
hospitals and public libraries, and there is no legal definition of 
affordability. 
In  future,  telephone  services  in Belgium will be  subject  to  a 
form of  price cap control.  The level of  the price cap has not yet 
been determined. 
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Belgacom' s  customers  receive  a  telephone  bill  every  two 
months.  It is possible for customers to obtain intermediate bills 
which only cover usage charges, with a minimum billing period 
of eight days.  A charge of BF150 (ECU3.8) is levied for each 
intermediate bill provided. 
Until June 1995 all Belgacom's customers were obliged to pay 
a deposit equivalent to two months' rental and usage payments, 
to insure Belgacom against non-payment of  bills.  This practice 
has  been discontinued  and  all  customers  are  currently having 
their deposits refunded over a 24-month period in the form of a 
rebate on each bi-monthly telephone bill. 
Article  18  of the  management  contract  between  the  Belgian 
State  and  Belgacom  allows  for  innovative  tariff schemes  for 
"social and humanitarian reasons". 
The most important of these reduced tariff packages is the  social 
telephone rate.  This tariff is  available to people aged 65  and over 
who live alone or with up  to  two other people, and to  people with 
disabilities who  are deemed to  be at least 66% incapacitated.  The 
social telephone rate provides reductions  on both connection  and 
rental  charges  (70%  and  50%  respectively),  and  includes  50  free 
units  in each two-month billing period  for  calls  within Belgium. 
Approximately 370 000 customers have benefited from this scheme, 
equivalent  to  just  over  8%  of  all  connections  (business  and 
residential). 
The  royal  decree  on universal  service of October  1996  states 
that customers who  cannot pay their telephone bill should not 
be disconnected from the telephone network.  Where a customer 
can  demonstrate  hardship,  outgoing  calls  are  barred  but 
incoming  calls  are  allowed,  as  well  as  access  to  emergency 
services and toll free  numbers.  Customers who refuse to  pay 
(i.e.  cannot  demonstrate  financial  hardship  as  the  reason  for 
failure to pay) are disconnected from the network. 
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Denmark 
Affordability 
Billing 
Deposits 
Special tariff 
schemes 
There  is  no  formal  definition  of affordability,  but  existing 
policy  is  intended  to  provide  the  "best  and  cheapest 
telecommunications  services  in  the  world".  Downward 
pressure on prices is seen as one of  the keys ways of  improving 
affordability. 
The  standard arrangement is  for  customers to  be billed every 
three  months,  but  customers  have  the  option  of receiving 
monthly bills.  Tele  Danmark  can  charge  for  more  frequent 
billing. 
Provision  exists  for  deposits  to  be  charged if for  any  reason 
Tele Danmark believes that a consumer may not be able to meet 
his obligations. 
Until recently, Danish telecoms legislation prohibited discrim-
inatory  pricing,  and  no  low-user  schemes  are  currently 
available.  However, the new telecoms legislation which came 
into effect in July 1996 allows discounts to  be offered for low 
users, and it is likely that Tele Danmark will introduce such a 
scheme because of the  associated public relations benefits:  at 
present, Tele Danmark is piloting a low-user scheme.  There are 
no  other schemes  for  offering reduced bills.  Schemes  which 
reduce prices for users who can be served at lower cost to  the 
operator are allowed by the regulator, but no  scheme has been 
introduced by Tele Danmark. 
Text phones are available for the deaf,  at  charges similar to  those 
for an ordinary telephone.  A relay service is also provided where a 
Tele  Danmark  employee  acts  as  an  interface  between  a  text 
telephone  and  an  ordinary  phone.  This  service  is  provided  at 
normal usage rates. 
_Analy_sys ___________________  _ Page32 
Debtors and 
disconnection 
Finland 
Affordability 
Billing 
Deposits 
Special tariff 
schemes 
Analysys Final Report for DGXIIIIAJ 
Customers  who  fail  to  pay  outstanding  bills  are  completely 
disconnected, usually about six weeks after the initial bill and 
four  weeks  after a reminder letter.  Access  to  the network is 
restored on repayment of the debt (or agreement on a schedule 
for repayment) plus a reconnection fee of  approximately £20. 
Tele Danmark distinguishes between those customers who have 
been disconnected (i.e. because of unpaid bills) and those with 
whom the contract has been terminated.  Where a contract has 
been terminated a customer is  treated as  a new customer and 
must both settle any outstanding debts in full  and pay another 
connection fee before service can be restored. 
There  is  no  formal  definition  of affordability  in  Finland. 
However,  according to  section 22  of the Telecommunications 
Act, the Ministry of Transport and Communications can issue 
specific rules on tariffs if the needs of customers are not well 
served. 
Customers are  able to  establish credit limits with their service 
provider  and/or  pay  for  services  in  advance.  However, 
customers do not have a legal right to this service. 
Operators  in Finland do  not require  deposits  from  customers 
although they have the right to do  so.  They can agree a credit 
limit with customers, to reduce their exposure to bad debts, and 
can also ask customers to demonstrate in advance their ability to 
pay their telephone bills. 
There are no low-user schemes in Finland.  Special services for 
the  disabled,  specifically for  users with impaired hearing,  are 
financed from the government's social welfare budgets. Around 
FIM 3 million (around ECU500 000) are granted to this form of 
support  which  includes  some  support  for  the  text  phone 
exchange. 
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Debtors and 
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France 
Affordability 
Billing 
Deposits 
Operators can disconnect a customer when: 
•  the customer fails to pay for telephone services 
•  bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated against the account 
holder. 
If a  customer  can  demonstrate  that  non-payment  is  a  result  of 
illness,  unemployment  or  another  related  reason  then  a  further 
month is allowed for settlement of  the debt. 
In the case of non-payment disconnection is not allowed in any of 
the following cases: 
the bill is paid within two weeks of  payment being requested 
11  the payable bill does not exceed FIM300 
111  the  user  disagrees  with  the  level  of the  bill  but  pays  that 
proportion of  the charges which are not in dispute 
tv  the  operator has  failed  to  follow  the  due  procedures  prior to 
disconnection. 
The  definition  of universal  servtce  contained  in  the  1996 
Telecommunications Bill states that telephony services must be 
provided at an affordable price.  However, the bill includes no 
definition of  the term affordability. 
Residential  customers  of France  Telecom  currently receive  a 
bill every two months.  It is not possible to change this billing 
frequency  nor  is  it  possible  to  agree  a  limit  on  telephone 
spending in a billing period.  France Telecom does  not warn 
customers of unusually large telephone usage before the end of 
a billing period. 
France Telecom's customers are not required to pay deposits. 
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France Telecom's low-user scheme takes the form  of a rebate 
on the subscription tariff.  The rebate applies to users who make 
a small number of  calls in a billing period (fewer than 26 units). 
A line which makes no calls at all in a billing period does not 
receive  the  rebate;  this  is  to  ensure  that  telephones  in places 
such as lifts do not qualify for the rebate. 
Connection charges are waived for people aged over 65 who qualify 
for  certain benefits.  Injured war veterans  or Resistance members 
receive 50% discounts  on rental and 40  free  units per month.  In 
addition,  the visually impaired qualify for  free  access  to  directory 
enqutnes. 
The  1996  Telecommunications  Bill  foresees  the  introduction  of 
additional schemes, particularly those targeted at low-income users. 
When France Telecom's customers have  difficulty paying for 
telephone services, they can contact the operator to  arrange an 
instalment plan for repayment of the debt.  As a way of reduc-
ing  their  future  exposure  to  debt,  customers  can  also  request 
restrictions on the service available to  them (e.g.  the ability to 
make local calls only, national calls only, or no outgoing calls). 
The  1996 Telecommunications Bill states that in the event of non 
payment,  a minimum service should be maintained,  so  that  some 
categories of debtor who  have been identified as  facing  financial 
difficulty can continue receive calls and make calls to free services 
and emergency services for a period of  one year. 
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The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  requtres  universal 
services  to  be  made  available  at  an  affordable  price.  A 
mechanism  will  be  established  to  protect  customers  in  areas 
where the cost of  providing telephone services is high. This will 
involve defining the maximum amount which can be paid by a 
'typical customer' (defined by typical calling patterns) for basic 
telephone  services  from  1  January  1998  onwards  to  be  the 
amount which that customer would have paid for those services 
on 31  December 1997.  From 1 January 1998, operators will be 
able  to  offer  services  at  a  price  lower  than  this  limit;  the 
discount will vary depending on the costs of  providing service. 
Residential  customers  of Deutsche  Telekom  are  billed  each 
month.  There is  no  possibility of agreeing a different billing 
frequency.  There is  also no  option for  agreeing a credit limit 
with  Deutsche  Telekom  which  would  limit  expenditure  on 
telephone services in a billing period. 
Deutsche  Telekom  does  not  charge  its  customers  deposits 
although it has the right to do so if  it chooses. 
There is no  scheme for low users in Germany, despite support 
for such a scheme from the Ministry.  Deutsche Telekom is only 
willing to offer discounts for high-volume users and in the form 
of 'friends  and  family'  schemes.  There  is  a  reduced  tariff 
scheme  for  elderly,  disabled  and  low  income  groups.  These 
special groups receive a DM5  reduction on rental charges and 
30  units  free  of charge  per month.  All  assistance  which  is 
available is funded voluntarily by Deutsche Telekom. 
When a customer fails  to  pay a bill,  a warning is  issued,  and 
continued failure to pay results in disconnection. 
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There  is  no  mention of affordability  of telecoms  services  in 
Greek law or in OTE's operating licence.  Tariffs are entirely at 
the  discretion  of OTE.  Although  the  government  has  no 
explicit  control  of tariffs,  it  does  appoint  (and has  power to 
remove) the Director General of  OTE. 
There is no mechanism for  customers to  agree  financial  limits 
on telephone expenditure with OTE. 
OTE requires deposits from  all new customers.  This a matter 
for  OTE  and  is  not  subject  to  regulation  by the  Ministry  of 
Communications. 
There is no low-user scheme in Greece. 
No special provision is made to improve access to the telephone 
network  by  disabled  users.  However,  specific  provision  is 
made for blind users; under Law No.  2257 (1994) they receive 
150 units of calls per month free  of charge on their first main 
line  subscription.  Employees  of OTE  receive  300  units  of 
telephone usage free each month. 
A  scheme  is  currently  being  considered  for  organisations  to 
negotiate  special tariffs  from  OTE.  Any  discount  granted  in 
this  way  is  entirely  at  the  discretion  of OTE,  provided  that 
general competition regulations are observed. 
A  customer  who  fall  into  arrears  are  given  a  number  of 
warnings.  Customers are only disconnected from the network if 
their arrears  are  more  than Dr15 000  (ECU50).  This  discon-
nection is temporary and customers can be reconnected if they 
repay their debt within six months of disconnection.  However, 
customers  who  fail  to  clear  their  debt  within  this  time  are 
permanently disconnected from the network. 
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All tariff increases planned by Telecom Eireann are  currently 
subject to  the  approval  of the Minister for  Transport,  Energy 
and  Communications.  Once  the  independent  regulator  is  in 
place (expected by the end of 1996) Telecom Eireann's prices 
will be subject to a price cap regime. 
Telecom Eireann' s residential  customers  are  billed every two 
months.  There are no exceptions to this billing frequency. 
Telecom Eireann does  not generally require  deposits  from  its 
customers. 
There is no explicit low-user scheme.  However, all subscribers 
who  are  in receipt of an old age pension or disability pension 
and live alone have their line rental charges paid by the Depart-
ment of Social  Welfare.  Subscribers  who  do  not  live  alone 
may, at the discretion of  the Department of Social Welfare, also 
have  their  rental  paid  in  special  circumstances  (elderly  and 
infirm couples, elderly couples who  live more than a specified 
distance  from  a public  telephone,  elderly  people  living  with 
others all under the age of 18). 
The  operator  does  not  subsidise  special  equipment  for  the  deaf 
(Minicom), although VAT refunds are available from social welfare 
funding.  Because  this  type  of communication is  slow,  users  are 
given a discount of 70%  on usage  charges  (subject  to  an  annual 
maximum of IR£162 [ECU206]).  This scheme is administered by 
the National Association for the Deaf.  Directory enquiry services 
are provided free of  charge for the visually impaired. 
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Customers  who  fail  to  pay  their  bills  may  ultimately  be 
disconnected, although the procedure for non-payment goes to 
some lengths to try to avoid disconnection.  Users have the right 
to  be reconnected once they have cleared their arrears but are 
charged  a  reconnection  fee  of IR£15  (ECU18).  Telecom 
Eireann does not generally seek a deposit from customers who 
have  previously  defaulted  on  payment,  although  in  a  small 
number  of cases  it  may  require  a  deposit  or  other  form  of 
security. 
There  is  no  explicit  definition  of  affordability  tn  Italian 
legislation. 
Customers  are  billed  every  two  months  and  no  variation  is 
possible. 
All Telecom Italia customers are required to pay a deposit when 
they are connected to the network. 
Telecom Italia operates a low-user scheme.  Low-user rental is 
L8300 (ECU4.3) per month, a discount of L4550 (ECU2.3) on 
the  normal  subscription.  The  first  50  units  per  month  are 
charged  at  L50  (ECU  0.023)  per unit,  the  next  60  are  L346 
(ECU  0.18)  per  unit,  and  all  subsequent  units  are  L127 
(ECU0.066) per unit.  The scheme is available to all customers 
upon request. 
At present, Telecom Italia makes no provision for the disabled, but 
this  issue  has  been  the  subject  of political  discussion.  Before 
addressing the issue of access for the disabled, the Italian Ministry 
is waiting for the Commission to make its position clear on this and 
other matters. 
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Customers  who  fail  to  pay  their bill  are  given  a number  of 
warnings.  Continued  failure  to  pay  results  in  complete 
disconnection from the network.  Disconnected customers have 
the right to be reconnected when they have settled their arrears 
in full. 
There  is  no  explicit  definition  of  or  control  over  the 
affordability of telecoms services in Luxembourg, although all 
price  changes  for  voice  telephony  services  are  subject  to 
government approval. 
All  residential  customers  receive  monthly  bills  from  P&T 
Luxembourg.  No  other  billing  periods  are  available  for 
residential customers.  It is not possible to agree financial limits 
on telephony usage in a billing period, although customers are 
able to  find  out how much is  owing on their bill at  any time 
during the billing period. 
Customers with a history of  poor payment of  telephone bills can 
be  asked  to  pay  a  deposit  to  insure  against  future  payment 
difficulties.  However,  Luxembourg consumer law means that 
customers  cannot  be  required  to  pay  a  deposit.  In  fact, 
customers  do  sometimes pay the  deposit as  this  can result in 
faster reconnection to the network. 
There is no  low-user scheme in Luxembourg, the main justifi-
cation being that the basic telephone tariffs "are still very low". 
P&T Luxembourg provides special equipment to allow disabled 
people  to  communicate  over  the  telephone  network.  This 
equipment is  funded by the TO  or by social security funding, 
with assessment on a case-by-case basis. 
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Customers who fail to pay their bill are sent a reminder.  If no 
action is then taken, the TO institutes court proceedings under 
Luxembourg's  consumer protection  laws.  The  court  tries  to 
find  a way for  the customer to  pay the  amount owing and  so 
remain  connected to  the  network.  If the  court cannot  find  a 
solution,  the  TO  is  free  to  disconnect  the  customer.  The 
customer  is  entitled  to  be  reconnected  on  repayment  of the 
arrears, but can be asked for a deposit to cover future payment 
difficulties. 
There  is  no  formal  definition of affordability.  However,  the 
general position adopted is  that improvements in affordability 
are achieved through price controls which prevent prices from 
increasing at a rate equal or greater than inflation. 
Customers  are  not  able  to  vary  the  billing  terms  which  are 
defined by the PTT, nor can they establish financial credits with 
the PTT. 
Deposits are  not required from  customers.  A history of poor 
payment or credit risk is not seen as justification for payment of 
a deposit. 
Low-user schemes are not allowed, as  they are seen as  giving 
preferential access to  one group of customers over others; the 
1989  Communications Act would need to  be amended before 
such a scheme could be introduced.  However,  some  form  of 
discretionary support is available for disabled users, through the 
Ministry of Social Affairs.  This support is for the purchase of 
special  equipment,  and  does  not provide tariff subsidies.  No 
schemes are available to help groups such as the elderly. 
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If a  customer  is  unable  to  pay  a  telephone  bill  and  all 
possibilities for payment have been exhausted, the customer is 
disconnected from  the  network.  Before the  customer can be 
reconnected, all debts must be settled and the standard connec-
tion fee must be paid; in effect, the customer is treated as a new 
customer. 
There  is  no  legal  definition  of  affordability  for  telecoms 
services in Portugal. 
Residential customers are billed monthly by Telecom Portugal; 
no other arrangements are possible. 
Portugal Telecom does not require deposits from its customers. 
It is, however, entitled to ask for deposits if  it so chooses. 
Portuguese  law  (40/95  passed  in  February  1995)  obliges 
Portugal  Telecom to  provide  special  discounts  for  vulnerable 
customers  such  as  pensioners.  Pensioners  whose  income  is 
below the national minimum wage receive a 60% discount on 
line  rental  and  25  free  units  of telephone  usage  per month. 
Portugal Telecom is also obliged to provide special equipment 
for  disabled  customers  with  special  needs  (such  as  inductive 
couplers for users with impaired hearing). 
A  customer who  has  failed  to  pay  a  telephone  bill  is  given 
warnings that the debt is outstanding.  If  these warnings are not 
heeded and the customer fails to contact Portugal Telecom, the 
line  is  fully  disconnected.  When  the  debt  is  cleared  the 
customer can be reconnected to the telephone network. 
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There is no administrative definition of  affordability, although a 
definition is expected to be established during  1997 following 
completion  of  the  consultancy  review  which  is  currently 
underway. 
Residential customers are billed every two months.  Customers 
cannot  agree  limits  on  their  telephone  expenditure  with 
Telef6nica. 
Telef6nica only requires deposits from  customers who have  a 
history of non-payment of  phone bills, non-residents and under 
other  special  limited  circumstances.  Telefonica's  policy  on 
deposits is subject to regulation by the Spanish Government. 
There are no  low-user schemes.  People who  are in receipt of 
retirement or disability pensions and whose pensions and phone 
usage are both below the stated thresholds, receive discounts on 
installation  and  rental  charges  (but  not  on  call  charges). 
Tariffs for other services are used to fund these discounts. 
20 days  after the  deadline  for  settling  a bill,  Telefonica may 
suspend service,  although typically it only suspends outgoing 
calls.  Thereafter, Telef6nica may serve customers with a notice 
warning  that  the  contract  will  be  cancelled  within  10  days. 
Before  customers  are  reconnected,  they  must  settle  all 
outstanding bills and associated penalties and pay a reconnec-
tion charge.  In some cases, Telef6nica also requires payment of 
a deposit. 
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There is  no  explicit reference to  the  affordability of universal 
services in Sweden.  The topic is currently being discussed as 
part of  the debate in advance of new telecoms legislation which 
is expected in mid-1997.  However, no definition of affordabil-
ity has yet been agreed.  Article 2 of  the agreement between the 
Swedish government and Telia imposes a price cap of RPI-1% 
on some ofTelia's charges for domestic customers. 
Telia's  residential  customers  are  normally  billed  every  three 
months, although the billing frequency is flexible and bills can 
be  issued  at  any  reasonable  frequency  requested  by  the 
customer. 
The  idea  of agreeing  credit  limits  for  customers  has  been 
discussed but this option is not yet available.  Telia does offer a 
facility for customers to be sent a warning if their expenditure 
in a billing period exceeds an agreed threshold.  This threshold 
is normally SKr5000 (ECU600), but a different threshold can be 
agreed between the customer and Telia. 
Where Telia deems  that  a new  customer is  not credit-worthy 
(following a standard credit check), it can ask the customer to 
pay a deposit of up to  SKr5000 (ECU 600), although the level 
of the deposit is  usually set in accordance with expected call 
patterns.  The  deposit  regime  is  determined  exclusively  by 
Telia,  although  it  is  subject  to  Sweden's  general  consumer 
legislation. 
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The  agreement  between  Telia  and  the  Swedish  government 
specifies that there must be a low-user tariff for Telia custom-
ers.  The  exact nature of the tariff is  left up  to  Telia, but the 
rental tariff must be reduced by at least 30% and there must be 
no  charge  for  converting  to  this  tariff.  The  agreement  does 
allow Telia to raise usage charges. 
The  low-user  scheme  chosen  by  Telia  offers  a  discount  on 
rental charges of SK.rlOO  (ECU12) per quarter?  Call charges 
are double the normal rate.  If  a customer makes a large number 
of calls and the resulting bill is  SKr50 (ECU6) or more higher 
than  the  bill  for  a  normal  telephone  user,  the  bill  is 
automatically  recalculated  at  the  standard  tariff,  plus  an 
additional charge ofSKr50. 
Telia's licence obliges it to provide a free directory enquiry service 
to  disabled  customers  who  are  unable  to  use  standard  telephone 
directories.  It must also provide intermediary telephony services for 
speech/text  communication  at  the  same  price  as  communication 
made  directly  between  users.  Telia  receives  a  'cost-orientated 
compensation'  for  providing these  services  for  the  disabled.  The 
compensation is paid by the Swedish government via the regulator. 
If a  customer  is  unable  to  pay  a  telephone  bill  and  all 
possibilities for payment have been exhausted, the customer is 
disconnected from the network.  A customer normally receives 
one warning and one final  demand before disconnection.  The 
procedure  was  devised  by  Telia  and  is  not  regulated.  No 
attempt is made to distinguish customers who cannot pay from 
those who are simply unwilling to pay.  Some years ago  Telia 
experimented  with  a  scheme  whereby  customers  who  were 
disconnected could still receive calls,  but the  experiment was 
discontinued because it was not possible to provide this scheme 
everywhere. 
The amount of  rental discount has remained constant over recent years, while rental charges have increased steeply as tariffs are 
rebalanced. 
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There is no formal position on affordability in the UK, but the 
regulator  Oftel  is  considering  two  schemes  which  explicitly 
address  the  issue  of affordability,  either  by  increasing  the 
degree  of  control  or  spreading  the  costs  of  telecoms 
expenditure.  Oftel's  view  is  that  affordability  is  a  "relative 
concept", in that as long as the cost of services falls relative to 
the  retail  price  index,  there  is  an  increase  in  affordability  of 
telephone services. 
B  T bills are issued every three months, although customers can 
request monthly billing. Oftel is  encouraging the development 
of  credit limits and 'call my bill' services. 
In July 1996 BT introduced a scheme whereby new customers 
can agree  credit limits  on their telephone  expenditure  for  the 
first  year of connection.  A  standard credit limit of £100 per 
quarter is available to  all new customers, and those who agree 
to  this  limit will  not be asked  for  deposits.  Customers who 
require a higher credit limit are subject to a credit check.  If  the 
credit check is satisfactory a higher credit limit will be agreed; 
otherwise, the customer will be asked to pay a deposit. 
The provision of a low-user scheme is required by the licence 
held by BT.  For every £0.01  by which usage charges incurred 
in any one quarter fall  below £10.80 (ECU13.5), the customer 
receives  a  rebate  of £0.01235.  Thus  the  maximum  rebate 
payable is £13.34 (ECU16.36) per quarter.  Where call charges 
exceed £10.80 (ECU13.25) no  rebate is  payable and  calls  are 
charged at the normal rate. 
Customers  are  eligible  for  the  low-user  scheme  1n  any  of the 
following situations: 
•  their call charges have been under £10.80 (ECU 13.25) for the 
last four quarters 
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•  due  to  a change  in circumstances  they believe  that  their  call 
charges  will  be  lower  than  £10.80  (ECU 13.25)  for  the  next 
three quarters 
•  they are a new customer and believe that their call charges will 
be less than £10.80 (ECU 13.25) for the next three quarters. 
Customers who qualify under the first condition are invited to join 
the scheme on the first occasion they qualify.  Customers with call 
charges of more than £15  (ECU18.4) on three successive bills are 
automatically removed from the scheme. 
Terms of access for the disabled are described in the licences issued 
to BT.  Textphones are available for use by deaf customers, and a 
relay service allows communication between a deaf person using a 
textphone and a hearing person using an ordinary telephone.  The 
relay service is  funded by BT and operated by the Royal National 
Institute  for  the  Deaf.  Customers  with  visual  impairment  are 
entitled to  free  directory  enquiry calls.  Licence holders  have  an 
obligation to advise the regulator on matters affecting disabled and 
the elderly. 
Oftel  is  currently  holding  discussions  with  the  industry  on 
mechanisms for implementing tariff schemes which combine rental 
and usage charges. 
Failure to pay a bill within three weeks results in a reminder bill 
being sent to the customer.  Failure to pay within ten days of  the 
reminder may lead to disconnection from the network.  In some 
cases,  BT will  attempt  to  contact  the  customer by telephone 
before disconnection but does not guarantee to do so. 
Customers who have been disconnected due to  failure to pay their 
telephone bill are only reconnected once they have paid all arrears 
plus a reconnection charge. 
Oftel believes that there are too many disconnections, and favours 
the use of soft disconnection (whereby disconnected users are still 
able to  receive calls).  The regulator does not have power to force 
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the  introduction  of  such  a  policy  but  can  propose  licence 
amendments to do this if  necessary. 
Table 2.1  summarises our discussion of the arrangements for universal service within the 
Member States of the EU, covering both the nature of universal service and affordability 
Issues. 
TABLE 2.1:  Summary of  Universal Service Components in the EU 
NBED  wp84 
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2.2  UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
The development of universal service is an issue of global importance at the moment as 
telecoms markets liberalise.  Given the level of debate on universal service world-wide, it 
is instructive to look at some examples of  the implementation of  universal service outside 
the EU.  The experiences of  five other countries were studied as part of  this project: 
•  Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, all countries which are likely to join the EU 
in the short to medium term 
•  New Zealand, which has the most liberal telecoms market in the world 
•  the USA where a vigorous debate over universal service is currently being conducted, 
following the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
2.2.1  Central Europe 
Interviews were undertaken with the regulatory agencies in Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary.  The  legal basis  for  universal  service  is  typically set  out in the national 
Telecommunications  Act  and  the  detail  of the  policy  is  articulated  in  the  contracts, 
concession  agreements  and/or  licences  which  govern  the  actual  delivery  of telecoms 
services.  The basic policy framework for universal service in these countries is broadly 
similar  to  that  within  the  EU,  with  the  focus  of provision  on  voice  telephony  with 
geographically-averaged prices.  The main issues connected with universal service in these 
countries relate to ensuring the rapid deployment of additional network resources in order 
to satisfy the substantial existing demand (evident in waiting lists of  up to 100 months). 
Hungary 
The term  'universal service obligation'  does  not exist officially in Hungarian laws  and 
decrees.  The  function  is  covered  and  regulated  in  'concession  contracts'  between 
operators  and  the  government.  Lines  are  supplied  either  by MATAV  (the  principal 
operator), which has an exclusive licence to provide telephony services in 36 of the  51 
'primary areas' into which the country was divided at the time of  de-regulation in 1994, or 
by one of 12  local telephone operators (LTOs) which cover the remaining  15  'primary 
areas'.  MAT  A  V accounts for approximately 80% of  lines in service. 
The  concession  contracts  each  run  for  25  years,  during  the  first  eight  of which  the 
concession holder  enjoys  exclusive  rights  to  provide  telephony  services.  MAT  A  V  is 
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required to provide long-distance and international service throughout the country and to 
L  TOs  at  non-discriminatory  rates.  The  LTOs  are  also  required  to  provide  universal 
telephone  service  in their  areas.  Operators  do  not  receive  any  subsidy  in  return  for 
providing universal telephone service, but they do receive exclusive rights. 
MATAV's universal service obligations include the provision of a basic telephony line 
capable of making and receiving all types of calls; capable of fax  and data transmission; 
and which has access to emergency services, operator services and directory enquiries (at 
local call rates).  Itemised billing is also included as standard.  However, single party (i.e. 
not  shared)  service  is  not  provided  as  standard:  shared  lines  are  about  4%  of lines 
(concentrated in Budapest) although the trend now is towards single party service, and no 
new shared lines are being offered.  Shared service is tolerated by the regulator because it 
is  currently the  only way  of extending  telephone  penetration  in  areas  where  the  local 
switches are full.  Touch tone dialling is only available on lines which are connected to a 
digital exchange.  X25 data services are provided at uniform tariff throughout the country, 
but there is no requirement to  make Internet access,  leased lines,  and ISDN available at 
uniform tariffs. 
In  addition  to  setting  out  the  services  to  be  provided  to  all  subscribers,  MAT  A  V'  s 
concession  contract  contains  clauses  on  non-discrimination  (which  effectively  ensure 
uniform  tariffs  throughout the  country),  on  accounting  separation (designed to  prevent 
cross-subsidies) and on prohibiting anti-competitive practices.  The LTOs have the same 
basic contractual conditions as  MAT  A  V, but there are  some variations in the conditions 
regarding extra services (usually services not related directly with basic telephony). 
Subscribers can be charged a higher-than-standard price for  a telephone line because of 
where they live, but fewer than 1% of prospective customers actually do  have to pay "a 
little higher" than standard tariffs.  They are  all  located in remote  areas,  mostly in the 
northern hilly region.  The amount they have to pay is based on cost and is determined on 
a case-by-case basis.  The Ministry is taking action to change this arrangement and hopes 
that by the start of 1997 tariffs will be uniform throughout the country.  The normal tariff 
for  the  installation of a telephone  line  covers cabling right up  to  the termination point 
inside the subscriber's property. 
Public  telephones  are  provided  by  all  licence  holders  throughout  the  country.  The 
concession contracts state that public payphones must be provided in all municipalities 
with a population greater than 100. 
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The telecommunications fund law (Law No. 54 of 1995) created a telecoms fund, which is 
entitled to  10% of state revenues from privatisation of MAT  A  V plus 70% of concession 
fees,  fees  for the use of radio frequencies, any fines levied by the regulator on operators 
who  breach  the  conditions  of their  concession  contracts  and  some  international  aid. 
According  to  the  fund's  rules,  at  least  90%  of annual  expenses  must  be  used  for 
development of the telecoms market.  The government is currently considering proposals 
to change the means by which the fund is administered and the means by which funds are 
disbursed.  The ministry recognises that universal service obligations mean some losses 
(net costs) for the operators and the telecoms fund could be used to reimburse operators 
As far as  the future is concerned, the Ministry has a watching brief.  There are ongoing 
discussions within the  Ministry as  to  whether to  terminate MAT  A  V'  s  exclusive rights 
period earlier than the end of  2001.  Any curtailment of  MAT  A  V'  s exclusivity period will 
involve some kind ofbargain with MATAV.  The Ministry is examining whether or not to 
initiate negotiations on this point. 
In addition to internal discussions, it is watching EU universal service initiatives closely. 
Its thinking on the subject is still flexible and it is likely to follow whatever the European 
Union  does.  There  are  currently no  proposals  for  broadband  access  for  schools  and 
hospitals, or the extension of services for the disabled (teletype relay service for hard of 
hearing, etc.). 
An interesting development in the  Hungarian telecoms  market  is  the  extensive  use  of 
wireless local loop access by a number of operators there.  DECT and NMT  -900 systems 
have been used to  provide wireless  local  loop  in different parts of Hungary.  In  1995 
Motorola won a contract to supply MATA  V with a wireless local loop system capable of 
serving over 200 000  customers.  This is  currently being deployed and it is planned to 
have 700 000 customers in Budapest served by wireless local access by the end of 1997. 
This  is  a  good  example  of using  an  appropriate  technology  to  deliver  coverage  of 
telephone services in a rapid and cost effective manner. 
Waiting  time  targets  for  customers  are  written  into  the  concession  contracts  of both 
MAT  A  V and the L  TOs.  These targets stipulate that, by the end of 1996, 90% of  all orders 
for telephone lines must be dealt with within six months and 98% within 12 months.  The 
sanctions for failing to meet these targets are written into all of the concession contracts, 
and takes the form of fines, followed by legal action by the regulator against the offending 
operator. 
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Deposits are not required for telephone service.  Operators do  not offer special tariffs to 
low users,  pensioners or other types  of customers who  may have difficulty paying for 
telephone service.  No  state  aid is provided to  such groups.  As  far  as  the Ministry is 
aware, operators do not have any special offerings targeted at disabled people in order to 
improve their access to telecoms.  However, MATAV does contribute to a 'social fund' 
which provides certain limited financial aid to people with sight or hearing problems on a 
case-by-case basis.  Such help is not given automatically.  All concession companies must 
provide phone booths with access for wheelchairs. 
Customers who do not pay their telephone bill receive two warnings during the first month 
of  non-payment.  There is then a period of 15 days during which the subscriber can receive 
calls but not make calls.  If  the bill is not settled at the end of that period, the consumer is 
disconnected. 
Poland 
Telephone service is available in all parts of  Poland, although with waiting lists as long as 
100 months, this universal coverage is largely theoretical in some areas.  However, there is 
a legal basis to universal service in Article 2.1  of the Act on Communications (Posts and 
Telecommunications) of 23  November 1990, as  amended on 12 June 1995  (Sections 14, 
15  and  18).  Universal service is not associated with the  award of monopoly rights to 
operators; the only legal monopoly rights are for providing international public telephone 
and telex services (Article 16.1  of the Act).  All other types of service require a licence 
from the Minister of  Posts and Telecommunications (Article 12).  The licences are granted 
through public tender procedure (Article 13); often more than one operator is licensed in 
an area.  The principal operator (TPSA) is obliged to provide universal service in all parts 
of the country (under the Communications Act),  and the private licensed operators  are 
required to provide universal service in their licensed area, under conditions set out in their 
licences.  Operators do not receive any subsidy for providing universal service. 
Universal  telephone  service  includes  a  basic  telephone  line  capable  of making  and 
receiving  calls,  fax  transmission,  access  to  emergency  services,  access  to  directory 
enquiries,  touch  tone  dialling,  itemised  billing  and  access  to  operator  services,  plus 
freephone and premium rate services.  All subscribers pay the same price for telephone 
service  regardless  of where  they  live.  The  normal  tariff covers  installation  of the 
telephone line up to a network termination point inside the property. 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~ly~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN  EUROPE  Page 53 
Universal  service  provision  does  not  extend  to  X.25,  leased  line,  Internet  and  ISDN 
services,  although such services have  to  be provided at  uniform prices across  the  area 
covered by each operator offering them.  However, given that there are several suppliers of 
such services, there tends to be a range of  prices available in the market. 
Operators are not required to provide telephones in particular places, only to  ensure that 
the  number  of public  phones  is  1%  of the  number  of main  telephone  lines.  This 
requirement is covered in Article 4.3 of  the Decree of8 February 1996. 
Poland intends to put a new telecoms law in place in 1998 or 1999, which will incorporate 
changes to regulation covering universal service.  As a preparatory step towards the new 
law,  the  Council  of Ministers  approved  a  discussion  document  "Telecommunications 
Development Policy" in May 1996.  The most important statement as  regards universal 
service in this document is that ''New law and regulations should follow EU regulations 
and global changes  (i.e.  world telecommunications organisations").  In other words,  in 
common with most Central European countries, Poland is going to wait and see what the 
EU does. 
There is currently no  legally-specified minimum set of quality standards which must be 
met for all telephone customers in the country, although one is under preparation.  It will 
draw on studies underway in other countries, especially in the EU, as well as on TPSA's 
current (unpublished) quality targets. 
Operators are not allowed to collect deposits until they have built 20% of  the total number 
of  lines which their area can support (this measure is part of  the system of  incentives put in 
place by the government to encourage operators to increase telephone penetration rapidly). 
TPSA  operates  a  low  user  scheme  in  so  much  as  the  first  ten  units  (equivalent  to 
ECU0.57) per month are free.  The monthly subscription fee is about ECU3.97.  The State 
does not offer financial  assistance to  low users, with the exception of a 50% rebate on 
monthly subscriptions for World War II veterans. 
TPSA offers  special phones  and  special  facilities  in public  telephones  for  the  hearing 
impaired.  There are no  special arrangements for state aid to disabled people to  improve 
their access to the telephone but disabled organisations offer some general financial aid. 
Customers who fail to pay their bill will be disconnected from the network, after receiving 
reminders (up to three months). 
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Czech Republic 
The legal basis of  the universal service policy is the 1992 telecoms law, which is itself an 
amendment of  the earlier 1964 telecoms law.  A new telecoms law, more comparable with 
EU policy, is  expected to be passed during  1997.  The operations of SPT (the national 
operator) and local telephony concession holders are governed by 'authorisations'.  Until 
1995, local telephony was provided under monopoly by SPT, with the exception of two 
small  'pilot project'  areas where competition was  allowed (Dattel in downtown Prague 
and Cable Plus in a limited part of Liberec  ).  During 1995  the government issued local 
telephony authorisations to six further companies, covering 16 additional areas (at the time 
of writing these  companies  are  only just beginning to  operate).  Authorisations  oblige 
operators to offer service throughout their licensed area and to provide public payphones; 
they do not allow price discrimination.  Operators in the Czech Republic do  not receive 
any subsidy in return for providing universal service. 
While universal service is a government aim, the waiting list (650 000 at the end of 1995) 
shows that it is far from being achieved.  Universal service includes basic telephony, fax 
transmission  capability,  single  party  (i.e.  not  shared)  service,  and  access  to  operator 
services,  emergency services  and  directory  enquiries.  Itemised billing  and  touch  tone 
dialling are not covered by universal service.  Operators who  provide X25  data,  leased 
lines,  or Internet access must offer the  same tariffs  throughout the  country.  However, 
different operators can use different tariffs. 
Conditions regarding payphones are set out in the authorisations.  A public payphone must 
be installed in every village with more than 2000 inhabitants and there must be one per 
800  inhabitants.  The  Czech  Telecommunications  Office  (CTO)  monitors  this,  and 
believes it has been achieved. 
The basic tariff covers installation up  to  and including the termination point inside the 
subscriber's property in all cases.  Some subscribers used to pay higher prices than others 
for installation because of where they lived, but this was cancelled by mutual agreement 
between SPT and CTO in 1994. 
It is expected that there will be some explicit provision regarding universal service in the 
1997/8  telecoms  law currently being prepared.  There  are  currently no  documents  (not 
even internal working papers) to indicate what these provisions will be, but it is likely that 
they will be based on the trend set in the EU in the meantime. 
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An  explicit  minimum  set  of quality  standards  which  must  be  met  for  all  telephone 
customers is set out in the authorisations.  It covers call completion, time to wait for dial 
tone, time to wait for ringing tone, time to wait for an operator, time to wait for directory 
enquiries,  time  to  repair,  time  to  repair  public  phones  and  time  to  repair  a  teletype 
terminal.  Numerical targets are defined for all of  these over the period 1995-2000. 
Operators  do  not  take  deposits  from  their  customers  in  respect  of new  telephone 
connections.  All  residential  users  receive  the  first  ten  units  per month  at  CZK1.05 
(ECU0.03); the price thereafter is CZK2.0 per unit (ECU0.06).  Further price discounts are 
available to the disabled, to members of  the Union of  Fighters for Freedom (World War II 
veterans), and to people with low pensions. 
Neither the  State  nor the  operators  make  any  special  provision explicitly  for  disabled 
people in order to improve their access to the telephone, but some local authorities provide 
general benefits to disabled people.  Special phones for the hearing impaired are available, 
but are not subsidised. 
Customers who do not pay their bills are disconnected after the receipt of two warnings, 
with operators following a standard procedure.  There is no  'soft' disconnection, largely 
because of  the technical limitations of  the network. 
2.2.2  New Zealand 
New Zealand has no legislative controls regarding the provision of universal service or 
community  service  obligations.  It is  up  to  the  individual  service  providers  to  make 
provision for these in their normal operations- there is also no positive benefit other than 
good customer relations if  they meet any of  these obligations 
At the privatisation of  Telecom Corporation of  New Zealand (TCNZ), residential services 
pledges were incorporated into the legal agreements and Articles of  Association of  TCNZ: 
•  free local calling will remain a tariff option available to all residential customers 
•  the standard residential rental for a phone line will not rise faster than movements in 
the Consumer Price Index unless the profits of TCNZ's regional operating companies 
are unreasonably impaired 
•  phone line rentals for residential customers in rural areas will not be higher than in the 
cities, and the residential service will remain as widely available as it is at present. 
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Under its continued ownership of  a 'golden share', the New Zealand government monitors 
TCNZ' s adherence to these pledges. 
Line rental is  charged according to  class of service.  There  are  two  classes  of service, 
standard and non-standard.  Standard rentals apply to  most residential customers, and to 
business  customers  in  areas  which have  local  call  charging.  Non-standard  line  rental 
applies  to  older  types  of exchange,  and  to  business  customers  in  areas  with  modem 
exchanges but no  local call charging.  Non-standard is further divided into two types of 
service: individual and party-line. 
The Consumer Guarantees Act obliges all companies to provide a service or product fit for 
its purpose with reasonable care and skill.  Furthermore, TCNZ is bound by a voluntary 
agreement with the Ministry of Consumer Affairs to publish information every six months 
on residential quality of service (though it is obliged to meet any targets).  TCNZ has a 
service guarantee, offering any residential customer a $NZ50 (ECU 27.5) phone card or 
one month's line rental rebate if the customer has to  wait more than 24  hours after the 
agreed repair time. 
While TCNZ is not obliged by law or through its licence to offer low user schemes, there 
are a number of  self-funded TCNZ initiatives to increase ease of  access for the elderly, the 
disabled and low income customers: 
•  A special package  ("60  Plus  Phone  Option")  is  available  to  customers  aged  60  or 
more.  This comprises a reduced monthly line rental and per minute charge for local 
calls.  The telephone must be installed at the customer's permanent place of  residence 
and only one package per customer is allowed.  This package will be made available 
progressively throughout the country. 
•  TCNZ has set up  a Special Needs Advisory Panel to  investigate ways in which the 
disabled can be assisted.  A range of rental phones is available, with features that can 
assist customers with special needs.  For teletype users, there are special numbers for 
emergencies,  faults  and  enquiries.  For sight-impaired customers,  there are  toll-free 
numbers  to  access  spoken  versions  of  key  TCNZ  publications  and  product 
information. 
•  Under  a  TCNZ  scheme  called  Budget  Link,  20 000  low  income  households  can 
receive toll-barred telephone services with half price rental and free connection. 
8  The 
programme  is  administered  by  the  New  Zealand  Federation  of Family  Budgeting 
8  Toll-barred telephone services allow customers to receive incoming calls and make only local calls (which are free). 
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Services.  Budget Link is  available to  Budget Service clients who  agree  to  receive 
budget advice while they are on the service.  It can be extended for up to 24 months on 
the recommendation of a customer's budget advisor.  Those with an existing debt to 
TCNZ of  up to NZ$400 can qualify for Budget Link if  they have an agreed repayment 
plan. 
TCNZ bills residential customers monthly.  If an account is not paid by the due date, the 
next bill shows "Account Overdue".  If the account is not paid immediately, the customer 
is telephoned by an automated voice messaging system with a reminder.  A week later, a 
second automated message is given with a disconnection warning.  After another week the 
customer is contacted personally, and if the payment is not made within the next seven 
days the customer is  disconnected (around two  months  after the  date of the  first  bill). 
However, in the course of this procedure it is possible for  the customer to  come to  an 
agreed repayment plan with TCNZ which will avoid disconnection. 
2.2.3  USA 
In the  USA universal  service was  established under  Section  1 of the  1934  Communi-
cations Act.
9  This section was the 'touchstone' for virtually all  major universal service 
policy discussions throughout the world  The debate over universal service led to several 
initiatives, the most important of  which are described below. 
•  In  1984  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  adopted  an  plan  which 
offers low-income households (satisfying a state-determined means test) a reduction in 
fixed charges for telephone service equal to  the Federal subscriber line charge.  For 
eligible households, the result of this scheme was a 50% reduction in total subscriber 
line charge (with the operator receiving compensation from federal funds). 
•  In  1985  the  FCC  adopted  a broader  'Lifeline'  assistance  measure  for  low-income 
households, jointly funded by the Federal and state governments.  This scheme has the 
potential to provide a telephone line free of rental charge where the state authorities 
are  willing  to  participate  fully  (i.e.  provide  50%  of the  line  rental,  which  is  then 
matched from federal funds).  The scheme is means-tested on a regular basis to ensure 
that only those eligible individuals are benefiting from the scheme and is  limited in 
availability to a single line for the principal residence. 
9  An act to provide for the regulation of interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and for other purposes, 19 June 
1934. 
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•  The third scheme, adopted by the FCC in April  1987, has two elements.  The first, 
'Link-up America', is  a scheme designed to  connect low-income households to  the 
telephone  network.  Under  this  scheme,  Federal  assistance  provides  50%  of the 
connection charges, up to a maximum of $30 (ECU23) in benefits.  Under the second 
part of the scheme, Federal assistance is available to local exchange carriers to cover 
interest  costs  in  those  cases  where  a  carrier  offers  a  deferred  connection  charge 
payment plan, up to a value of$200 (ECU154). 
The passing of the  1996 Communications Act led to  the amendment of Section 1 of the 
1934 Act.  Section 254 of the 1996 Act requires licensed telecommunications carriers "to 
make  available,  so  far  as  possible,  to  all  the  people  of the  United  States  without 
discrimination on the basis of  race, color, religion, national origin, or sex a rapid, efficient, 
Nation-wide,  and  world-wide  wire  and  radio  communication  service  with  adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges". 
The FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Services has identified six key principles 
on which the debate over universal service should focus: 
•  quality and rates 
•  access to advanced services 
•  access in rural and high cost areas 
•  equitable and non-discriminatory contributions 
•  specific and predictable support mechanisms 
•  access to advanced telecoms services for schools, health care and libraries. 
Consideration of  universal service issues in the USA has been further refined by the terms 
of  the 1996 Act, which describe two primary categories of  service: 
•  a core group of services to be available to all citizens, with support for consumers on 
low incomes or in rural, insular and high-cost areas 
•  additional  services,  including  advanced  telecoms  and  information  services,  for 
providers  of health  care  or  educational  services  - a  "targeted  universal  service" 
provision to  ensure access to  advanced services through public institutions.  As  yet 
there are no concrete proposals as  to how this would be achieved, nor are there any 
estimates of  how much it would cost. 
As a result of  making these categories explicit, it is now possible for regulators in the USA 
to  think in terms of two  levels of universal service,  each appropriate to  the needs of a 
specific user group.  According to  the FCC Joint Board: "As we interpret the 1996 Act, 
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our first responsibility is to  identify what core group of services should be supported by 
Federal  universal  service  mechanisms,  to  enable  the  first  group  of beneficiaries  to 
purchase those services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.  As to the second category 
of services, advanced telecommunications services for  schools,  libraries and health care 
providers, section 254(  c) (3) authorises the Commission 'to designate a separate definition 
of  universal service applicable only to public institutional telecommunications users"'.
10 
In November 1996  the  Joint Board of the Federal Communications Commission made 
recommendations on universal service in accordance with the  1996 Telecommunications 
Act.  One recommendation it made was the introduction of the concept of 'competitive 
neutrality' meaning that "all providers of inter-state telecommunications services should 
make  an  equitable  and  non-discriminatory  contribution  to  the  preservation  and 
advancement  of universal  service".  These  contributions  would  constitute  a  universal 
service fund to be used to compensate operators who provide universal services. 
The Joint Board also recommended "that eligible schools and libraries be able to purchase 
at  a discount any telecommunications services,  internal connections among classrooms, 
and access to the internet.  The Joint Board recommends providing higher discounts for 
economically-disadvantaged schools and libraries and those entities located in high cost 
areas.  Discounts are a minimum of 20% and range from 40%-90% for all but the least 
disadvantaged schools and libraries.  Total expenditures for universal service support for 
schools and libraries is capped at $2.25 billion per year, although any funds not disbursed 
in a given year may be carried forward and also disbursed"  .
11 
In summary, in contrast to  universal service measures adopted in the EU,  policy in the 
USA has used means testing to target schemes to help low-income families remain on, or 
join, the network.  Furthermore, the passing of  the 1996 Act has allowed for two distinctly 
different policy objectives for different groups of  users to be identified: 
•  continuation of  schemes designed to help those on low incomes 
•  the creation of a separate definition of 'universal service' which is only applicable to 
public  institutional  telecoms  users,  namely,  schools,  libraries  and  health  care 
providers, in order to provide access to new and advanced services. 
1°  FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Services 'Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Establishing Joint Board', CC 
Docket No. 96-45 8 March 1996. Source http;//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common  _  Carrier/Notices/fcc96093.  txt 
11  Joint Board adopts universal service recommendations, FCC News Release, CC Docket 96-45 
Analy...sys __________________  _ Page 60  Analysys Final Report for DGXII/1  A 1 
Thus the Act allows for universal service to  be focused on network completion and the 
support  of low-income  households,  while  creating  a policy mechanism  to  support  the 
initial exploration of  the value of  advanced communications by certain user groups. 
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3/  Perspectives on Universal Service 
In a study on the future of  universal service in Europe, it would be ill-advised to seek input 
only from  those directly involved in providing telecoms services.  In order to  ensure a 
balanced view on the development of universal service, it is equally important that views 
of  the customers and other interest groups are taken into account.  Therefore, in addition to 
soliciting  the  views  of incumbent  TOs  and  competitive  operators  (where  they  exist), 
Analysys  interviewed  consumer  associations  (representing  residential  customers)  and 
telecoms  user associations  (representing business  customers).  The  specific  interests of 
those living in rural areas were sought by interviewing development agencies which have 
responsibility for peripheral regions.  Finally, the interests of employees in the telecoms 
and  other  sectors  as  well  as  those  concerned  with  broader  social  development  were 
captured  in  interviews  with  representatives  of trade  unions,  social  organisations,  and 
organisations  respresenting  the  disabled.  This  section  describes  the  views  of the 
organisations interviewed, illustrating areas of consensus and divergence of opinions both 
within and between the groups approached.  A complete list of organisations contacted is 
provided in Annex A. 
3.1  INCUMBENT TOS 
In the course of  this study Analysys interviewed a number of  European and non-European 
incumbent TOs with respect to their views on universal service and its development.  We 
focused on operators in countries with liberalised or fairly liberalised telecoms markets, as 
the need to  determine an  approach to  universal service in competitive markets is  more 
pressing in those countries.  The organisations contacted were Ameritech, Telstra, TCNZ, 
BT, Telia, PTT Telecom, France Telecom, Telef6nica and SPT.  This section is also based 
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on responses to the Commission theme paper on universal service 
1 and the Commission 
Green  Paper  on  the  Liberalisation  of Telecommunications  Infrastructure  and  Cable 
Television Networks.
2 
3.1.1  Scope of Universal Service 
All the incumbent TOs to which we spoke have an obligation to provide services of some 
kind  in  their  countries,  with  an  obligation  to  provide  basic  telephone  services  as  a 
minimum  (see  Chapter  2).  Some  operators  have  further  obligations  placed  on  them 
relating  to  national  security,  defence  of the  state,  and  education,  and  even  obligations 
regarding the TO's research and development spending.  These obligations can impose 
considerable costs on a TO. 
In their responses to  the Commission's theme paper on universal service and the Green 
Paper  on  the  liberalisation  of infrastructure,  incumbent  TOs  were  unanimous  in  their 
support for universal service as a concept and for the attention it is receiving in the current 
climate of  liberalisation.  Most incumbent operators regard universal service as a means by 
which  services  are  provided to  the  minority of customers  who  would  not  receive  the 
service if it were provided in a totally free market, i.e. they have a 'market failure' vision 
of  universal service. 
3.1.2  Development of Universal Service 
The operator interviews and the submissions sent in response to  the Commission papers 
are  unanimous  that universal  service  should concern itself with  services  which can be 
provided over existing PSTN infrastructure i.e. basic voice telephony, fax  and low-speed 
data using  modems.  In  fact,  most  incumbent TOs  favour  restricting  the  definition of 
universal service to basic voice telephony only.  In many cases they explicitly stated that 
they  would not  wish  to  see  universal  service  extended to  basic  rate  ISDN.  There  is 
opposition from  some  TOs  to  including  services  such as  free  itemised billing and  call 
barring, because provision of  these services increases their costs.  They maintain that these 
increased costs should be borne by the customers who  enjoy the benefit of the service, 
1  Theme Paper on Universal Service Issues, EC DG XIII (6 December 1995). 
2  Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks, COM(94  )440 Final (25 
October 1994  ). 
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rather than being spread across all customers.  A number of incumbent TOs and ETNO 
(the  European  Telecommunications  Network  Operators  association)  assert  that  the 
provision of leased lines  should not be part of a universal  service obligation,  and that 
leased line services should be made available on a fully commercial basis. 
Some incumbent operators recognise that deposits are a deterrent to new customers.  For 
example, Belgacom recently abandoned completely the practice of  taking deposits from its 
customers  and BT has  also  introduced its  "Call Level"  scheme  designed to  use  credit 
limits to remove the requirement for deposits (discussed below).  Other operators insist on 
deposits only from new customers or from customers who have a history of  poor payment. 
A number of initiatives exist or are planned by operators to  assist customers who have 
difficulty controlling their debt from telephone usage: 
•  BT has recently introduced a £100 per quarter ceiling for the first year of service to 
new customers (its "Call Level" scheme).  This will greatly reduce the need to charge 
deposits to customers to insure against bad debts.  If a customer requires a credit limit 
greater than the standard, it is possible to lodge a deposit or undergo a credit check. 
•  other operators such as Telstra and Ameritech allow customers in their home market to 
opt for incoming calls only, and offer a cheaper subscription tariff with this service. 
•  Telia monitors customer expenditure on telephone services: if a customer's spending 
increases dramatically, it will inform the customer between normal bills. 
These schemes are a recognition by the incumbent operators that their own interests are 
not served by customer's lack of  control over their debt. 
There was some support for the idea of  the Commission providing guidance on the nature 
of universal service to  promote a common understanding of universal service across the 
EU.  However, there is no consensus among incumbent operators on the issue of  the level 
at which universal service legislation should be handled: 
•  BT, for instance, supported the creating of  a common understanding, and also supports 
a common funding mechanism.  However, it said that the definition of affordability 
should be handled at a national level. 
•  Telia  suggested  that  there  is  a  danger  of  national  governments  using  the 
implementation of universal service legislation to  erect barriers to  trade in telecoms 
services,  either by creating  complicated procedures  or by insisting  that  companies 
wishing to enter a market take on an excessive universal service obligation.  It should 
be the responsibility of the Commission to prevent this from happening.  Telia also 
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believes that the universal  service  ought to  be defined  at  a  European level by the 
Commission and that governments should deal with funding it at a national level. 
•  Telecom Italia believes that there should be a set of mandatory services defined at a 
European  level  by the  Commission  which will  be  implemented  by NRAs  in the 
Member States. 
•  Telecom  Finland  believes  that  universal  service  should  be  entirely  defined  at  a 
national level as  there is  sufficient diversity of circumstances between the Member 
States to make a European definition very difficult. 
There is a strong division between incumbent operators on the position of funding  for 
universal  service.  Operators  in the more  liberalised  countries  (UK,  Sweden,  Finland) 
favour a universal service fund.  On the other hand more traditional incumbent operators 
(Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Telecom Italia) favour funding of universal service 
through  a  system  of supplementary  charges  on  interconnection.  A  few  operators 
expressed no preference between these options.  An overview of the various methods of 
funding universal service mentioned in this chapter is provided in Annex B. 
There is unanimous hostility among incumbent telecoms operators to the idea of using 
universal  service to  drive  the  roll-out of particular technologies.  It is  contrary to  the 
philosophy of universal service which is to provide to the few,  services which have been 
adopted by the  many.  In  addition,  it  involves  government  and  regulators  in picking 
winning technologies.  Incumbent TOs argue that there is a grave danger that such a policy 
will introduce inefficiencies because technologies will be promoted which have not been 
required by the market. 
In relation  to  this,  BT raised  the  question  of government-imposed restrictions  on the 
technology used to deliver services.  BT currently faces  restrictions on the use of radio 
technology to deliver fixed telecoms services.  In some of the more remote parts of the 
UK, using radio would be more efficient than using copper access.  BT feels that it should 
have  the  right  to  use  the  most  efficient  technology  to  serve  these  areas  if it  has  an 
obligation to cover them.
3 
Indeed, regulators  have  conceded this  point and  awarded  BT a licence  to  operate radio based fixed  network services  in  the 
Highlands and Islands area of Scotland.  The authorities cited reducing the  cost of providing universal service as  part of their 
rationale.  Restrictions on the use of  radio apply to BT in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
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3.1.3  Tariffing Issues 
Geographical averaging of telephone tariffs occurs to  a large extent in all EU countries, 
with the result that incumbent operators charge all customers more or less the same price 
for  connection, rental and usage,  regardless of the cost of providing that service.  This 
means  that  some  customers  (typically  in  urban  and  sub-urban  areas)  pay  a  lot  more 
(although how much more has not been quantified) for  services than it costs the TO  to 
provide those services, while customers living in remote rural areas (or urban areas where 
vandalism is a problem for TOs) pay less than it costs the TO to provide services. 
There is widespread acceptance among operators that geographical averaging of  prices for 
telecoms services across whole countries will become unsustainable when their national 
telecoms markets are liberalised.  The end of geographical averaging of prices will bring 
the  pricing  of telecoms  services  more  closely into  line  with  ONP  charging  principles 
which  require  the  prices  charged  for  services  to  reflect  the  costs  of providing  them. 
However, there is  some concern among  incumbent operators that,  for  political reasons, 
governments will attempt to prolong geographical averaging following liberalisation while 
their competitors in urban areas will be free to pursue only their more lucrative customers. 
3.2  COMPETITIVE OPERA  TORS 
Only  in  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the  UK  can  competitive  operators  currently 
provide  basic  voice  services  (the  activity  presently  covered  by  universal  service 
obligations).  We therefore focused our interview programme on competitive operators in 
these countries.  However, we also studied the responses to the theme paper on universal 
service and the comments on the Green Paper on infrastructure liberalisation which were 
made  by organisations  intending  to  become  competitive  providers  of basic  telephony 
services in other countries following liberalisation. 
3.2.1  Scope of Universal Service 
There is  broad agreement  among  the  competitive  operators  included  in this  study that 
universal  service  is  a  laudable  aim.  However,  several  make  the  point  that  an  issue 
requiring  rapid  clarification  is  identifying  the  objective  of universal  service  more 
precisely.  Is the objective of  universal service the provision of a telephone in 100% of all 
households in the EU?  (If this is the objective, it has not yet been met under monopoly 
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provision of telecoms services.)  They believe that a 100% penetration target is futile as 
there will always be a small proportion of  households which do not want a telephone. 
It is the view of most of the competitive operators contacted that universal service is  a 
mechanism to provide service to  a small proportion of the population which the market 
fails to adequately provide with services.  The household penetration of a service is a key 
criterion in determining whether or not a service should be included in universal service 
provision.  However, a number of  competitive operators argue that high penetration alone 
is  not a sufficient reason to  include a service in the definition of universal service;  for 
example, microwave ovens, video recorders and motor vehicles all have high penetration 
in most European countries, but it would obviously be absurd to argue that they should be 
subject to some kind of  universal service obligation.  These operators feel that, in addition 
to high penetration, it should be demonstrable that inability to access a service is a source 
of  disadvantage to the minority of  customers who do not have the service. 
The provision of  universal service was generally accepted as a cost to be shared across the 
industry.  There was  some  scepticism regarding the real  size of the burden which the 
universal service obligation placed on incumbent operators.  One  competitive operator 
wondered what value was placed on an identifiable nationwide corporate presence by an 
incumbent operator which views its obligation to provide public pay-phones as a 'burden'. 
Another operator suggested a test to  determine incumbents'  attitudes to  their universal 
service obligation - they should be asked to publish a list of  services they would withdraw 
and  customers  they  would  disconnect  if they  were  not  obliged  to  offer  them  under 
universal service. 
3.2.2  Development of  Universal Service 
There was unanimity that universal service should apply only to basic telephone services 
as  they  are  now delivered.  Energis  provided  a  list  of the  services  that  it regards  as 
currently legitimately covered by universal service. 
•  basic telephony 
•  reasonable quality of  service 
•  special tariffs for social purposes 
•  publication of  information on special services 
•  directory services 
•  operator assistance 
•  public pay-phones 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~ly~s---I 
THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN  EUROPE  Page 65 
•  access to emergency services 
•  assistance for the disabled. 
There is  considerable  opposition among  all  the  competitive operators  to  extending the 
definition of universal service even to  include telephony services such as  selective call 
barring  and  itemised billing.  Competitive  operators  see  these  services  as  a  means  of 
distinguishing themselves from incumbent TOs and would prefer it if  the incumbents were 
not obliged by the  regulator to  implement these  services,  thus  eliminating  one  of the 
competitive  operators'  competitive  advantages.  There  is  unanimous  opposition  to 
extending universal service to include services such as ISDN or broadband until there is a 
proven disadvantage to a small minority who do not have such services. 
With regard to funding, a number of  competitive operators made the point that, in an ideal 
world, a matter of social policy such as universal service would be funded from general 
taxation.  However they acknowledge that this is not an ideal world and that, for historical 
reasons,  and  because  of current  constraints  on public  spending,  the  cost  of universal 
service will continue to be borne by the industry.  There is thus support for the idea of a 
universal  service  fund  which  compensates  the  providers  of universal  services,  and  is 
funded  by the  industry,  with contributions  in proportion to  the  annual  turnover of the 
operators.  A number of operators expressed some concern that a universal service fund 
which  is  not  tightly  controlled  would  tend  to  grow  each  year,  consuming  an  ever-
increasing proportion of industry revenues: one operator suggested that the contributions 
should be capped at 1% of  turnover for each organisation.  There was some support for the 
franchising  of universal  service  'uneconomic  areas'.  Under  a franchising  scheme,  the 
right  to  provide  universal  service  in  uneconomic  areas  could  be  auctioned  to  the 
organisation requiring the lowest subsidy from the universal service fund. 
Mercury argued that if, following a detailed analysis, the cost of  universal service is found 
to  be  very  small  as  a  proportion  of revenues  then  there  should  be  no  bureaucratic 
procedure established to share the cost and it should be borne by the incumbent operator. 
Competitive operators are strongly opposed to the use of universal service as  a means of 
driving  the  roll-out  of technology  and  services.  They  argue  that  the  regulator  or 
government has no business trying to pick winning technologies ahead of the market and 
that to do so will lead to economic inefficiency. 
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3.2.3  Tariffing Issues 
All  competitive operators  interviewed and  most of those  who  submitted papers  to  the 
Commission expressed support for the provision of special facilities for users with special 
needs as part of  universal service.  Provision of  special equipment for users with speech or 
hearing impediments was  deemed to  be a particular priority.  It was  felt  that the  costs 
imposed by such provision would be only a small proportion of overall universal service 
funding. 
Competitive operators agree that one of the reasons why a proportion of customers has 
failed  to  subscribe to  telephone  services  is  the  generally unimaginative tariff packages 
offered by the incumbent TOs.  For example, failure to offer tariff packages which reduce 
the burden of connection or rental by raising usage  charges  causes  some  customers  to 
decide that they cannot afford telephone services.  Operators including MFS maintain that 
one  of the  greatest  contributions  to  increasing  penetration  will  be  the  innovation 
stimulated by competition.  The new services made available to  customers as  a result of 
fierce competition will not only be cheaper but, because of  their diversity, of  more value to 
the customer.  This decrease in price combined with the increase in perceived value should 
cause more customers to take up telephone services. 
This  point  of view  is  supported  by  evidence  from  the  UK,  where  there  has  been 
competition in the  provision of basic  telephony  since the  mid  1980s.  The  UK Cable 
Communications Association says that upto  10%  of the  customers its members  supply 
with telephony  services have  not previously had  a telephone,  an  indication that  lower 
connection and  rental  charges  result in greater numbers  of customers  taking  telephone 
services. 
Some operators stated that the abolition of geographical averaging of tariffs would be a 
positive development, as geographical averaging was a mechanism which made telephone 
services too expensive for large numbers of less well off customers in areas that are not 
expensive to serve.  Most operators felt that geographical averaging could not survive the 
introduction of a competitive market.  MFS described geographical averaging in telecoms 
as an anomaly.  People living in urban areas have higher costs than those living in remote 
areas  for  some  things  (e.g.  accommodation)  and  lower  costs  for  others  (e.g.  public 
transport).  MFS's view is that there is an asymmetry: people living in rural areas where 
telecoms  is  expensive  to  provide  are  compensated  by  people  living  in  areas  where 
connection  is  less  expensive,  but  no  levy  is  charged  on  the  people  of rural  areas  to 
subsidise the high housing costs faced by residents in London, Paris, Milan and Frankfurt. 
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MFS asks why the people of  those cities should subsidise provision of  telecoms to people 
in rural areas. 
3.3  CONSUMER ASSOCIATIONS 
In the course of the study Analysys interviewed a number of national consumer organi-
sations in the EU (in Sweden, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland); the Bureau 
Europeen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC, the European organisation of  consumer 
associations); and the Consumer Federation of  America.  In addition, Analysys has studied 
the position papers submitted by consumer associations to the Commission as  comments 
on  the  theme  paper  on  universal  service  and  the  Green  Paper  on  infrastructure 
liberalisation. 
3.3.1  Scope of Universal Service 
Most of the consumer associations interviewed were of the opinion that universal service 
is an important issue for consumers as it ensures access on as wide a basis as possible to 
essential communications  services.  (One  exception to  this  was  the  Finnish Consumer 
Association which does not regard universal service as  a particularly important issue in 
Finland, reflecting the fact that most of the local telephone companies in Finland are co-
operatives owned by their customers.)  Consumer associations are  also  aware  that it is 
consumers who will bear a large proportion of the costs arising from  universal service 
provtston. 
Universal  service  is  seen  to  be  increasingly  important  as  telecoms  markets  liberalise: 
consumer associations are concerned that residential customers could find their services 
suffer as operators compete for lucrative business customers.  There is particular concern 
that incumbent operators will shift costs to residential consumers in order to compete more 
effectively for  business  customers;  the  business market will be  the  first  to  experience 
competition and incumbent operators will strive to  minimise loss of market share.  This 
concern recognises the fact that there can be a significant delay between the  legislative 
opening of the market and the arrival of actual competition, particularly in the residential 
market. 
All  of the  consumer  association  representatives  interviewed  which  expressed  a  view 
agreed  that  universal  service  should  apply  only  to  residential  customers,  because 
competitive operators  entering the market usually target business customers when they 
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enter  the  market.  In the  words  of the  representative  of the  Consumer Federation  of 
America:  "Businesses  are  the  first  to  be  taken  care  of by the  market".  In  addition, 
business has basic requirements in excess of  those for residential customers.  For instance 
it is now very difficult to run a business without a fax machine, but most households exist 
quite happily without one. 
Consumer organisations' complaints vary from country to country.  In some countries the 
poor provision of  digital lines is a problem which means that certain services (such as call 
forwarding, call waiting, etc.) are unavailable to customers.  In others, basic telephony is 
subject to frequent interruption of service and in Greece, for instance, it is has been the 
case that customers have had more than one telephone line to  increase their chances of 
having a single working line at any one time. 
Waiting lists did not prove to be an issue with the consumer associations we interviewed 
because connection delays in their countries are low and reflect reasonable administrative 
delay in processing applications.  However, in other EU Member States, waiting lists can 
be sizeable: for example, 218 000 in Greece, 38 000 in Italy, 31 000 in Germany, 17 000 
in  Portugal,  and  12 000  in  Austria.
4  We  are  also  aware  that  there  are  considerable 
problems in Central and Eastern Europe as the inadequate networks inherited from former 
regimes are upgraded. 
An area  of major  concern  to  many  of the  consumer  associations  interviewed  is  the 
unlimited  liability that  telephone  customers  are  exposed  to  in their relationships  with 
telephone  companies:  "The  fact  that  the  customer  is  granted  unlimited  credit  by the 
telephone  operator is  dangerous  for  both parties."  Agreeing  a fixed  monthly limit  to 
expenditure on telecoms services would give consumers the comfort of  knowing that they 
cannot get into great debt through using the phone.  In Sweden and Finland there is also 
concern about customers being charged for telephone calls made by third parties tapping 
into their telephone lines.  Credit limits could at least limit the amount of  debt in dispute in 
these cases, but this facility is not currently made available to most European telephone 
customers. 
Call barring was also felt to be increasingly important with increasing availability and use 
of international and premium rate telephony.  In Sweden, a customer must take explicit 
action to get access to certain categories of  premium rate line.  This reverses the problem 
4  Analysys (1996), 1998,  A New Era for EU Telecoms  Regulation, Blackman, Dr C.  and  Denmead, M.,  Analysys Publications 
(1996). 
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of exposing  customers  to  potential  debt  without  their  prior  agreement.  Innovative 
schemes such as  control of access  to  premium rate  services  via personal identification 
number are another solution to this problem.  Consumers should be able to define in detail 
the type of  calls to which access is barred: it should be possible to bar access to sex lines 
while retaining access to information lines. 
There is a strong consensus among consumer associations that universal service is a tool to 
help  achieve  increased  social  equality.  All  of the  consumer  associations  interviewed 
agreed that a service should be classed as universal if  "failure to access the service results 
in the exclusion of individuals from major parts of society."  This will normally only be 
the case when the penetration of  that service is high, but some consumer associations were 
clear that high penetration in itself is not a valid reason for making a service universal. 
Finally, it was suggested that a particular service should be included in universal service 
provision if  it is cheaper than the service which it replaces.  Some telephone companies in 
the USA actually charge their customers more for tone dialling than pulse dialling, despite 
the fact that tone dialling is cheaper for the telephone company to provide and maintain. 
Under these circumstances the Consumer Federation of America argues that tone dialling 
should become universal (and cheaper). 
3.3.2  Development of  Universal Service 
All the  consumer  associations  included  in this  study  support  inclusion of basic  voice 
telephony in universal service.  In addition, BEUC supports inclusion of fax  and modem 
access  at  a  minimum  speed  in  universal  service,  and  the  Dutch  Consumenten  Bond 
supports the inclusion of basic cable television services  in universal  service within the 
Netherlands  because  of the  very  high  penetration  of cable  TV  in  Dutch  Households 
(greater than 95%).  There was no suggestion that cable TV be added to universal service 
elsewhere. 
Consumer associations  are  aware  that  imposing  costs  on TOs  may result  in  increased 
prices for consumers.  They advocate close monitoring of the requirements of citizens to 
determine whether lack of access to specific services is causing inequality.  Only if  this is 
found to be the case should that service be considered for inclusion in a universal service 
obligation.  The suggestion that ISDN could be made a universal service in order to make 
ISDN  available  in  all  parts  of the  European  Union  was  not  endorsed  and  there  was 
unanimous  opposition  to  the  idea that  universal  service  could  be used  as  a  driver  to 
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technology roll-out: "Our organisation is not happy for consumers' money to be used to 
develop technologies and services for which there is no apparent demand" 
Several associations supported the idea of  a minimum universal service level to be defined 
at an EU level.  This would apply in all Member States, with additional services added at 
national  levels  where  they  are  desired  by the  national  regulator,  in  accordance  with 
subsidiarity.  However, some associations were adamant that all universal service issues 
should be handled at a national level. 
The consumer associations interviewed were divided on the best way to  fund  universal 
service.  A small majority felt that customers who cannot afford services should have the 
shortfall made up through contributions from the social welfare budget.  Others favour a 
universal  service  fund  either  based  on  a  system  of  supplementary  charges  on 
interconnection or 'pay or play'.  In this context, it is also interesting to note the proposal 
of the Consumer Federation of America for dealing with universal service in the USA.  It 
proposes  a basic  level  of universal  service  applied  across  the  whole  of the  USA and 
funded by Federal resources, which could be supplemented by additional services required 
by individual states if  thought desirable and which would be funded from state revenues. 
3.3.3  Tariffing Issues 
Most  consumer  associations  recognise  that,  in  a  competitive  environment,  it  will  be 
impossible to maintain geographic averaging of  prices.  They are, however, unhappy with 
the idea that uniform pricing will be removed completely and suggest that there should be 
some  attempt  to  maintain  some  level  of uniform  pricing  through  subsidies  from  a 
universal service fund.  They are particularly wary of the risk of TOs using the lack of 
competition in less profitable areas as an opportunity to actually penalise customers living 
in those areas, i.e. increasing prices in those areas beyond the level which reflects the true 
costs  and  using  the  extra  revenue  to  subsidise  services  in  areas  where  they  do  face 
competition. 
Affordability of telecoms services - measured in terms of both how money is collected 
from customers and the amount that is charged for those services - is an issue which all 
consumer  organisations  regard  as  important.  The  current  practice  by  some  telecoms 
operators of charging deposits to  insure against bad debts is a significant barrier to  entry 
for customers of limited financial resources, especially when levied in addition to, and at 
the  same  time  as,  substantial  connection charges.  Current billing practices  (billing  in 
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arrears every two or three months) cause particular difficulties poor customers: monthly 
billing or the possibility of  pre-payment for services would help to alleviate this problem. 
Consumer associations also felt that changes to the typical pricing structure for telephone 
services  are  needed in order to  avoid deterring  low-volume users.  The existence of a 
significant rental charge each month, even if  no calls are made, means that the cost per call 
for customers who make few calls each period is relatively high.  The mobile telephony 
sector has shown how it is possible to segment the market and offer tariff packages which 
are attractive to  low volume users.  Packages offering lower line rentals and higher call 
charges could be offered by TOsto reduce the barriers to low-volume users from taking a 
telephone service. 
One of the organisations we spoke with (BUEC) felt that affordability of basic telephone 
services  should be expressed in financial  terms.  It suggested that operators  should be 
obliged to  ensure that  a minimum level of telephone  service could be purchased for  a 
specified proportion of average annual income or annual minimum wage in each Member 
State. 
All  but  one  of the  consumer  associations  interviewed  favoured  soft  disconnection  of 
customers  who  have  difficulty  paying  bills  as  an  interim  measure  before  full 
disconnection.  Soft disconnection was generally defined as barring outgoing calls (except 
to  emergency numbers and freephone numbers) but continuing to  allow incoming calls. 
While there is considerable support for soft disconnection as a step in the procedures taken 
when customers fall into difficulties with their bills, the consumer associations also accept 
that full disconnection is appropriate for customers who consistently fail to pay their bills. 
In a number of  Member States special discounts exist for telephone customers with special 
needs,  i.e.  low  users,  the  elderly  and  the  disabled.  All  but  one  of the  consumer 
associations interviewed in the course of this  study supported the idea that discounts of 
this type should ideally be funded by general taxation and allocated through social welfare 
spending.  However,  they  also  accepted  that  governments  are  reluctant  to  be seen  to 
increase taxation and so it is unlikely that such discounts will be funded in this way.  In 
recognition of these political constraints, most of the consumer associations accept that 
these discounts should be taken from whichever form of funding mechanism is used for 
universal service. 
Access to the Information Society for the homeless is not an issue which the consumer 
associations interviewed had considered in any depth.  There was some support for the 
idea of giving the  homeless free  voice-mail boxes as  a means  of allowing  them to  be 
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called,  thus  asststlng  them  in  their  search  for  work.  For  example,  Mercury 
Communications offers free voice mail services to the homeless in the UK.  However, one 
organisation candidly admitted that the homeless  do  not  feature  in the  membership  of 
consumer associations which tend to  be dominated by the better off in society, so  not a 
great deal of  consideration is given to their situation. 
3.4  USER ASSOCIATIONS 
User associations represent large corporate telecoms users.  They have been supportive of 
the  introduction  of competition  and  have  also  been  one  of the  most  active  groups 
participating in the whole debate on universal service.  User associations do  not stand to 
gain  a great deal  from  universal  service  as  their members  are  very  attractive potential 
customers for operators and so will be offered services in most locations at keen prices. 
However, costs imposed on the whole telecoms sector will be passed on to the customers 
of  the industry which include user association members. 
Three user associations were interviewed: AFUTT in France, Bel  tug-TMAB in Belgium 
and  BTG in the  Netherlands.  We  received  position  papers  from  the  UK  TMA  and 
INTUG. 
3.4.1  Scope of Universal Service 
There  is  a  spectrum of opinion  across  the  user  associations  we  contacted.  The  BTG 
regards universal service as a non-issue: "Universal service was an important issue for us 
when there were waiting lists, but now that the waiting lists have been eliminated we find 
that there is no requirement for universal service as it already exists.  It is a pity that it is 
only now that telecoms operators are beginning to regard universal service as an important 
issue."  However,  the  AFUTT  takes  the  view  that  there  is  no  public  service  without 
universal service, regardless of  whether France Telecom is publicly or privately owned. 
Users organisations are concerned that the cost of  universal service should not be too high, 
because any additional costs will have to be met (in part) by their members.  In its position 
paper,  the UK TMA draws  a clear distinction between universal  service  and  universal 
access.  It argues that it is likely that many service providers will not be access providers, 
but that their services should be made available to  customers on the same basis  as  the 
services provided by the access provider. 
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In its position paper on universal service INTUG describes the ultimate goal of universal 
service as  a affordable access to sufficient services for all human beings, enterprises and 
even pieces of  equipment, to play a full part in personal, social and commercial life within 
the global society.  INTUG goes on to point out that the untelephoned can be divided into 
three categories: 
•  those who actively do not wish to have telecoms services 
•  those  who  could  afford  to  have  the  service  but  choose  to  spend  their  available 
resources on other things 
•  those who wish to have the service, but either cannot afford to have it, no matter how 
much they deny themselves other things,  or are  prevented from  using the standard 
service for reasons of  disability. 
INTUG maintains that universal service should be targeted at the needs of  the third group 
described.  The UK TMA has a similar position, although it concedes that it is difficult in 
practice to distinguish the people who will not pay for a service from those who cannot 
pay.  However,  there  is  a  general  recognition by the  user  associations  that  there  is  a 
portion of society which has a genuine social need for telephone services but who cannot 
afford it.  The requirements of  this group should be met through some form of  assistance. 
Most of the user associations interviewed see universal service as  an issue for residential 
customers only.  This stems from the view that universal service is a concept which was 
developed  to  meet  social  needs.  Provision  of basic  telephone  services  to  businesses 
should certainly be mandatory, but businesses can pass their costs on to customers and so 
affordability of these services to  businesses is not a matter of concern in a competitive 
market.  The only organisation which disagreed with this view was the AFUTT, which 
pointed out that the distinction between business and residential customers is becoming 
blurred. 
3.4.2  Development of Universal Service 
All  but  one  of the  user  associations  contacted  supported  the  position  that  any  future 
definition of  universal service should include basic voice telephony.  There is considerable 
reluctance to  the inclusion of additional services, although Beltug-TMAB  supported the 
addition of  call barring and itemised billing. 
The  TMA  maintains  that  universal  service  should  be  applied  differently  to  different 
categories of customer: those in social need, the average domestic user, public access and 
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the business user.  Basic voice services should be universal services for all categories for 
all categories.  Beyond basic telephony, a combination of  the market and social need must 
determine the level of  universal service in each category. 
Both  the AFUTT and the TMA support the idea that the services included in universal 
service should be subject to regular review.  The TMA recommends that the review should 
take  place  every  three  years,  and  AFUTT  says  that  a  review  every  five  years  is  not 
frequent enough. 
The  opinion  of the  user  associations  contacted  was  that  universal  service  should  be 
regulated at a number of levels.  According to  AFUTT,  subsidiarity should prevail and 
universal service issues should be dealt with at a national level where harmonisation is not 
involved.  The TMA agrees that it would be a mistake to draw up detailed regulations on 
universal service on a European level, but feels that it would be of great benefit for some 
common definitions and targets to be set at a European level which would lead to greater 
equalisation of telephony penetration rates  and  service levels  in Member States.  Only 
Bel  tug-TMAB  take the view that as  universal service should be dealt with as  much as 
possible at the European level. 
3.4.3  Tariffing Issues 
All of  the user associations contacted agreed that geographic averaging of  telecoms tariffs 
will not be possible in a competitive telecoms market.  According to  INTUG, full  cost 
orientation will ultimately undermine the principle of geographical  averaging  of tariffs 
within individual countries.  INTUG acknowledges the political desire to see geographical 
averaging continue but argues that it may constrain the growth of  telephony penetration in 
the market by keeping prices artificially high for some customers. 
BTG also takes the view that geographical averaging will disappear but considers that the 
proportion of  customers with access to telecoms at a reasonable price will be maintained. 
AFUTT forecasts that a multitude of  tariffs will be available to telecoms customers which 
will vary according to geographic location, level of telecoms expenditure and the type of 
customer.  This will enable innovative tariff packages to be targeted at  specific groups. 
Beltug-TMAB believes that competition will result in a wider disparity between the prices 
paid by customers  for  services,  and  that  in  the  short  term,  there  is  a  risk  that  some 
residential customers will be disadvantaged. 
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Most of user associations interviewed were very hostile to the idea that universal service 
could be used as  a means of accelerating the roll out of new services and technologies. 
BTG considers that such a course would impose extra costs on the industry and would 
discourage competition by increasing the entry cost to new entrants.  The TMA feels that 
imposing extra costs on the industry will favour incumbent operators who will be better 
able to absorb those costs than competitive operators.  However, the AFUTT favoured the 
use of universal service to  encourage the roll-out of technology and services essential to 
the creation of  the Information Society. 
3.5  DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND BANKS 
Analysys interviewed a number of development agencies and banks regarding universal 
service.  We concentrated on development agencies which operate in peripheral areas of 
the  EU  in  Member  States  with  competitive  telecoms  markets:  Highlands  and  Islands 
Enterprise  and  the  Welsh  Development  Agency  in  the  UK;  Almi  F  oretagspartner  in 
Sweden;  Kemi-Tomio  Regional  Development  Agency  in  Finland;  and  Udanis  na 
Gaeltachta, a development agency concerned with Irish speaking areas in Ireland.  Czech 
Invest,  the  only  development  agency  in  the  Czech  Republic,  declined  to  participate 
because it is not a policy making body.  The EBRD and the EIB also declined, as they do 
not have a policy on universal service. 
3.5.1  Scope of Universal Service 
Universal  service  is  a very important issue  for  the  development  agencies  covering the 
peripheral regions  of the  European Union.  Even in countries with liberalised markets, 
there  is  not  much  actual  competition  in  these  regions,  particularly  for  access. 
Development agencies feel that, without universal service and particularly the quality of 
service requirements imposed, carrying out business would be considerably more difficult 
in areas which already suffer many other disadvantages because of distance from  major 
urban centres: "We cannot have companies here without universal service." 
The development organisations spoken to expressed broad satisfaction with the telephone 
service receive in their areas currently.  However, there is a higher than average incidence 
of older  exchanges  in  these  areas  and  this  can  cause  some  problems  for  accessing 
advanced  services.  In most  areas  ISDN  is  either impossible to  get  or the  connection 
charge is  such  as  to  deter most potential  subscribers.  The  exception is  Ireland where 
Telecom  Eireann  has  provided  ISDN  even  on  the  offshore  islands  when  it  has  been 
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requested.  Another  cause  of dissatisfaction  is  that  local  call  areas  are  sometimes 
determined by geographical area, rather than by the number of  people that can be reached 
for the price of a local call.  In the UK, for instance, a person living in London can reach 
approximately  10  million  people  for  the  price  of a  local  call,  whereas  only  tens  of 
thousands of  people are accessible for the price of  a local call in remote parts of  Wales and 
Scotland. 
Unlike  most  of the  other  categories  of interviewee,  all  of the  development  agencies 
interviewed supported the idea that universal service covers business as well as residential 
customers:  "They are  all  connected to  the  same  exchange".  A  number of alternative 
definitions were suggested: 
•  Scottish Enterprise wanted to  expand the definition still further:  it felt that a service 
should be a universal  service when it becomes a normal tool of business.  By this 
definition,  voice telephony,  and  fax  should be regarded  as  universal  services  now; 
access  to  the  Internet  is  likely  to  meet  this  criterion  in the  near  future.  Scottish 
Enterprise thinks that it will be some years before ISDN will qualify. 
•  The Welsh Development Agency stressed the principle that, if a service is important 
for  overcoming  peripherality,  it  should  become  a  universal  service. 
Videoconferencing can be used in many ways to reduce the isolation of remote areas, 
for  example in agriculture  (access  to  price information  and  remote  auctions),  and 
health  (using  videoconferencing  to  consult  with  specialists  in  other  hospitals). 
Therefore ISDN should become a universal service, as it allows videoconferencing. 
•  The  Swedish  agency's  requirement  was  straightforward:  when  a  service  is  in 
widespread use in cities, then it should be made universal.  Thus,  a service such as 
ISDN, which is available in major cities and used by businesses there, should be made 
available throughout the country. 
3.5.2  Development of Universal Service 
All of  the development agencies interviewed felt that lack of access to ISDN is a problem 
for businesses in their areas, and wish ISDN to be added to universal service for business 
customers,  although  Scottish  Enterprise  conceded  that  it  may  not  be justifiable at  the 
moment.  The Welsh Development Agency favours government 'pump priming' to  give 
services enough momentum to be successful on a commercial basis, although it agrees for 
the need to  first require evidence of user demand.  Other services which received some 
support were itemised billing,  access  to  digital  services  operating on SS7,  and  CLASS 
services.  It was generally felt that lack of access to  these services at  a reasonable price 
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was  disadvantaging  existing businesses  in  their areas  and  making  it  more  difficult  to 
attract new businesses. 
3.5.3  Tariffing Issues 
Scottish Enterprise and Udan1s na Gaeltachta strongly oppose the removal of geographic 
averaging,  believing  that  it  will  lead  to  peripheral  regions  being  even  further 
disadvantaged.  The  Welsh  Development  Agency  sees  that  the  end  of geographical 
averaging as inevitable, but wants it to continue until the arrival of  real competition in all 
areas, and believes that,  even then,  the price for telecoms services should be regulated, 
with the price in any part of the country not allowed to exceed a specified amount.  The 
Swedish agency  sees  geographical  averaging  disappearing,  with the  peripheral  regions 
being disadvantaged in the short term.  However, it believes competition and technical 
innovation will see that disadvantage eroded in the longer term, and all regions will have 
similar prices for similar services. 
3.6  TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS 
In the course of this  study we contacted both trade unions  and groups concerned with 
social issues.  The trade unions interviewed fall into three categories: 
•  those  with  a  direct  or  indirect  interest  in  the  telecoms  sector:  Deutsche 
Postgewerkschaft, Communication Workers Union, IPTT (Internationale du Personnel 
des  Pastes, Telegraphes et Telephones),  Eurofedop  (European Federation of Public 
Service Employees) 
•  those  with  a  direct  or  indirect  interest  in  the  emerging  Information  Society: 
International Committee of  Entertainment and Media Unions, International Federation 
of  Journalists 
•  those representing more general trades union groups: ETUC (European Trades Union 
Confederation). 
In addition, we spoke with the  Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer pour le  Progres de 
l'Homme which is concerned with the development of  social policy. 
It is important to note that, in discussing the future of universal service in Europe, trade 
unions and social organisations tend to take a long view, looking towards the Information 
Society of  the future.  They are clearly concerned with how liberalisation of the telecoms 
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market will affect their members, but also with wider consideration of the nature of work 
in the future and the impact on the rights and benefits of  workers in general as a result of 
changes brought about by widespread deployment of  communications technologies. 
3.6.1  Scope of Universal Service 
The positions expressed by most of  the organisations we interviewed related to the role of 
universal  service  when  the  Information  Society  is  a  reality.  There  was  therefore  a 
considerable  amount  of support  for  the  inclusion  of broadband  services.  The  CSC 
maintains that, in an Information Society, universal service should be as comprehensive as 
possible.  The  ICEMU maintains  that  all  individuals  must  have  access  to  broadband 
services to obtain employment, enjoy leisure, receive information and exercise citizenship. 
The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft maintains that access to telecoms services is becoming a 
fundamental  right  for  citizens  comparable  with  access  to  schools  and  universities.  It 
believes that a true Information Society cannot be based on just a minimum offering for 
the  poor  and  so  universal  service  must  cover  not  only  the  basic  telecommunications 
network, but also access to, and use of, ISDN. 
One of the unions interviewed (SUD) took a more cautious approach to the development 
of universal  service.  It believes  that  it  is  necessary  to  prioritise  the  requirements  of 
citizens, and that the top priority is to guarantee access to basic telephone services for all 
inhabitants of  Europe as well as making specific regulations to guarantee those services in 
the face of  social exclusion and poverty. 
3.6.2  Development of Universal Service 
A  number  of unions  raised  the  issue  of access  to  information  being  essential  for 
empowerment of European citizens in the  future.  It is  clear that,  in the  short term,  it 
would be prohibitively expensive to provide every citizen with all the equipment required 
for  accessing the Internet or similar services and so  it is  necessary to make information 
available  to  citizens  via  public  access  points  in  libraries  or  other  public  buildings. 
Eurofedop favours the mass business approach to deploying technologies in the market at 
an  affordable  price.  Here  the  government  chooses  a  technology  and  creates  the 
circumstances for its widespread deployment in society rather than waiting for the market 
to deliver widespread technology deployment. 
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However, it is not sufficient to provide the equipment for access to information.  The vast 
majority  of people  in  the  European  Union  are  not  computer  literate.  Although  the 
proportion of  computer literate people is growing all the time, it will be many years before 
the  majority  of citizens  will  be  comfortable  using  computers.  Therefore  it  will  be 
necessary for a basic training in computer literacy to be available to  those who wish to 
learn. 
The  anticipated  growth  of teleworking  is  a  cause  of some  concern  for  trade  unions. 
Considerable attention has been devoted to  the potential pitfalls faced by teleworkers in 
terms of coping with the stresses of conventional work without the social benefits, and 
bearing costs such as office space, power, and heating which conventional employees do 
not  have  to  bear.  However,  the  issue  of how  the  blurring  of the  boundary between 
business  and  residential  usage  of telecoms  services  should  affect  the  definition  of 
universal service was not addressed. 
All but one of the unions spoken to  favoured funding universal service from  a universal 
service fund contributed to by all of  the players in the telecoms sector.  SUD believes that 
the existence of  a monopoly incumbent TO is the best way to ensure universal service.  At 
the other extreme, Eurofedop took the position that, while a universal service fund was the 
best  method  in  the  short  to  medium  term,  if real  competition  in  telecoms  becomes 
widespread in Europe, there will be no need for universal service and its funding ceases to 
be an issue. 
3.6.3  Tariffing Issues 
There is support for the continuation of geographic averaging beyond the introduction of 
competition in 1998.  It is regarded as being too important a mechanism for social equity 
to be discontinued, despite the difficulties in implementing it in a competitive market.  Far 
from accepting a diminution of geographical averaging at a national level, SUD maintains 
that there should be some form of  geographic averaging across the EU.  It suggests that the 
EU should assume  tariff control powers  with  a view  to  harmonising  tariffs  across  all 
Member States.  The ICEMU broadens the issue even further: it believes that the arrival of 
the  Information  Society  should be  seen  as  an  opportunity  to  reduce  the  inequality of 
communications  capability  between  countries:  "Telecommunications  penetration  and 
network development in different  countries  already  reflects  the  massive  inequalities in 
wealth and power in the  international community.  The advent of broadband networks 
must not widen these already huge divisions." 
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3.7  ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTING THE DISABLED 
In the course of the study we spoke to two organisations concerned with universal service 
from the perspective of the disabled customer.  These were COST 219,  an  organisation 
concerned with all disabilities and how they affect the lives of disabled people, and a UK 
body  called  Telecommunications  Action  Group  which  is  concerned  with  access  to 
telecoms services for people with hearing disabilities. 
3.7.1  Scope of Universal Service 
According to the organisations interviewed, universal service definition must incorporate 
considerations  of  access  to  telecoms  services  for  people  with  disabilities.  Most 
commentators  discuss  universal  service  in the  context  of access  for  people  in remote 
locations  or access  to  services  for  people  of limited  financial  means.  However,  the 
organisations we contacted argue that the issue of  access for people with disabilities is just 
as fundamental as access for people in remote locations. 
The  difficulty which people  with disabilities  encounter in accessing  telecoms  services 
obviously varies depending on the nature of the disability.  Special equipment is required 
to enable people with hearing and speech difficulties to communicate over the telephone 
network.  However,  disabled people are affected in a range of different ways, many of 
which make telephone services difficult, impossible or prohibitively expensive for them to 
use.  The  organisations  interviewed  believe  that  universal  service  should  strive  to 
eliminate  these  difficulties  and  make  telecoms  services  affordable  for  people  with 
disabilities. 
3. 7.2  Development of Universal Service 
Table 3.1  illustrates the wide range of problems which disabled people face in using the 
telephone, together with a variety of  possible solutions. 
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TABLE 3.1: 
Disability 
Hearing difficulty 
Sight difficulty 
Hearing and sight 
difficulty 
Motor difficulty 
Cognitive disability 
Some of  the Problems Faced by the Disabled in Using the Telephone 
Service 
Problem  Possible solution 
Cannot hear speech  Teletype service with 
relay or inductive 
couplers which interact 
with hearing aid 
Cannot hear telephone  Flashing light attached to 
nnging  nnger 
Access to public phones  Ensure that a proportion 
of  public telephones are 
text phones 
Dialling  'Pip' on the 5 key on 
push button phones 
Use of  paper directories  Access to telephone 
.  . 
enquiry service 
Cannot hear speech or  Teletype Braille 
read teletype  attachment 
Access to public  Consideration given to 
telephones  access for wheelchairs in 
siting and housing public 
telephones 
Disconnection of  call  Extend time-outs for 
before dialling is  some customers 
complete, due to time-
out 
Confusion when faced  Make human assistance 
with automated systems  more available 
Confusion with  Ensure that simple 
complicated telephones  telephone handsets are 
available 
Some of  these solutions are expensive to implement; for example, a teletype service with 
relay requires is expensive in terms of the equipment required and the human resources 
needed to  operate the  relay service.  Both of the  organisations  which we  interviewed 
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emphasised that the needs of the disabled are far better served and at much lower cost if 
the solutions are incorporated at the initial design phase of equipment and services rather 
than 'bolted on' as an afterthought.  An example of such a solution is the 'pip' on the '5' 
key of push button telephone dials which allows people with sight difficulties to identify 
the keys for dialling. 
There was agreement that  a  set of minimum standards  should be defined  for  network 
facilities  for the disabled,  and that suitable terminal equipment should be available.  In 
particular, the interviewees believed that specialist terminal equipment should be available 
to  the disabled on a rental basis in the  same way that standard handsets are.  As  such 
terminal  equipment  is  usually  more  than  ten  times  the  price  of ordinary  telephone 
equipment a rental arrangement could reduce the barrier of  high initial equipment costs. 
3.7.3  Tariffing Issues 
It is not the aim of organisations which represent the disabled to seek special favours for 
disabled people.  They maintain that many of the requests they make on behalf of their 
members are designed simply to bring access to telephone services for the disabled up to 
the level enjoyed by other customers.  Where small additional costs are imposed on the 
disabled person then there is not a great issue of access to consider.  However, additional 
costs can mount up very quickly due to a combination of the need for special equipment 
and the longer usage time required for communication.  Just as people who incur very high 
additional telecoms costs due to their geographical location argue that funding should be 
available to offset some of the disadvantage they face,  organisations which represent the 
disabled maintain that funding should be available for people whose disability means they 
incur very high  additional  costs.  One  way of providing this  funding  would be  via a 
universal service fund. 
3.8  CONCLUSIONS 
A number of strong themes have emerged from our discussions with organisations which 
have an interest in the development of  universal service.  The most important of these are 
as follows: 
•  There is a broad consensus that access to telecoms services is an important issue and 
an  acknowledgement that  it  is  becoming increasingly important  as  the  Information 
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Society emerges.  This consensus extends to  supporting the use of universal service 
obligations as a means of  reducing the risk of  social exclusion. 
•  Universal  service  is  seen  as  an  issue  for  residential  customers  only.  Business 
customers do not need the protection of  universal service. 
•  With the exception of  development agencies we found almost no support for extending 
universal service to cover more than basic telephony services.  There was a divergence 
of  opinion between operators and consumer associations about what constitutes a basic 
service.  Consumer  associations  support  the  inclusion of itemised billing  and  call 
barring as  they provide basic information on and control over telecoms expenditure. 
Some operators are concerned about the cost of  including such services. 
•  Most of the  organisations  interviewed  were  hostile  to  the  idea of using  universal 
service to roll out new technology rather than to complete established networks. 
•  There  was  acknowledgement  from  most  of the  interviewees  that  geographical 
averaging of  prices is unsustainable in a competitive telecoms market. 
•  A lack of  creativity and flexibility in the tariffing of  fixed telephone services is seen as 
a  significant  impediment  to  the  take-up  of telephone  services.  The  frequency  of 
billing is also an issue for some customers. 
•  Access  to  telecoms  for  disabled  customers  is  directly  comparable  with  access  for 
customers in remote geographical locations. 
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4/  Practices in Other Sectors 
Telephone services have traditionally been grouped with other utilities such as gas, water 
and electricity, which provide essential services for the population and require extensive 
networks deliver their services.  In the past these characteristics were considered powerful 
arguments  for  the  creation  of 'natural'  monopolies  which  delivered  services  to  large 
sections of the population, if not the population as  a whole.  (It was not always the case 
that a single organisation provided these services throughout a country, but a customer 
would generally be able to get utility services from only one supplier in a given area.) 
In the course of this study we spoke to providers of utilities and regulators in the  water, 
electricity and gas sectors to find out how they deal with obligations to provide universal 
service to their customers.  We concentrated on countries where liberalisation has resulted 
in utility providers which are privately owned and already face,  or will face,  competition 
from  other suppliers.  Interviews were conducted with the regulators of water,  gas  and 
electricity sectors in the UK, with Lyonnaise des Eaux (French water company), and with 
the providers of gas, water and postal services in Australia and the postal service in New 
Zealand.  The inclusion of interviews in Australia and New Zealand allowed the study to 
consider in detail the problems of  providing universal service in remote and rural areas. 
This chapter describes the nature of the  obligations placed on  operators in these  other 
sectors and draws conclusions as to the applicability in the telecoms sector of some of  the 
issues raised. 
4.1  THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN THE UK 
The  electricity  industry  in  the  UK  is  entirely  held  in  private  hands.  Generation  of 
electricity is carried out by a number of competing companies including National Power, 
Powergen, and British Energy.  National distribution is carried out by the National Grid 
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Company.  Local  distribution  is  provided  by  14  regional  electricity  companies  which 
currently do not compete for residential customers.  All of these companies are successor 
companies to  the  nationalised  electricity companies  and hold Public Electricity Supply 
(PES) licences.  Another type of  licence (Second Tier Supply licence) is available to: 
•  generators supplying direct to customers 
•  regional electricity companies wishing to supply outside their areas. 
•  resellers of  electricity from other sources. 
Currently, only large business customers have a choice as  to  where they purchase their 
electricity.  However,  this  will  change  in  1998  when  both  residential  and  business 
customers will be able to  seek supply from any electricity generator.  National and local 
distribution  of electricity  will  remain  a  monopoly  for  residential  customers  for  the 
foreseeable future,  although functions such as meter reading and connection are likely to 
be separated and made subject to competition. 
In 1998, when generators of electricity are free to  compete for domestic customers, then 
they  will  take  on  a  universal  service  obligation  to  provide  services  to  all  domestic 
customers.  However they can refuse to  supply some domestic  customers  for  "reasons 
beyond their control".  Regional electricity companies cannot refuse to provide service. 
Electricity supplies are connected to an electricity meter which must by law be housed in a 
building.  Connection incurs a standard charge except when the distance to the building is 
unusually  long:  then  the  electricity  company  is  allowed  to  recover  its  costs  from  the 
customer.  Electricity prices vary from  area to  area in the UK, but within a single area 
prices must be in accordance with a regulated tariff which must be published.  This tariff 
includes different charges for electricity depending on whether or not access to electricity 
is via prepayment meter. 
When customers of electricity companies have difficulties paying their bills, procedures 
agreed by the  regulator state  that  the  next  step  is  for  the  customer and  the  electricity 
company to discuss how debts can be cleared.  One of  the standard approaches to dealing 
with customers  who  are  in  arrears  is  to  offer them  a pre-paid  electricity meter which 
eliminates the danger of  future debts. 
Prepaid meters are smartcard-controlled; the smartcard can have credits loaded onto it in 
post offices, electricity company shops and other outlets.  The system is designed so that, 
if the  credits  run  out  in  the  night  or  at  the  weekend,  the  subscriber  is  allowed  to 
accumulate a small debt in order that electricity supplies are not disconnected at  a time 
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when it is not possible to restore credits on the card.  This debt is recouped then next time 
the card is loaded with credits.  Furthermore, when a customer has accumulated debts, the 
smart card can be calibrated to  charge a higher amount of money per unit of electricity 
than for normal prepayment.  The extra payment is put towards the elimination of  the debt. 
Since the introduction of  the code of  practice for domestic consumers in 1991, the rate of 
disconnection of electricity customers in the UK has fallen from nearly 13 000 per annum 
in 1992/3 to 1083 in 1994/5, a fall of  more than 90%.  Table 4.1  shows the disconnection 
rate per region over the three years.  Currently in the United Kingdom more than 12% of 
electricity customers use prepaid meters. 
TABLE 4.1: 
Company 
Eastern 
East Midlands 
London 
Man  web 
Midlands 
Northern 
NOR  WEB 
SEEBOARD 
Southern 
SWALEC 
South Western 
Yorkshire 
Hydro Electric 
Scottish Power 
TOTAL 
Residential Customer Electricity Disconnections in the UK,  1991-
I  1996 [Source: OFFER} 
199112  1992/3  1993/4  1994/5  1995/6  % 
Reduction 
1589  882  508  229  238  85 
1414  390  311  153  56  96 
8019  526  139  0  0  100 
1122  350  23  27  30  97 
5033  963  211  8  7  99 
3364  2431  184  39  54  98 
218  468  344  270  101  54 
2521  1123  101  23  0  100 
5276  1338  185  128  73  99 
563  207  54  35  24  96 
2717  834  66  94  67  98 
1839  1804  397  36  4  99 
1570  471  227  14  10  99 
5773  936  67  27  10  99 
41018  12723  2817  1083  674  98 
1  Report on Customer Services  1994/95, Office  of Electricity Regulation  (OFFER).  Reproduced  with  the  kind permission of 
OFFER. 
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OFFER monitors quality of service in the UK electricity industry.  Electricity companies 
are  required  to  meet  guaranteed  standards  of performance,  and  results  are  published 
annually.  There is a voluntary compensation scheme for performance which fails to meet 
the specified targets. 
4.2  THE WATER INDUSTRY IN THE UK 
The water industry in England and Wales is in private hands, with 32 water companies 
operating monopolies for residential supply in their regions.  Unlike the electricity and gas 
industries, there is no national water distribution network.  Water supply in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland is still in public ownership.  Under Section 51 of  the Water Industry Act, 
water companies are obliged to supply water to customers in their areas if  requested by the 
owner of  the property. 
Residential customers for water are billed in three ways. 
•  Un-metered customers are billed according to the rateable valuation of their property 
and pay a fixed charge for water and sewerage services.  Additional fixed charges are 
made for using devices such as sprinklers which use a lot of  water. 
•  Metered customers pay a standard charge which covers only the cost of  meter reading 
and billing.  They then pay a charge for each cubic metre of water used in a billing 
period.  The  charges  per  cubic  metre  currently  varies  between  £0.41  and  £1.06 
depending on the region of  the country. 
•  The budget payment scheme is a method for prepayment of  water bills.  A smartcard 
unit is installed in the customer's home and the customer is given a smart card which 
can be charged with credits, allowing the customer to use the water service normally 
for a given period of  time.  Credits are transferred from the smartcard to the unit when 
the card is inserted in the box.  An emergency credit period is programmed into the 
card so that there is a period between the expiry of the credits and a shut off of the 
water supply.  If the unit runs out of credits, the water supply can be immediately 
restored by inserting a charged card.  As with the electricity smartcard scheme, the 
card can be calibrated to a higher tariff  to repay an outstanding debt. 
The  introduction of the budget  scheme  and  the  code of practice  for  disconnection of 
customers has  had a  dramatic  effect on the number of disconnections  in England and 
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Wales.  Table 4.2 shows the number of  disconnections since the financial year 1991/2 and 
how they have fallen since the introduction of  the code of  practice in 1992. 
Ofwat monitors quality of service in the UK water industry and ensures that companies 
meet their legally-guaranteed standards.  Customers are entitled to compensation if these 
standards are not met.  Quality of service measures include customer service aspects (e.g. 
punctuality), time to repair faults, and water quality. 
TABLE 4.2: 
Company 
Anglian 
Bournemouth 
Bristol 
Cambridge 
Chester 
Cholderton 
Dwr Cym:ru 
East Surrey 
Essex & Suffolk 
Folkestone 
Hartlepool 
Mid Kent 
Mid Southern 
North East 
North Surrey 
North West 
Northum  brian 
Portsmouth 
Severn Trent 
South East 
South Staffs 
South West 
Southern 
Sutton 
T'ring Hundred 
Thames 
Three Valleys 
Residential Customer Water Disconnections in England and Wales, 
2  1991-1996 [Source: OFWAT] 
91/92  92/93  93194  94/95  95196  %Reduction 
1306  214  978  403  204  84 
342  72  95  42  49  86 
111  89  149  225  177  (60) 
323  303  304  264  32  90 
13  106  49  36  20  (54) 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
2938  2316  527  84  81  97 
95  123  86  34  46  52 
197  272  270  345  166  16 
32  132  179  44  42  (31) 
94  37  10  135  24  74 
715  478  524  220  281  61 
376  820  900  149  27  93 
210  8  0  58  112  47 
11  420  188  335  145  (1200) 
2074  495  363  451  490  76 
705  709  363  183  37  95 
23  674  912  1514  512  (2100) 
1303  1222  590  553  462  65 
251  358  227  64  0  100 
3494  1878  698  302  254  93 
381  300  149  274  128  66 
2043  3158  1600  1330  360  82 
70  88  93  103  72  (3) 
59  137  98  103  50  15 
61  852  1195  1130  1075  (1600) 
1471  1362  621  796  504  66 
2  Office of  Water Services (OFWAT) news release, 7 May 1996.  Reproduced with the kind permission ofOFWAT. 
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Wessex  39  154  2  7  0  100 
Wrexham  0  26  30  77  20  -
York  161  112  103  86  11  93 
Yorkshire  2384  1721  1149  700  382  84 
TOTAL  21282  18636  12452  10047  5826  73 
Note: The water regulator does not regard water supply interruption by smartcard units as 
disconnection of  the customer from the water supply. 
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4.3  THE GAS INDUSTRY IN THE UK 
British Gas  was privatised in  1986  and  has  operated as  a  single  company since  then. 
However, the company is now proposing to separate into two parts: a gas supply company 
(equivalent to  a generator in the  electricity industry)  and a distribution company.  The 
distribution company will retain a monopoly over the distribution of gas in the UK for the 
foreseeable future. 
On  the  supply  side,  when  British  Gas  was  privatised,  competition  was  opened  for 
customers who were heavy users of gas (more than 25 000 therms per annum).  In 1992, 
this threshold was lowered to 2500 therms per annum.  British Gas now faces competition 
from more than 30 other companies. 
On the distribution side, the only current player (British Gas Transco, soon to be renamed 
BG pic) is obliged to provide gas to a customer whose property is within 23  metres of a 
gas main pipe.  Customers living at a greater distance can be supplied if  they are willing to 
pay the  full  cost of the  connection.  Pilot programmes  of full  competition  (including 
domestic consumers) are currently underway in the South of England in advance of full 
competition in 1998.  Where  competition for  residential customers  exists,  a residential 
customer living within 23 meters of  a gas main must be supplied by any provider of  gas if 
a customer requests  supply.  Larger commercial customers have no  rights  to  insist on 
supply. 
Where customers have a history of  poor payment or are regarded as a credit risk then they 
can  have  a  prepayment  meter  fitted  for  gas  services.  These  meters  are  similar  in 
functionality to the meters described for the electricity and water industries.  The impact of 
prepayment meters on the annual number of  disconnections is shown in Exhibit 4.1. 
OFGAS requires all suppliers of gas to provide special services to their older, chronically 
sick  or disabled  customers  including  those  who  are  partially  sighted  or have  hearing 
difficulties.  Suppliers provide help and advice on the safe use of gas, including a free gas 
safety check on request.  They also  supply special adaptors and controls for those who 
have difficulty using their gas appliances.  However, they do not offer price discounts to 
such customers. 
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EXHIBIT 4.1:  Residential Customer Gas Disconnections in England and Wales 
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4.4  THE WATER INDUSTRY IN FRANCE 
There are 13 000 Collectivites in France, local authority bodies which are responsible for 
water distribution.  Each  Collectivite  either has  its  own  water department  (a regie)  or 
subcontracts  water  distribution to  one  of the  five  major private  water  groups  such  as 
Lyonnaise  des  Eaux  and  Compagnie  Generale  des  Eaux.  Approximately  45%  of the 
Collectivites  run  their  own  water  department,  but  the  private  water  companies  are 
dominant in densely-populated areas and service 75% of the population of  France.  There 
is  real  competition to  be the  water company in each Collectivite;  every year there  are 
around 400 competitions for water services and  around 50 of the resulting contracts are 
awarded  to  a supplier other  than the  incumbent.  There  is  no  regulator  for  the  water 
industry; the Collectivites, as  the customers of the water suppliers, ensure that standards 
are maintained. 
3  UK Gas Consumers Council Annual Report, 1995.  Reproduced by kind permission of the UK Gas Consumers Council. 
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There are no special schemes providing assistance for customers with payment difficulties 
or  special  needs.  However,  disconnections  are  very  rare:  if a  customer  gets  into 
difficulties, the water company will usually contact the customer and the local authority, 
and special payment arrangements and extra assistance are arranged. 
4.5  THE GAS INDUSTRY IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
Gas & Fuel is a monopoly which supplies gas to customers in Victoria (there is no single 
gas  supplier which covers the  whole of Australia).  It is currently owned by the  State 
government, but this position will change in mid-1996 with the break-up and privatisation 
of  the gas industry nationwide, when it will fall under the responsibilities of  the Regulator-
General.  Gas is currently charged at a standard price across the State, although this may 
not continue under the new regime. 
Gas is piped from the mains located in the street to the gas meter, usually located at the 
house.  If  this distance is up to 23 metres from the main gas pipe then the customer pays a 
standard  connection  charge.  For distances  of between  23  metres  and  55  metres,  the 
customer pays an additional fee to cover the cost of  the connection work.  Gas & Fuel will 
not carry out installations for distances greater than 55 metres, but will position the meter 
at  a suitable location, usually the  street,  with the remaining distance to  the  customer's 
premises being the responsibility of the customer.  Most of the State is serviced, with the 
exception  of some  country  areas  for  which  supply  is  not  economic.  In  such  areas 
customers may choose to use either bottled gas or electricity.  98% of houses built now 
are connected to gas. 
Gas & Fuel monitors itself against a number of  self-generated obligations which are based 
on customer satisfaction levels and benchmarked against gas  companies in other States 
and overseas.  Customer satisfaction is surveyed on a continual basis. 
There is no low user scheme,  but Gas  &  Fuel is  developing some programmes for the 
disabled and elderly.  Its universal service activities for 1995 included: 
•  Easy-Way instalment payment scheme, A$1. 7 million (ECU1 million) 
•  administration of State Government's Winter Energy Concession to  pensioners  and 
beneficiaries, A$0.5 million (ECU0.3 million).
4 
Gas & Fuel Annual Report 1995. 
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There is a formal disconnection process.  First, the Gas & Fuel will try to agree a payment 
plan.  If this is not possible, the customer applies for an Energy Relief Grant (ERG), a 
once-off payment of  the bill funded by the State government.  If  the customer still cannot 
pay,  options such as  council assistance,  charities or financial  counselling are explored. 
The customer is disconnected as a last resort.  A customer is reconnected once the account 
is paid, and must pay a reconnection fee of  A$15 (ECU9) or a minimum of  A$30 (ECU18) 
if  the service was disconnected at the street.  A deposit is required if a customer has been 
disconnected due to arrears more than twice. 
4.6  THEW  ATER INDUSTRY IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
There  are  three  water and  sewerage  companies  ('Licensees')  operating  in Melbourne. 
Water companies serving rural areas in the State of Victoria are not currently regulated. 
The Licensees must supply the customer with water supply service to meet his reasonable 
needs,  except if the water supply is  restricted or disconnected  in accordance with the 
customer charter. The Licensees are not required to provide a customer with the minimum 
flow rate if: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the property service pipe is the customer's responsibility to maintain and is damaged 
or in poor condition 
there is a planned or unplanned interruption of  the customer's water supply 
there is a water shortage due to peak summer demand 
there is a water shortage due to a drought or an unavoidable cause 
Melbourne  Water  Corporation
5  has  informed  the  Licensees  that  the  water  supply 
should be reduced to avoid a water shortage in the future. 
In  the  last  two  cases,  supply  of water  will  be  restricted  to  all  customers  1n  equal 
proportions unless the Minister decides otherwise. 
Quality of service measures  exist relating to  water quality and interruption of service. 
Licensees  must  ensure  that  the  supply  of drinking  water  is  clear  and  free  from 
objectionable odour and taste, and that the quality of the water complies with the health-
related parameters set by the Department of  Health and Community Services.  They must 
ensure that there  are  no  more than five  unplanned interruptions of a  customer's water 
Melbourne Water collects and stores water in dams and reservoirs, distributes to  retail  companies, treats sewage collected by 
retail companies and operates the drainage system. 
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supply,  and three  unplanned interruptions  of a customer's  sewerage  service  each year. 
The water supply must be restored  as  quickly  as  possible,  with the  licence  conditions 
requiring 90% of  interruptions restored within five hours.  The Licensee must also ensure 
customers have  access  to  emergency supplies  of water.  Interruptions  to  the  sewerage 
service must be restored as quickly as possible.  For planned interruptions, the Licensee 
must inform customers in writing of the time and duration at  least two working days in 
advance. 
Customers are eligible for concessions if they hold a Pensioner Concession Card, Health 
Care  Card,  Health  Benefits  Card,  Dependent  Treatment  Entitlement  Card  (for  War 
Widows) or Personal Treatment Entitlement Card.  Special needs customers, such as those 
who require a water supply to operate a life support system, should be registered with the 
Licensee.  Customers  registered  for  health  reasons  cannot  be  disconnected  for  non-
payment. 
If a customer is having difficulty in paying the bill, the Licensee must give the customer 
information  on  alternative  payment  schemes,  once-off  government  funded  financial 
assistance  (under  the  Water  Rates  and  Charges  Relief Grants  Scheme),  government-
funded  concessions  to  eligible  customers  or  refer  the  customer  to  a  no-cost  and 
independent financial counsellor.  A customer owing more than A$75  (ECU47) may be 
disconnected due to non-payment, but only as  a last resort after other options have been 
fully  explored.  Customers  cannot be disconnected if it is  a Friday,  a weekend,  public 
holiday or the day before a public holiday.  Service is restored once payment is received, 
or agreement over how payment will occur has been reached.  A Licensee may charge a 
reconnection fee. 
4. 7  THE POSTAL SERVICE IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia Post operates under the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989.  Section 27 of 
the Act requires that: 
•  Australia Post provide a letter service for both domestic and international mail 
•  the  letter service be available  at  a single uniform price  for  standard letters  carried 
within Australia by ordinary post 
•  in  view of its  social  importance,  the  letter  service  be reasonably  accessible  to  all 
people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry out business 
•  the performance standards (including delivery times) for the letter service reasonably 
meet the social, industrial and commercial needs of  the Australian community. 
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The  cost  of providing  universal  service  was  estimated  to  be  A$65  million  (ECU40 
million) for 1994/95. 
Universal service covers only the letter service, not parcels.  The standard letter rate is 
A$0.45; other items such as large letters and bulk posting are not uniformly priced. 
There is a daily delivery service, five days a week, to 98-99% of  households.  Letters are 
delivered to the edge of  the property in most cases.  In some country areas where there is 
no regular delivery service, a roadside service is provided by a contractor at a convenient 
location.  According to  its  1994/95  Annual Report,  Australia Post services  7. 7 million 
addresses.  Of  those, 2.2 million addresses are in rural and remote areas: 94% received five 
deliveries per week (compared with 99.8% in metropolitan areas).  Of the remainder in 
rural and remote areas,  5.8% received deliveries two to  four times per week,  and 0.2% 
once a week.  Around 8% of  rural and remote delivery points do not currently receive a "to 
the property" delivery service, but could do so if they wished.  Many of these customers 
prefer existing arrangements, such as a concessional Post Office Box. 
Location of  street posting boxes are at Australia Post's discretion, but it does consult with 
local  communities  as  to  location,  and  may continue to  maintain boxes  at  uneconomic 
locations if  they are close to particular locations, such as homes for the elderly. 
There are no special provisions for the disabled or elderly made available by Australia 
Post, except that pensioners can get one free redirection order per year (redirecting mail 
for  three  months  to  a  new  permanent  address).  The  Social  Security  Department 
administers a scheme to subsidise free postage of  certain articles for some disabled people, 
such as the blind, and pays Australia Post market rates for the service. 
4.8  THE POSTAL SERVICE IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand Post was  established  as  a  State-owned  enterprise  in April  1987,  and is 
registered as a limited liability company.  The Postal Services Act 1987 (as amended by 
the Postal Services Amendment Act 1990) provides New Zealand Post with a statutory 
monopoly on the commercial  delivery of letters  under 200g in weight,  unless  at  least 
NZ$0.80 or more is charged.  The statutory monopoly covers standard letters, bulk mail, 
and certain large items. 
In return for the statutory protection of the Act, New Zealand Post concluded a Deed of 
Understanding with the Government, which has been extended to 31  March 1997.  Under 
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the terms of  the Deed, New Zealand Post is required to maintain defined levels of service 
and price for the basic letter post.  The Deed requires uniform pricing, defines the rate of 
price rises for the basic letter, and determines the frequency of deliveries and the size of 
the postal network in terms of postal outlets and delivery centres.  NZ Post is required to 
publish performance results in its Annual Report. 
New Zealand Post regularly delivers mail to 1.3 million delivery points: 75% of  these are 
urban residents,  15%  are  businesses  and the remaining  10%  are  rural residents  served 
either  by direct  delivery  to  residential  address  via  a  rural  delivery  box,  or  through 
collection facilities offered to the addressee (private box, counter collection or community 
mail boxes).  Rural delivery boxes comprise 8.8% of delivery points and account for 10% 
of  total annual mail.  Box holders pay an annual fee ofNZ$80 (ECU44) and have varying 
frequencies  of service:  91.2%  receive  deliveries  six  days  a  week,  8%  receive  five 
deliveries per week, and 0.8% receive between one and four deliveries per week. 
From 1921, rural householders requiring a delivery service had to pay a rural delivery fee. 
This charge was abolished in April1995.  While there have been a number of closures of 
rural post offices in recent years, these were generally replaced by postal agencies which 
are  typically held  by some  other retail  business  and  are  open  for  longer  hours,  thus 
increasing the availability of  postal services. 
4.9  CONCLUSIONS 
The most important lesson to  be learned by the telecoms  sector from  the  other sectors 
considered in this  chapter:  the  importance of soft  access  to  the  network.  Soft access 
eliminates the possibility of  the customer getting into difficulty with debt, by ensuring that 
the customer only has access to the service when it is already paid for.  It also reduces the 
need for the customer to cope with a number of large bills each year.  The customer is 
deprived of service only for the period during which he is unable to  afford the service, 
avoids expensive reconnection charges to be paid when service is resumed, and does not 
get into difficult disputes with the company providing the service. 
The success of soft  access  in reducing the number of disconnections  in an industry is 
obvious from the experiences of UK electricity, gas and water sectors.  In these sectors 
there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of disconnections from  the network 
since the introduction of soft access  schemes:  more than 90% in the electricity sector, 
more than 70% in the water sector and by more than half  in the gas sector. 
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The prepayment meters installed by water and electricity companies are not appropriate 
for  a telecoms  solution.  However,  a  scheme  which  uses  some  form  of rechargeable 
prepaid calling card could be used.  If soft access were applied to customers of telephone 
services,  they  would pay  considerably  more  for  each  telephone  call  than  an  ordinary 
customer.  However  they  would  not  have  to  pay  a  regular  rental  charge,  which  is  a 
significant barrier to taking up the service in the first case. 
Another lesson from the experience and philosophy of  universal service in other sectors is 
that  business  customers  are  deemed  to  require  significantly  less  protection  and  fewer 
guarantees of  service than residential customers.  This attitude is visible in the UK gas and 
electricity sectors, and is founded on the belief that there is more competition for business 
customers. 
A third lesson shows how an  essential service such  as  water supply can have different 
prices  for  different  regions  of the  country,  depending  on  the  cost  of providing  those 
services.  The  prices  which  water  companies  in England  and  Wales  charge  domestic 
customers  for  water supply  vary  from  one  part of the  country to  another,  with prices 
reflecting  the  costs  of providing  the  water  supply.  However,  the  disconnection  of 
customers  who  are  unable  to  pay  for  their  water  supply  does  not  represent  a  major 
problem.  Indeed the number of water customers who  are  disconnected (in an industry 
which does not have national geographical averaging of  prices) is significantly lower than 
the number of telecoms customers who are disconnected (in an industry which does have 
geographical averaging). 
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51  Technology and Demand Scenarios 
There  is  a  strong  consensus  among  those  interviewed  and  in  the  literature  that  the 
penetration of a service should be an important factor in determining whether that service 
is  considered  a  universal  service.  In other words,  penetration is  seen  as  a proxy  for 
demand.  It is  in the network completion phase of a service that the  issue of universal 
service becomes important, as it then that we see the failure of the market to bring service 
to all citizens as those who cannot afford the service are not connected. 
1  When penetration 
reaches high levels, then those who cannot afford the service are put at a disadvantage. 
Currently only basic telephony services are included in definitions of universal service. 
However, a number of  new services are now being rolled out which may enter the network 
completion phase in the next ten years or so.  Analysys has identified cellular telephony 
and basic rate ISDN as the two services which are most likely to develop in this way.  We 
have  therefore  developed two  scenarios  which project  demand  for  these  services  as  a 
proportion of  the number of  households in Europe, over the next ten years. 
It was originally proposed that this  study should investigate the  likely availability of a 
wide range of  new services (through detailed demand scenarios) and assess whether users 
and regulatory bodies would at some stage start to perceive these new services as being 
either  a  basic  public  social  good,  a  transactional  good  or  a  merit  good  (through  an 
understanding of the  triggers which lead to  a change in the perception of a  service or 
good).  However,  the  results  of the  interview  programme  indicated  that  such  detailed 
analysis  would  not  be  particularly  relevant  (see  Chapter  3),  and  that  a  more 
straightforward forecast of the development in market penetration of currently available 
services such as traditional PSTN, mobile and ISDN would be appropriate. 
1  Cave,  M,  Milne,  C,  and  Scanlan,  M,  (1994):  Meeting  Universal  Service  Obligations  in  a  Competitive  Environment  (ONP-
CCP(95), Report to CEC DGIV (March 1994). 
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The two demand scenarios described in this chapter were developed to  assess the likely 
penetration rates for these services over the period 1995-2005  in three country groups. 
These country groups  are  characterised by the  short- to  medium-term  outlook  for  the 
development of  competition and are composed as follows: 
•  Group 1: countries where full competition is well established (UK, Sweden, Finland) 
•  Group 2: countries in which competition is currently developing (France, Germany, the 
Netherlands) or where full competition has recently been introduced (Denmark) 
•  Group 3:  others (Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy and 
Ireland). 
These  demand  scenarios  form  the  basis  for  an  analysis  of the  requirement  for  future 
revisions  to  the  definition  of universal  service.  In  addition,  a  high-level  analysis  is 
undertaken of the costs associated with such revisions.  This high level analysis is based 
on current price levels  which  are  assumed  to  be related  to  the  cost of providing  the 
services.  The results reflect the cost of provision and not the  'net cost' to  a universal 
service fund which is likely to be lower. 
The general framework of Cave et al is used to interpret the projected penetration rates in 
the context of  universal service. A detailed description of this framework can be found in 
Annex  C.  In summary,  it  describes  four  stages  in  service  take-up,  each of which is 
characterised by a certain level of  take-up by residential and business users: 
•  Stage  1:  network establishment,  notional residential penetration between 0%  and 
10%, business penetration between 0%  and 30%.  A  current example is basic rate 
ISDN. 
•  Stage 2:  wide geographical reach, notional residential penetration between 5% and 
30%  business  penetration  between  20%  and  80%.  A  current  example  is  mobile 
telephony. 
•  Stage 3:  mass  market take-up,  notional residential penetration between 20% and 
85%, business penetration between 70% and 100%.  Only PSTN services have reached 
these  levels  of penetration  in  all  Member  States  although  mobile  telephony  has 
reached these levels in some Member States, particularly the Scandinavian countries. 
•  Stage  4:  network  completion,  notional  residential  penetration  between  75%  and 
100%, business penetration of 100%.  Only PSTN services have reached this level of 
penetration. 
Each  of these  stages  has  different  implications  for  universal  service.  This  study  is 
primarily  concerned  with  the  universal  service  issues  which  characterise  the  network 
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completion  phase.  As  mentioned  above,  this  stage  is  characterised  by  a  household 
penetration ofbetween 75% and 100%, and 100% penetration among business users.  The 
demand  scenarios  in  this  chapter  therefore  focus  on  the  development  of household 
penetration reflecting the views expressed by those interviewed, who considered universal 
service to be a matter of  concern only for the residential sector. 
Apart from the potential inclusion of  new services such as ISDN and mobile telephony in 
a future definition of universal service, the cost of universal service will also be affected 
by changes in existing usage patterns.  In particular, the strong growth in Internet usage 
leads to an increased usage of local calls by residential users, both in terms of  volume and 
duration.  This issue is explored in Section 5.5. 
In  addition  to  our analysis  of residential  demand,  we  have  also  undertaken  a  limited 
analysis  of the  cost  of providing  advanced  communication  facilities  and  services  to 
institutional users.  In particular, this chapter presents initial results of an analysis of the 
cost of providing ISDN access to schools, hospitals and public libraries.  The additional 
cost  associated  with  subscribing  to  Internet  services,  buying  appropriate  customer 
premises equipment and the installation of  the required internal cabling is also considered. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections.  Section 5.1  describes in qualitative terms the 
two  penetration  scenarios  which  have  been  developed  for  each  country  group.  The 
methodology used for quantifying household penetration rates is discussed in Section 5  .2. 
The results of the scenarios in terms of take-up of the services and implications for the 
definition of  universal service are analysed in Section 5.3.  Section 5.4 analyses the likely 
costs associated with extending the universal service definition as outlined in Section 5.3. 
Further implications for the cost of universal service of increased utilisation of the local 
loop due to factors such as increasing Internet access are discussed in Section 5.5.  Section 
5.6 deals with provision of  advanced communication facilities and services to institutional 
users, particularly the supply of ISDN to schools, hospitals and libraries.  Finally, Section 
5.7 summarises the overall conclusions and policy implications. 
5.1  PENETRATION SCENARIOS 
As  part of ongoing research into  the development of the European telecommunications 
sector Analysys  has  developed  a number  of demand  forecast  scenarios  for  traditional 
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PSTN,  ISDN and mobile services.  The results have been published in several studies 
undertaken by Analysys for the Commission. 
2 
For this study we have considered two demand scenarios.  The key factor distinguishing 
these scenarios is the development of telecoms liberalisation.  In particular the timing of 
the  events  which  distinguish  the  two  scenarios  are  largely  driven  to  the  degree  of 
consensus and unity achieved in the Single Market. 
Under the first  'rapid' scenario, there is a swift and uniform implementation of the pro-
competitive liberalisation framework proposed by the Commission, reflecting the fact that 
some  Member  States  have  chosen  to  introduce  liberalisation  in  advance  of the  1998 
deadline.  It takes full account of the various starting positions of the Member States, but 
assumes that they move rapidly to  create a stable and pro-competitive environment for 
investors, that investment opportunities are many and varied, and that the incumbent TO 
can also  benefit from  these opportunities.  New operators  are  granted licences without 
delay and with the minimum of  procedure and protocol.  Disputes are addressed speedily 
by authoritative and independent NRAs. 
Under the second 'gradual' scenario Member States are moving towards liberalisation, but 
at different rates;  for  instance, countries with derogations make use of them in order to 
delay the onset of fullliberalisation, but only Greece is expected to use the full derogation 
period to 2003.  The key issues of developing effective regulatory frameworks, promoting 
competition,  implementing  ownership  strategies  for  incumbent  TOs,  pricing  and  tariff 
rebalancing are implemented promptly in some Member States, but delayed in others.  The 
consequence  is  a more  liberalised  market  in  most  countries  but  a  longer  path to  full 
liberalisation in others  with the effects of liberalisation only being felt in 1999 or 2000 
rather than in early 1998. 
In terms of the effects of these scenarios on the three country groups, Group 1 countries 
(Finland,  Sweden  and  UK)  have  markets  which  are  already  liberalised  and  have been 
2  Performance of the  Telecommunications  Sector up to  2010 under Different Regulatory and Market  Options,  Analysys Final 
Report for CEC DGXIII/D2 (February 1992). 
Provision of  Quantitative Data as Background Material for the Bangemann Group, Analysys Final Report for EC  DGXIII (May 
1994). 
The Impact of  Advanced Communications on European Growth and Trade, Final Report of the METIER Project for EC DGXIII 
(September 1995). 
Impact of Telecoms  Liberalisation on  the Single Integrated Information  Market,  Analysys  Draft Final Report for  EC  DGXV 
(June 1996). 
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liberalised  for  some  time,  and  have  few  if any  regulatory  barriers  remaining  to 
competition.  As a result we anticipate very little difference between the two scenarios for 
Group 1 countries. 
Group 2 countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) will 
either implement liberalisation measures ahead of  the EU deadlines (or have already), or at 
least  in  good  time  to  meet  the  EU  deadlines.  However,  there  are  some  differences 
between the scenarios with regard to  the pace of progress,  and particularly the level of 
commitment,  towards  liberalisation.  In  the  rapid  scenario  we  assume  that  national 
regulators  are  quickly  given  the  power  to  establish  frameworks  for  negotiating 
interconnect  agreements  and  a  fair  and  reasonable  licence  agreement.  In  the  gradual 
scenario such a move to a liberalised environment is delayed until well into 1999.  Where 
price  controls  are  not  already  in place,  these  are  agreed  before  1998  under  the  rapid 
scenario, but delayed until around 2000 in the gradual scenario. 
In the rapid scenario, governments successfully distance themselves from the incumbent 
by selling off a majority stake in the operator by around the end of 1997.  In the gradual 
scenario the market reacts negatively to the likely prospects for such operators and so the 
share  sale  is  delayed  until  closer  to  the  end  of the  decade.  In  the  rapid  scenario 
liberalisation of voice services and infrastructure begins in 1996 and the market is fully 
liberalised in 1997, in advance of the  1 January 1998  deadline.  In the gradual scenario 
liberalisation only becomes a reality after the 1998 deadline, because of  legal challenges to 
liberalisation legislation and less than wholehearted political support for the liberalisation 
process. 
Group 3 countries (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain) achieve at best slow progress in implementing the liberalisation measures.  Internal 
political difficulties, the agendas of those with a vested interest in the existing structure, 
and  a lack of political commitment to  the  liberalisation process  all  combine to  hinder 
progress. 
In the rapid scenario, difficulties currently being experienced prove to be only short-term 
and are overcome quickly.  The regulators in all three countries establish growing power 
over the market in 1998.  The countries which have secured derogations for liberalisation 
move  more  rapidly  than  required.  By  2000  the  markets  in  all  countries  have  been 
effectively  liberalised,  and  effective  regulators  impose  price-cap  regulation  on  the 
incumbent  TOs.  Under  the  gradual  scenario,  intentions  to  implement  liberalisation 
evaporate and the markets remain clear of competition until well into  1999.  Even then, 
national regulators  are  unable to  effectively control  anti-competitive practices,  and real 
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liberalisation is delayed until 2000.  The countries with derogations make use of these, 
with Greece applying for the full possible derogations to 2003. 
The regulatory scenarios outlined above would have a significant impact on the structure 
and the development of the telecoms sector.  Table 5.1  provides an overview of the likely 
number of operators providing traditional  services in  the  EU under each  scenario,  and 
indicates their network coverage (in terms of  accessible population). 
TABLE 5.1:  Traditional Services Market Structure and Coverage 
Number of  Operators  % of  European Population with 
Access to More than one Operator 
1997  2000  2005  1997  2000  2005 
Local 
Rapid  74  92  125  7%  19%  37% 
Gradual  74  85  91  7%  17%  29% 
Long Distance 
Rapid  22  38  54  17%  44%  77% 
Gradual  22  37  45  17%  36%  59% 
International 
Rapid  5  8  12  7%  47%  84% 
Gradual  4  4  5  7%  31%  61% 
International Resale 
Rapid  12  16  8  38%  88%  98% 
Gradual  12  18  22  38%  75%  92% 
Service Providers 
Rapid  5  8  12  6%  31%  55% 
Gradual  3  5  7  5%  20%  45% 
5.2  HOUSEHOLD PENETRATION 
As  previously  mentioned,  this  study  builds  on  previous  forecasts  of the  size  of the 
subscriber base for traditional PSTN, ISDN and mobile services between 1995 and 2005 
in terms of the total number of connections.  The analysis is taken further in this study, 
through analysing the development in the business and residential sector separately.  In 
particular this study focuses  on assessing residential household penetration measured in 
the number of  connections per 100 households.  It is important to note that the penetration 
figures used here indicate the total number of connections divided by the total number of 
households,  which  does  not  necessarily  equate  to  subscribing  households.  Data  on 
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household penetration was only available for eight Member States (see Table A1  in Annex 
D).  This implies that the penetration figures used in this study will in general be higher 
than the actual number of subscribing households.  As a consequence the study takes an 
optimistic view of  the network roll out stage achieved as set out in the framework of Cave 
eta/. 
Population  forecasts  from  the  World  Bank  and  the  ITU/WTI  have  been  used  in 
constructing these penetration estimates.  Forecasts on the number of households have 
been obtained from a variety of sources, including the World Bank; each shows a gradual 
decline in the average size of household.  This implies that the number of households is 
growing at a faster rate than the total population.  Whereas the annual population growth 
rate  between  1996  and  2005  is  projected  to  be  around  0.3%,  the  total  number  of 
households is projected to grow around 1.3% per annum.  As a consequence penetration 
rates measured per household grow at a slower pace than penetration rates measured per 
head of  population. 
Our assumptions regarding the business/residential split are in keeping with the hypothesis 
that,  as  the  overall  penetration rate  of a  service  increases,  business  lines  represent  a 
reducing proportion of total lines: more and more residential users will adopt the service 
as  it matures and the  service becomes more affordable.  For example, residential lines 
accounted for around 79% of total connections in Europe in  1990 and for  an estimated 
82o/o  in 1996.  However, determining the proportion of total connections which can be 
classified as residential is problematic, as there is no common definition of a residential 
connection among the various European TOs 
•  The best data is  available for traditional PSTN connections:  it is  relatively easy to 
distinguish  residential  connections,  as  TOs  charge  differently  for  residential  and 
business connections. 
•  It is much more difficult to obtain data on the split between business and residential 
connections for mobile services.  Tariff structures and plans are based around monthly 
usage and do  not discriminate between business and residential users. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that residential users account for the majority of subscribers to 
the  so-called  low-user  tariff packages.  Studies  we  have  conducted  for  mobile 
operators suggest that subscribers to low-user packages account for nearly 50% of  the 
total  UK subscriber base  in  1996.  However,  the  UK mobile  market  is  relatively 
mature and so  we have assumed that residential subscribers will account for around 
80o/o of  subscribers to mobile telephony low user packages by 2005 across Europe. 
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•  The uptake of ISDN is currently mainly restricted to  business users.  However, we 
anticipate that residential lines will account for an increasing proportion of total lines 
as overall ISDN penetration grows.  This reflects the policy of most European TOs to 
price ISDN in a similar way to PSTN.  Annex E shows how the pricing of ISDN is 
related to the pricing ofPSTN.  As the price of  terminal equipment falls with increased 
penetration of  the business market for ISDN we will begin to see ISDN penetration of 
the  residential  market  We  therefore  assume  that  by  2005  residential  ISDN  will 
account for about 20% of  lines installed per year across Europe. 
5.3  DETAILED PENETRATION SCENARIOS 
This section describes the penetration rates achieved for PSTN, ISDN and mobile services 
for business and residential users, for each of the three country groups under each of the 
liberalisation scenarios: 
•  the results for each country group are discussed in Section 5.3 .1 
•  an overall summary is presented in Section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 Results for the Country Group 
Group 1: Fully Competitive Countries 
As described in Section 5.1, the UK, Sweden and Finland have markets which are already 
liberalised,  and have  few  if any regulatory barriers  remaining to  competition,  thus the 
results for the two scenarios will be broadly the same. 
Under the gradual scenario PSTN retains the highest penetration rates of  the three services 
considered.  However,  due  to  increased  competition  from  ISDN  and  mobile  services, 
penetration rates fall over the whole forecast period.  Household PSTN penetration falls 
from  100  lines  per  1  00  households  in  1996  to  78  lines  per  100  households  by 2005. 
However, because of the relatively high growth in the number of households, the actual 
number ofPSTN lines is projected to keep growing until1999. 
Although total ISDN connections are forecast to  grow at an annualised rate of 31% over 
the period, the majority of these lines are taken up by business users.  Residential ISDN 
lines are assumed to account for 0.5% of  newly installed ISDN lines in 1996 and for 20% 
by 2005.  This results in a residential penetration rate of just over 1 connection per 100 
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households by 2005.  In contrast, for business users ISDN connections will stand at 54% 
of  total PSTN and ISDN connections by 2005. 
Mobile  connections  currently  stand  at  just below  20  per  100  households.  Under the 
gradual  scenario  this  is  expected  to  rise  to  around  64  per  100  by 2005,  implying  an 
annualised growth rate of  just below 16% for residential connections.  This growth rate is 
higher than that  for  the  total  mobile market  (10%),  indicating the  relative maturity of 
mobile  services  as  compared to  ISDN.  Note that our analysis  implicitly assumes  that 
sufficient radio  spectrum will be made  available  to  achieve  the  relative high projected 
penetration rate.  If this is  not the case,  and the available spectrum becomes congested, 
operators  are  likely  to  raise  their  tariffs  in  order  to  ease  congestion  and  retain  those 
customers who  are  willing  to  pay  the  most.  This  could  mean  that  the  service  could 
become unaffordable for some users, potentially at relatively low penetration rates. 
Under the rapid scenario, PSTN penetration rates  display a trend similar to  that shown 
under  the  gradual  scenario.  However,  in  this  case,  mobile  penetration  in  residential 
households is expected to overtake PSTN penetration: by 2005 the penetration rates are 81 
and 78  connections per 100 households respectively.  This level represents a fall  in the 
overall  demand  for  PSTN,  as  many  residential  customers  substitute  mobile  for  fixed 
telephony.  In  order  to  achieve  this  penetration,  mobile  services  have  to  grow  at  an 
annualised rate of  just under 19% (overall market growth rate is around 13%).  Again this 
presupposes enough spectrum will be (made)  available.  ISDN penetration remains low 
among residential users: a penetration of 2 connections per 100 population is expected by 
2005.  For business users ISDN connections will stand at 64% of total ISDN and PSTN 
connections.  The detailed results for Group 1 are illustrated in Exhibits 5.1 and 5.2. 
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EXHIBIT 5.1:  Residential Penetration, Gradual Scenario, Group 1 Countries 
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EXHIBIT 5.2:  Residential Penetration, Rapid Scenario, Group 1 Countries 
120 
100 
80 
/ 
60  ---------------------------------------------~--------
~~ 
40  ---------------------------------~-------------------
------ 20  ----------------------~------------------------------
------ --- 0  .-=====-.-----,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  Ill  '  T  ' 
0  -
N  M  ~  ~  ~  ~  00  ~  0  -
N  M  ~  ~ 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  0  0  0  0  0  0 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  0  0  0  0  0  0  - - - - - - - - - -
N  N  N  N  N  N 
--Mobile  -+-PSTN  -ISDN  -Network 
Completion 
stage 
____________________  Analy.-SY-s _ THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE  Page 107 
Group 2: Approaching Competition 
For Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, PSTN remains the dominant service 
in both scenarios.  Historically,  Group 2 countries have experienced higher penetration of 
basic PSTN than Group 1 countries.  PSTN penetration is projected to start falling from a 
peak of 110 connections per 100 households in 1977 to 97 connections by 2005.  Under 
both  scenarios  the  absolute  number  of residential  PSTN  connections  is  projected  to 
continue growing until1999, and the absolute number of  residential PSTN connections in 
2005 is higher than in 1996. 
Mobile  penetration  is  projected  to  reach  between  one  third  and  half of the  PSTN 
penetration rate by 2005 at 3  7 connections per 100 households under the gradual scenario 
and 4  7 connections per 100 households under the rapid scenario.  This represents annual 
growth rates in the number of connection of 24% and 27% respectively.  Although these 
growth rates  are  higher than  those  for  Group  1 countries  (because  mobile  services  in 
Group 2 countries are typically less mature), the much lower starting point in 1996 means 
that penetration rates are still lower by 2005. 
Similar  to  Group  1 countries,  take-up  of ISDN  remains  very  low  in  both  scenarios, 
reaching just 4  and  5  connections  per  100  households  respectively.  Note  that  these 
projections  indicate  a higher take  up  of ISDN  in Group  2  countries  than  in  Group  1 
countries.  This is mainly driven by the historic commitment the countries in this group 
have made to promote ISDN. For business users ISDN connections account for 61% and 
68% respectively of total PSTN and ISDN connections.  The detailed results for Group 2 
are illustrated in Exhibits 5.3 and 5.4. 
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EXHIBIT 5.3:  Residential Penetration, Gradual Scenario, Group 2 Countries 
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EXHIBIT 5.4:  Residential Penetration, Rapid Scenario, Group 2 Countries 
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Group 3: Late Competition 
Historic figures  indicate that residential PSTN penetration is  the lowest in the  Group  3 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland).  However, even in this 
Group the projections indicate that PSTN penetration rates are likely to start falling from 
1997  onwards.  The  absolute  number  of residential  PSTN  connections  by  2005  is 
projected to be slightly below the level seen in 1995. 
Mobile services are projected to achieve higher penetration rates in Group 3 countries than 
Group  2.  This  is  because Italy,  which represents just under half of the  population of 
Group  3,  is  expected to  have a high penetration of mobile telephony at the end of the 
period.  Additionally mobile penetration in France and the Netherlands are expected to be 
low,  reducing  the  expected penetration of Group  2.  Overall  residential  penetration is 
projected to reach 51  and 65 connections per 100 households respectively.  This represents 
annual growth rates of 17% and 20% respectively. 
Residential  ISDN  is  projected  to  reach  penetration  levels  of around  2  lines  per  100 
population by 2005  under both scenarios.  Business ISDN connections  are  projected to 
account for  between 43% and 50%  of total combined PSTN and ISDN connections by 
2005.  The detailed results for Group 3 are illustrated in Exhibits 5.5 and 5.6. 
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EXHIBIT 5.5:  Residential Penetration, Gradual Scenario, Group 3 Countries 
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EXHIBIT 5. 6:  Residential Penetration, Rapid Scenario, Group 3 Countries 
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5.3.2  Overall Summary of Results 
Table 5.2  summarises the  key  findings  of the  demand projections;  for  comparison, we 
have also included projections ofPSTN penetration.  Our projections for residential ISDN 
penetration indicate that ISDN will remain firmly in Stage 1 (Network Establishment) for 
all country groups, under both scenarios.  Given that this study is primarily concerned with 
the  universal  service  issues  which  relate  to  the  Network  Completion  Phase  (stage  4) 
characterised by a household penetration of between  7  5 and  100  connections  per  100 
households, it is quite clear that ISDN is not suitable for inclusion in a revised definition 
of  universal service. 
However the projections for  mobile services indicate that it is  very likely that  Stage 3 
(Mass Market Take-up) will be achieved in all three country groups, although penetration 
rates differ between country groups and between the different scenarios.  Moreover, under 
the rapid scenario, Group 1 countries have a projected penetration rate of 81  connections 
per  100  households  and  are  thus  on the  threshold  of Stage  4  (Network  Completion). 
Thus,  under  favourable  circumstances,  mobile  services  can  achieve  penetration  rates 
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which would make the inclusion of  mobile services in an extended definition of  universal 
service a feasible policy option towards the beginning of  the next century. 
TABLE 5.2: 
ISDN gradual 
ISDN rapid 
Mobile gradual 
Mobile rapid 
PSTN (both) 
Summary of  Penetration Forecasts (connections per 100 households 
by 2005) 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
1  4  2 
2  5  2 
64  37  31 
81  48  65 
78  97  86 
The interviews reported in Chapter 4 suggested that user organisations (and others) have 
not started to  consider whether mobile services could become a universal service issue, 
and have instead focused their attention on ISDN.  The results in Table 5.2 indicate that 
there is likely to be pressure for a change in focus from ISDN to mobile telephony. 
5.4  COSTS OF EXTENDING THE DEFINITION OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
This section considers the effect of  including mobile services in an extended definition of 
universal service in terms of the additional costs this would impose on universal service 
providers, i.e. the difference in cost between serving 75% to 85% of all households and 
serving 100% of all households.  It examines the effect for Group 1 countries under the 
Rapid Scenario.  In this scenario, mobile penetration in Group 1 countries is projected to 
reach 84 connections per 100 households by 2005.  This would mean that at least 16% of 
households (around 26 million) did not subscribe to mobile services if such services were 
not included in universal service provision. 
Analysys has undertaken detailed universal  service costing studies in the UK, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands.  The methodology used in these studies is based on the 
concepts  of revenue  foregone  and  avoidable  cost.  A  detailed  description  of the 
methodology can be found in "The Costs, Benefits and Funding on Universal Service in 
the  UK",  published by Oftel.  This  report  describes  the  results  of a  study  Analysys 
undertook for Oftel in 1995. 
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In order to calculate the additional cost to  mobile operators of including mobile services 
within universal  service,  we  have  undertaken  a high  level  analysis  based on the  same 
methodology  as  used  for  these  USO  studies.  However,  in  this  context  it  is  more 
appropriate to refer to long-run incremental cost (LRIC) rather than avoidable cost, given 
that we are considering the cost of increased penetration and not the cost of an existing 
burden.  The  assumptions made with regards  to  the  long-run incremental  cost and the 
revenues foregone are outlined below: 
•  Incremental  cost.  Based  on  a  number  of engineering  economic  studies  which 
Analysys has undertaken in recent years,  we  estimate that the  long-run incremental 
cost per mobile subscriber at 85% overall penetration is approximately ECU75 a year.
3 
We have assumed no change in the long run incremental cost over the period to 2005. 
This is a prudent approach:  a lower LRIC might reflect technological progress but a 
higher LRIC might reflect spectrum congestion. 
•  Revenues foregone.  It is reasonable to assume that if  these households will be offered 
incentives  to  subscribe  to  mobile  services  the  vast  majority  of these  will  be  low 
revenue customers.  A recently published tariff comparison study by Analysys shows 
that  the  bill  for  total  cost  of service  faced  by  a  low-usage  subscribers  varies 
substantially between different operators: in Sweden such a subscriber would currently 
pay just ECU55, while in France the equivalent costs around ECU380 a year.
4  We 
have assumed that by 2005  average revenue across the EU will fall to  ECU 55.  We 
have not included any revenue from incoming calls. 
Based on these assumptions, mobile operators would lose ECU20 a year per subscriber. 
The total cost for  the 26 million additional low subscribers would therefore be ECU520 
million a year. 
It is  instructive  to  compare  this  total  cost  with  the  total  revenues  earned  by mobile 
operators.  A recent Analysys  study estimated that these revenues would be just under 
ECU59 billion by 2005.
5  However, this figure excludes the ECU1.4 billion extra revenue 
earned  from  the  26 million  additional  low  revenue  subscribers,  which  increases  the 
3  Local Loop Cost Study, Analysys Final Report for Oftel (April 1994). 
4  Cutting the Cost: The Falling Price of  Telephony in Europe, 3rd Edition, Analysys Publications (July 1996). 
5  Impact of Telecoms Liberalisation on  the  Single Integrated Information Market,  Analysys Draft Final  Report for  EC  DGXV 
(June 1996). 
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revenue  to  a total of ECU60 billion,  i.e.  the  cost of serving  these  26 million low-cost 
subscribers is equal to around 0.9% of  total revenues. 
In order to test the sensitivity of  the model to changes in revenue and cost assumptions we 
varied the major assumptions: 
•  Even if  the 26 million customers did not generate any revenue at all, then the cost per 
subscriber would rise to ECU7 5, resulting in a total cost of just under ECU2 billion. 
This represents just 3.4% of  total mobile revenues. 
•  An increased LRIC  estimate of ECU150 (+100%) results in a total cost of ECU2.5 
billion or 4.2% of  overall revenue (assuming revenues per subscriber ofECU55). 
Even  extreme  variations  of revenue  and  cost  assumptions  did  not  cause  the  cost  of 
extending universal service to mobile telephony to rise above 5% of  total mobile revenues. 
This indicates that the results are not overly sensitive to the assumptions with regards to 
either revenue or LRIC, though further research is required to validate this result. 
Our base estimate of 0.9% is  comparable to  the findings of current USO cost for  fixed 
network operators.  Analysys's studies show that the cost ofUSO as a proportion ofPSTN 
revenues in the range of 0.7% to 1.1% for BT; in the range of 0.8% to  1.2% fo  Telia; and 
is in the range 1.7% to  2.2% for the Swiss PTT.  Results of other studies undertaken by 
Analysys are still confidential. 
5.5  IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED LOCAL LOOP UTILISATION ON THE COST OF USO 
In addition to considering the impact of extending the definition of universal service on 
the cost incurred by a universal service provider, it is also useful to analyse the impact of 
increased utilisation of the local loop on the cost of  universal service.  This is likely to be 
an increasingly important factor in the medium term:  increased Internet access and other 
online  services,  for  example,  are  likely  to  drive  up  the  level  of local  call  volumes 
considerably. 
In the detailed universal service costing studies Analysys has undertaken in Europe, two 
main components were analysed:  the cost of serving uneconomic areas,  and the cost of 
serving uneconomic customers in economic areas.  The definition of an area depends on 
the network structure and, in practice, on the level of  detail at which the operator is able to 
supply data.  In practice, Analysys has used areas served by a single building where that 
building contains a switch or a remote concentrator.  An area is  defined as  uneconomic 
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when the  cost  of serving  the  area  exceeds  the  revenues  received  from  that  area  (the 
definition of  costs allows the operator to make a reasonable return on the capital invested 
in providing the service). The approach developed by Analysys is not simply a process of 
statistical data analysis, but is based on modelling of the relationships between customer 
and area characteristics, and their costs and revenues.  It is therefore possible for us to 
estimate the  effect of alternative  future  scenarios,  including tariffing  developments,  by 
simply altering the input parameters in an appropriate way, and re-calculating the models. 
Based on this work, we have analysed the likely change in the cost of  universal service if 
the volume of local calls originating from  residential users  increased by 100% (from 7 
minutes per day on average to 14 minutes per day).  Note that Internet services only affect 
residential  outgoing  volumes  and  the  incoming  call  volumes  to  residential  users  are 
therefore assumed to stay at the same level.  We have assumed the same increase for users 
in all revenue categories and no change in the local call tariff.  The results indicate that, 
based on uniformly increased local call volumes and revenues, the current cost of serving 
uneconomic customers and uneconomic areas could be reduced by 10% and 20%.  The 
analysis undertaken assumes the current price model of per minute call charges for local 
access.  Different results  are  likely if pricing packages are  available offering free  local 
calls or fixed-price unlimited local access. 
Note however that this  is  likely to  represent an  optimistic case;  at  least in the short to 
medium term,  the  uptake  of Internet  services  is  likely to  be biased towards  intensive 
telecommunications  users,  i.e.  those  customers  who  currently  spend  a  relatively  high 
amount on PSTN services.  These customers are  more likely to  own PCs and modems 
required to access the Internet, compared to low-revenue customers.  Most of these higher 
revenue customers are likely to be economic to serve already, apart from those which are 
uneconomic  due  to  the  high  cost  of serving  them,  not  due  to  the  low  revenue  they 
generate.  However,  in the  longer run  such  services  could be  taken  up  more  widely, 
depending on developments in: 
•  the cost of  the equipment required to access the Internet 
•  the user interface required to access these services 
•  the range of  content and services on offer 
•  the type of  pricing packages in operation for local access. 
The effect of  this is illustrated in Annex F. 
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5.6  THE SUPPLY OF ADVANCED COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND SERVICES TO 
INSTITUTIONAL USERS 
This section presents the results of high-level analyses of the cost of providing advanced 
communication  facilities  and  services  to  schools,  public  hospitals  and  public  libraries. 
The  results  should  be  treated  with  caution  because  of  problems  of  inconsistent 
classification of data items  across  individual member states,  particularly the  distinction 
between primary and secondary schools,  and between main libraries, branch offices and 
distribution points.  Thus,  the  results  of this  analysis  should be  seen  as  a preliminary 
investigation  of the  area;  additional  analysis  would  be  required  to  reconcile  these 
inconsistencies. 
5.6.1  Schools 
In this section we present the results of  a high level analysis of  the cost of  providing ISDN 
access  to  schools,  based  on the  published number of schools  in each  country and  on 
published ISDN tariffs from Phillips Tarifica.  This is followed by an assessment of the 
cost of  providing these schools with Internet access and then by 'ballpark' estimates of  the 
cost of meeting hardware and software requirements and internal cabling.  Again, these 
calculations are based on normal commercial tariffs and can be therefore be used to assess 
the likely subsidy required from third parties (e.g. the State) should this be the preferred 
funding option. 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study to  provide an indication of the likely 
underlying  cost  to  TOs  of providing  ISDN  access  to  schools.  Considerable  detailed 
modelling  would  be  required  to  undertake  this  task,  in  order  to  take  full  account  of 
country-specific cost drivers, such as different network topologies, existing infrastructure 
and the location of  schools. 
ISDN  Access to Schools 
Exhibit 5. 7 shows the estimated number of school sites in the three country groups.  In 
order to  take  a  view  of the  number  of ISDN  connections  required  at  each  site,  it  is 
necessary to  identify the number of classrooms per site.  Exhibit 5.8  shows the average 
number of  pupils by school type and country group - on the basis of an average class size 
of 30 pupils, there are on average 4.4 classrooms per primary school and 11.6 classrooms 
per secondary school.  Therefore, assuming that two classrooms share one ISDN channel, 
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a primary school would require two ISDN channels (one ISDN link), while a secondary 
school would require six ISDN channels (three ISDN links). 
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EXHIBIT 5. 7: 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Total 
EXHIBIT 5.8: 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Total 
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Number of  Primary and Secondary Schools by Country Group 
[Source: Europa World Yearbook 1996} 
Primary  Secondary  Total 
31418  9706  41  124 
74949  31 757  106 706 
77262  45202  122 464 
183 629  86664  270293 
Average Number of  Pupils per Site [Source: Europa World 
Yearbook 1996} 
Primary  Secondary 
181  368 
130  421 
114  293 
132  349 
Based on these assumptions about the number of connections required and on published 
ISDN tariffs,  the  once-off connection  cost  for  connecting  all  primary  and  secondary 
schools is calculated to be ECU95 million, while the yearly rental fees amount to ECU167 
million.  Exhibit 5.9 presents the detailed results. 
EXHIBIT 5.9: 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Total 
Connection and Rental Cost of  Providing ISDN to All Primary and 
Secondary Schools 
Primary (ECU  millions)  Secondary (ECU mUiions)  Total (ECU millions) 
Connection  Rental  Connection  Rental  Connection  Rental 
15  12  15  12  30  24 
7  22  7  26  14  48 
19  35  32  61  51  96 
41  69  54  98  95  167 
It is important to note that Exhibit 5.9 does not include any allowance for usage charges, 
which are displayed separately in Exhibit 5.10.  Assuming both ISDN channels are used 
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for six hours during the day, five days per school week, 35 school weeks per year, the total 
usage charge would be ECU2124 million (around ECU7850 per school), roughly 13 times 
the annual rental charge.  As Exhibit 5.10 shows, total annual rental charges are in fact 
equal to less than one hour of  local calls per day. 
EXHIBIT 5.10:  Usage Cost Based on per minute Tariffs for Local Calls (Assuming 
Five School Days per Week,  35 Weeks per Year) 
Usage per day  Primary  Secondary  Total 
per connection  (ECU millions)  (ECU millions)  (ECU millions) 
0.5 hour  37  52  89 
1  74  103  177 
2  148  206  454 
6  888  1236  2124 
Internet Access to Schools 
Internet  access  is  normally  charged  as  a  flat  monthly  fee,  the  cost  of which  varies 
according to the access method chosen.  Access options range from simple dial-up access 
to establishing permanent access and becoming a host computer.  We assume that schools 
will opt for the latter option.  Monthly fees for this option are likely to be around ECUSO 
per school, implying a total yearly cost of ECU162 million for all primary and secondary 
schools in all three country groups, as illustrated in Exhibit 5  .11. 
EXHIBIT 5.11:  Annual Cost of  Internet Access 
Primary  Secondary  Total 
(ECU million)  (ECU  million)  (ECU million) 
Group 1  19  6  25 
Group 2  45  19  64 
Group 3  46  27  73 
Total  110  52  162 
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Additional Hardware and Software Requirements 
In order for schools to  start using the Internet, additional hardware, software and cabling 
are  likely to  be required.  This  section provides  a preliminary indication of the  likely 
magnitude of these start-up costs.  It is important to bear in mind that these costs, unlike 
the  ISDN connection  costs,  are  likely  to  recur  every  three  to  five  years,  representing 
essential upgrades to hardware and software. 
The cost of an average multimedia capable computer is assumed to be around ECU1200. 
An additional  ECU350  is  required  to  cover the  required  Serial  Line Internet  Protocol 
(SLIP)  or Point  to  Point  Protocol  (PPP),  and  File  Transfer  Protocol  (FTP)  software. 
Equipment manufacturers  make  special cable  kits  available  for  schools,  providing  two 
access points for each of  six classrooms for around ECU300.  However the equipment and 
cable cost is likely to be only a relatively small percentage of the total cost; the greatest 
costs  will  be  those  incurred  to  pay  for  labour.  We  therefore  assume  a  total  cost  of 
ECU1 000 for two access points for each of  six classrooms. 
A primary school with 4.4 classrooms therefore faces an initial outlay of  around ECU8000 
(ECU6820 for hardware and software and ECU1 00 for cabling); a secondary school with 
11.6 classrooms faces costs of around ECU20 000.  This results in a total cost of around 
ECU 3.2 billion (see Exhibit 5.12). 
EXHIBIT 5.12:  Cost of  Additional Hardware, Software and Cabling Requirements 
Primary  Secondary  Total 
(ECU million)  (ECU  million)  (ECU  million) 
Group 1  326  204  530 
Group 2  577  755  1332 
Group 3  534  775  1309 
Total  1436  1734  3171 
Annualising the cost over the assumed three to five  year lifetime results in a per annum 
charge of between ECU0.6 billion and  ECU1.1 billion,  i.e.  between  3.5  and  6.5  times 
greater than the annual  ISDN rental charges  detailed in Exhibit 5.9  and comparable to 
usage charges incurred with a daily usage of  between 3 and 6 hours.  These results suggest 
that providing ISDN access is only part of  the story: the issue of  enabling schools to make 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~ly~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN  EUROPE  Page 121 
use of these connections  also  has to  be addressed,  and is,  in monetary terms,  a  much 
bigger concern. 
Total Cost 
Exhibit 5.12 presents an overview of the likely annual ongoing charges, excluding ISDN 
connection charges and any usage charges.  Roughly two thirds of  the total cost shown in 
this table are due to the annualised cost of  hardware and software and internal cabling.  It 
is important to note that daily usage of around four hours would result in total additional 
usage charges of around ECU908 million.  This implies that usage charges could easily 
account for 50% or more of  the total ongoing cost. 
EXHIBIT 5.12:  Annual Ongoing Total Cost (including ISDN Rental, Internet Access 
and Annualised Equipment Costs over Five-year Lifetime) 
Primary  Secondary  Total 
(ECU million)  (ECU million)  (ECU  million) 
Group 1  96  59  155 
Group 2  182  196  378 
Group 3  188  243  431 
Total  466  498  964 
5.6.2  Hospitals 
This section estimates the cost of  providing each hospital in the three country groups with 
an ISDN-30 connection.  Exhibit 5.13  shows the number of hospitals  in each country 
group. 
EXHIBIT 5.13 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Number of  Hospitals per Country Group [Source: World Health 
Organisation  J 
Hospitals 
2232 
7690 
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I  Group 3 
Total 
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3952  I 
13 874 
Exhibit  5.14  shows  the  once-off connection  fee  and  rental  charges  incurred  if every 
hospital  is  provided  with  one  ISDN-30  line.  However,  depending  on  the  specific 
applications for which the hospitals will use ISDN, connecting all hospitals might only be 
part  of the  task:  for  example,  for  applications  such  as  telemedicine,  it  will  also  be 
necessary to provide connections to local doctors, day care centres, universities, etc. 
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EXHIBIT 5.14:  Connection and Rental Cost of  Providing an ISDN-30 Connection to 
Each Hospital 
Connection  Rental·  Total 
(ECU million)  (ECU  millzon)  (ECU million) 
Group 1  46  10  56 
Group 2  47  30  77 
Group 3  188  22  210 
Total  281  62  343 
As is the case with schools, the total ongoing rental charges ofECU62 million are likely to 
be surpassed by usage charges incurred.  However, more detailed information about the 
applications which hospitals are likely to  support using ISDN 30 is required before it is 
possible to  estimate likely usage  charges  (the  usage  charges  calculated for  schools are 
based on local calls to the Internet service provider only). 
5.6.3 Public Libraries 
This section contains an estimate of the cost of  providing each public library in the three 
country groups with an ISDN-30 connection.  Exhibit 5.15 shows the number of libraries 
in each country group. 
EXHIBIT 5.15: 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Total 
Public Libraries per Country Group [Source: European Marketing 
Data and Statistics] 
Public Libraries 
993 
26216 
7129 
34338 
Exhibit 5.16 shows the connection and rental charges incurred if every library is provided 
with one ISDN-30 line.  However, in addition to access, there is an important issue to be 
taken into consideration when estimating the cost of ISDN provision to public libraries, 
namely the charges to be paid for on-line services.  In particular, some of these on-line 
services  will  replace  information  sources  which  are  currently  free  of charge.  This 
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therefore raises  questions with regard to  library budgets,  and  additional  information is 
required to assess the likely total usage charges. 
EXHIBIT 5.16: 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Total 
5. 7  CONCLUSIONS 
Connection and Rental Charges assuming an ISDN-30 Connection 
to Each Public Library 
Connection  Rental  Total 
ECUmillion  ECUmillion  ECUmillion 
37  3  40 
63  68  131 
427  47  474 
527  118  645 
The implication of  the demand scenarios is that in the short and medium term it will not be 
necessary to include additional services in the definition of  universal service (beyond basic 
telephony and  associated services).  Basic rate  ISDN will not penetrate the  residential 
market beyond the network establishment phase in the foreseeable future.  However, it is 
possible that by 2005  the residential penetration of mobile services will reach the  level 
which would justify their inclusion in universal service.  We have estimated that it would 
cost  less  than  1%  of total  mobile  revenues  to  extend  universal  service  in  this  way. 
However, this takes no  account of how essential mobile telephone services would be to 
full participation in society.  Furthermore, we have not considered the appropriateness of 
using household penetration to measure the penetration of what is essentially a personal 
service; it could be argued that penetration of the population would be a more appropriate 
measure for mobile telephony. 
We  have  also  analysed  the  cost  of supplying  advanced  communication  facilities  and 
services  to  institutional  users  including  schools,  hospitals  and  public  libraries.  Our 
analysis  shows  that  the  total  annualised  cost  of providing  Internet  access  to  schools 
(including ISDN rental, Internet access and annualised equipment costs over a five-year 
lifetime) could amount to ECU964 million.  Usage charges could account for another ECU 
908 million, assuming four hours' use per day 
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In the medium term, increased Internet access and use of other online services have the 
potential to increase local call volumes, and the cost of  serving uneconomic customers and 
areas could be reduced by 10% and 20%. 
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6/ Recommendations 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter brings together the key elements of  the research and makes recommendations 
as to how the European Commission should proceed in the area of  universal service.  The 
major conclusions of  the investigation are that: 
•  the universal service concept is built on a political judgement about the  benefits of 
extending access to particular telecoms services to all members of society rather than 
just to that element of  the population which would enjoy access to the service through 
the operation of  market forces 
•  universal service should therefore apply to the completion of the roll-out of particular 
telecoms services. 
This understanding of the rationale for universal service underpins the recommendations 
set  out  below.  The  major  issues  in  the  short-term  are  affordability  and  control  of 
expenditure.  With respect to  these two  issues, we make a number of recommendations 
which would bring some of the payment procedures  and tariff options  in the telecoms 
(PSTN) sector in line with those in other sectors, including the mobile telecoms market. 
In adopting the stance that universal service is about the completion of the diffusion of a 
particular telecoms service to all those in a society who demand the service, longer-term 
issues  relating  to  the  extension  of the  definition  of universal  service  to  include  new 
services are embraced within the perspective of  market failure and merit goods. 
We explicitly reject the view that universal service is primarily concerned with shaping 
initial users' and producers' choices during the early diffusion of a new technology and 
development  of  a  self-sustaining  market.  Where  the  benefits  of  new  telecoms 
technologies are contingent on the adoption of  other technologies, the strength of the case 
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for extending universal service to  cover these new telecoms technologies is substantially 
reduced. 
The recommendations in the next  section should be viewed in the  light of the  current 
European Commission definition of universal as  "a defined minimum set of services of 
specified quality which is available to  all users independent of their geographic location 
and, in the light of  specific national conditions, at an affordable price".
1 
6.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Below we discuss 14 recommendations, arranged in two groups.  The first group contains 
our recommendations as to the definition of  universal service which should be applied, the 
frequency with which it should be reviewed, and some related policy issues.  The second 
group  of recommendations  is  concerned with means  of increasing  the  affordability of 
telecoms services. 
6.2.1  The Nature of  Universal Service 
Recommendation 1: The Nature of  Universal Service 
Our  first  recommendation  is  based  on  the  belief (derived  from  the  interviews)  that 
universal  service  provision  is  purely  for  the  purpose  of making  available  particular 
telecoms services to that minority of potential users who do not have the service and for 
whom  not  having  access  to  the  service  would  constitute  a  social  or  economic 
disadvantage, i.e. essential services. For a service to be considered for inclusion within the 
universal  service obligation, the market penetration of that  service  should be high (see 
Recommendation 3). 
Universal service is only concerned with access to  essential services for that minority of 
potential residential users who want, and have not yet secured, access to the network under 
normal commercial conditions. 
Common Position (EC) No  34/96 adopted by the Council on  18 June  1996 with a view to  adopting Directive 96/  /EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through the application of  the principles of  open network provision (ONP), OJ C220, 29.7.96 
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Recommendation 2: Treatment of  Business Customers 
Our  second  recommendation  follows  from  the  first.  It explicitly  excludes  business 
customers  from  the  protection offered by universal  service.  This  is  because business 
customers  are  capable of distributing their costs between customers  (in terms of price 
increases),  their workforce  (changes  in  the  level  of wages)  and  shareholders  (through 
changes in the distribution of  profits).  The result of  explicitly including businesses within 
a universal service policy framework would be to  create a structure which allowed for 
normal  costs  incurred  by  businesses  to  be  subject  to  some  form  of  subsidy  or 
compensation.  Furthermore,  universal  service  should  not  be  used  as  a  mechanism  for 
ensuring delivery of  higher quality or specification services to business customers than are 
available to residential customers. 
Universal service should not be used to  ensure provision of telecommunications services 
of higher quality or specification to business customers.  The essential requirement that 
services be affordable applies only to residential customers. 
Recommendation 3: Service Penetration 
Almost all of  the organisations we spoke to were opposed to the concept of  using universal 
service as a mechanism to drive the roll out of new technologies and stimulate economic 
development  (e.g.  the  assertion  that  basic  rate  ISDN  should be included  in universal 
service in order to speed the diffusion of this service to the population as  a whole).  The 
belief that such an approach would lead to inefficient investments and that the costs would 
be spread over the industry cemented opposition from incumbent TOs, new operators, user 
associations  and  consumer  associations  (development  agencies  responsible  for  remote 
areas of  the European Union were the only exception to this). 
This position fits  well with the principle established in Recommendation  1;  the  central 
concerns of universal service are with the provision of essential services to  households, 
rather than with the diffusion of new telecommunications services or regional economic 
development.  By making a recommendation on the level of market penetration which a 
service should have before it is considered for inclusion in the universal service obligation, 
a clear trigger point is defined and the rules are transparent and predictable. 
Universal service should not be used as a means of initiating the roll-out of new services 
which have yet to  find wide market acceptance.  We recommend that for a service to be 
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considered for inclusion in the universal service obligation it ought to have already grown 
to a 75% market penetration under normal market conditions. 
Recommendation 4: Components of  a Basic Telephone Service 
The question of  what services should be covered by universal service is critical.  The result 
of applying the principles set out in Recommendation 1 and 3 is that only basic telephone 
services  currently meet the  criteria for  universal  service.  However,  there  is  a  further 
question to resolve, namely what constitutes a basic telephone service - clearly access to 
dial tone is only one of  several elements. 
•  Reasonable  quality  of service  (in  terms  of speed  of connection,  speech  quality, 
frequency of  failure and time to repair) is essential for reliable use of  the telephone. 
•  Adequate provision of  pay phones is essential to ensure that people are able to access 
the telephone network at all times. 
•  Free access to emergency services. 
•  Operator services are essential to cope with customer enquiries. 
•  Directory enquiry services are essential if  customers are to have sufficient information 
to use the network to full effect. 
•  Services to deal with complaints regarding malicious calls are necessary because the 
network provides opportunities for intrusion into peoples' lives and where this occurs 
it  is  necessary  that  action  be  taken  to  prevent  recurrences.  It  is  likely  that  the 
requirement for  such a service will  diminish  as  calling line  identification becomes 
available. 
•  Itemised billing is necessary to provide customers with information about the money 
spent on telephone services, bringing telecoms into line with almost every other area 
of commerce,  where  customers  receive  details  of their  expenditure  on  goods  or 
services. 
•  Selective call barring is necessary to allow users to prevent access to specific numbers 
from their telephone.  This allows the customer some control over exposure to debt, 
particularly where the telephone can be accessed by other people. 
All of  these elements, with the exception of  filtering services for malicious calls, are either 
currently within the scope of  universal service as set out in the Voice Telephony Directive 
(95/62/EC), or are found in the current proposal to amend that Directive (COM(96) 419). 
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Universal service should be limited for the moment to  the provision of basic telecoms 
services.  Basic telecoms services should include basic voice telephony at a defined level of 
quality (in terms of speed of connection, speech quality, frequency of failure and time to 
repair), payphones, free access to emergency services, operator services, directory enquiries, 
malicious call complaints services.  Itemised billing and selective call barring should be 
available to all customers at no additional charge above the basic tariff. 
Recommendation 5: New Technologies 
Public  policy  can  play  an  important  role  in  the  facilitation  of the  roll-out  of new 
technologies.  This is particularly so when the costs and value of the service are not well 
known: the information superhighway is an example of  this.  Under such circumstances, a 
policy on public access - as distinct from a universal service policy - can help to provide 
initial external support (such as awareness building or pilot projects) to the market. 
The initial  support of new technologies  could be embraced within a  policy on public 
access which would create awareness and stimulate demand for new telecommunications 
technologies for very limited periods prior to their widespread acceptance by the market. 
In contrast to universal service policies, public access policies should be characterised by 
the  diversity  of the  services  supported  and  the  limited  period of support,  and  where 
possible should be achieved through a public-private partnership. 
Recommendation 6: Regulatory Restrictions on Technologies Used 
Restrictions on the use of  particular types of  technology by operators can force an operator 
to provide services in a manner which is not the most cost effective.  An example of  this is 
the  restriction  placed  on  fixed  network  operators  preventing  them  from  using  radio 
technology to carry basic telephony services in sparsely populated areas.  Such restrictions 
increase  the  cost  of universal  service  and  should  be  removed.  This  is  particularly 
important  if  geographical  averaging  of  tariffs  is  removed,  as  the  costs  of  such 
technological restrictions would otherwise fall  on the people in the inefficiently served 
areas. 
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Where  a  telecoms  operator  has  an  obligation  to  provide  universal  service  then  that 
operator should be free  to  offer the service in the most economically efficient manner 
subject to constraints such as radio spectrum availability. 
Recommendation 7: Review of  Services Covered by Universal Service Obligations 
As noted in Recommendation  1,  there are two necessary conditions for  a service to be 
considered universal: 
•  high market penetration (typically 75% and above)  as  a proxy measure of network 
externalities/market failure 
•  there is  a serious  economic  and social disadvantage  from  not having access to  the 
service, as an indication of  a merit good. 
At  the  moment,  the  telecoms  services  which meet  these  criteria  are  limited  to  basic 
telephony  services  (Recommendation  4).  However,  the  telecoms  market  is  changing 
rapidly and it is likely that in the future other services will meet these criteria.  The market 
forecasts conducted in this study concerning the adoption and diffusion of  basic rate ISDN 
and mobile services indicated that it will be ten years before either of these services will 
meet the first of  the above criteria, and then only in certain countries.  We therefore do not 
believe it will be necessary for the services covered by universal service to be reviewed for 
several years, but by 2005 it is likely that mobile services in particular may well satisfy the 
market penetration criterion for inclusion within the universal service obligation. 
The services which are covered by universal service should be subject to periodic review 
to  assess whether additional  services  should be added,  based on the criteria of market 
penetration and economic disadvantage. 
6.2.2  Affordability Issues 
Recommendation 8:  Tariff  Packages 
Almost all TOs offer residential customers inflexible tariffs in terms of their structure -
significant fixed connection and rental charges with call charges added with usage.  The 
size of the connection and rental charges can be significant barriers to taking a telephone 
service for the less well-off citizen.  We therefore recommend that there should be a range 
of  tariff packages available to customers which subsume fixed charges into usage charges, 
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thus  allowing  lower  fixed  and  higher  usage  charges  than  the  standard  tariff package. 
Taken to an extreme, this could mean no fixed charges (or charges at a level which do not 
represent a barrier to  the adoption of network access) and very high call charges:  this is 
already done  by mobile  operators  in some  countries  as  a means  of offering  customers 
services  intended  for  use  in  emergency  situations.  In  addition  to  the  benefit  to  the 
consumer, benefits will flow  to the incumbent (or those with the USO) from  consumers 
who might otherwise restrict their use of  the telephone or may simply not subscribe to the 
networks. 
A wide range of tariff packages which reduce the effect of prices as a barrier to entry for 
the un-telephoned should be available as a right. 
Recommendation 9: Credit Control vs Deposits 
The practice of charging  deposits to  new  customers  and  customers with poor payment 
histories is  a significant barrier to  take-up  of telephone services.  It is  therefore  in the 
interests of  both consumers and suppliers to establish different forms of credit agreements 
which allow consumers greater control and reduce the levels of  risk assumed by the USO 
supplier. 
The telecoms industry should adopt a range of standard forms  of credit control used in 
most  other  competitive  consumer  markets,  specifically  the  adoption  of finance-based 
credit limits calculated on the basis of the customer's ability to pay and payment history. 
Deposits should not be required from customers. 
Recommendation 10: Billing Frequency 
Where a customer's income is weekly (as is the case for many people on low incomes) 
then budgeting to pay a bill quarterly or every two months can be difficult.  Allowing the 
customer to  choose  a more  frequent  billing period will  make  budgeting  for  telephone 
expenses easier for people in this situation. 
Customers should be offered the option of being billed at the  frequency which is most 
appropriate for their individual circumstances. 
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Recommendation 11:  'Soft' Network Access 
The danger of getting into debt is a deterrent to many people on low incomes causing a 
lower take-up of telephone services in this group.  This could be avoided by making it 
possible to pay for telephone usage in advance.  For example, prepayment for electricity, 
together with innovative tariff structures and payment schemes, have provided a form of 
'soft' access to the network for many customers.  With soft access, customers have access 
to the network at all times but it is the individual consumers who are deciding whether to 
incur expenditure.  With soft access, there is no possibility of  bad debt and disconnection 
from the network ceases to be an issue. 
Customers  should  have  the  option  of soft  access  to  the  network  through  the  use  of 
prepayment for telephone usage. 
Recommendation 12: Responses to Non-Payment of  Bills 
Currently most TOs disconnect customers who fail to pay for telephone service.  Complete 
disconnection from the network usually follows a recognised procedure of warnings, but 
some TO procedures are swift and can result in full disconnection from the network in a 
few weeks.  We recommend an alternative, incremental approach.  Initial failure to pay 
could result in outgoing calls being barred.  Further failure to resolve a debt could result in 
all calls being barred except outgoing calls to emergency services and healthcare services. 
However, the final  sanction of complete disconnection from  the network should not be 
removed from telephone companies. 
'Soft' disconnection should be the initial stage for the removal of service from a customer 
for non payment of  a bill.  Soft disconnection should be implemented for the billing period 
after that which a debt has been incurred. 
Recommendation 13: Disabled Users 
People  with  certain  disabilities  may  have  difficulty  In  using  the  standard  telephone 
service: 
•  People with speech and hearing difficulties may require access to a teletype service in 
order to use the telephone.  The required terminal equipment for this type of service is 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~ly~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE  Page 129 
relatively expensive.  In addition,  the time required to  communicate via a teletype 
service is longer than an equivalent spoken exchange. 
•  People with visual impairments may be unable to use paper-based directories (which 
are typically provided free  of charge)  and thus  are  forced  to  use directory enquiry 
services, for which a charge is frequently made. 
Universal service should compensate disabled users for the additional costs imposed on 
their use of the telephone service by their disability.  This recommendation should be 
supported by the monitoring and dissemination of  best practice within the EU. 
Recommendation 14: Public Access 
In the debate over the development of an Information Society it is frequently argued that 
special consideration should be given to  access to new 'broadband' services for schools 
and other public institutions.  Discussion has focused on the provision of  ISDN services to 
schools and hospitals.  This may be a laudable aim, but has little to do with designing and 
implementing  a  universal  service  policy.  Public  access  policies  are  best  seen  as 
encouraging the initial adoption of new services and their rapid diffusion.  They should 
therefore  be  seen  as  a  market  facilitator,  not  a  means  of addressing  issues  of market 
failure.  As  such,  public  access  policies  should  support  a  variety of technologies  and 
services and, importantly, only support any one initiative for a limited period.  The aim is 
to  encourage the take-up of services in the initial stage of market development, not to 
shape the roll-out of  a particular technology. 
One issue highlighted by public access policies is the explicit linkage between telecoms 
policy and other policy domains.  An example of  this is the support provided in education 
policies (and budgets) for related but necessary activities, particularly the provision of IT 
resources  (hardware  and  software)  and  ongoing  technical  and  training  support.  The 
provision of ISDN to schools and hospitals is not achieved through the simple supply of 
technical infrastructure. 
Public access policies targeted at providing new services to schools and hospitals are not 
part  of a  broader  universal  service  policy  debate  and  as  such  should  have  distinct 
characteristics; in particular, such policies should encourage a diversity of technical and 
service offerings and be relatively short-lived. 
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Annex AI Study Contacts 
We provide below a full list of  the organisations contacted in the course of  this study. 
National 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
Incumbent TOs 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Bundesministerium fiir Offentliche Wirtschaft und V erkehr 
(A) 
IBPT (B) 
Bundesministerium fiir Post und Telekommunikation (D) 
Ministry of  Transport and Communications (SF) 
Direction Generale des Postes et Telecommunication (F) 
Ministry of  Telecommunications & Transportation (GR) 
Department of  Transport Energy and Communications (IRL) 
Administration des Postes et Telecommunications (L) 
Ministerio delle Poste e delle Telecommunicazione (I) 
Ministry of  Transport and Public Works (NL) 
Instituto das Comunicacoes de Portugal (P) 
Ministerio de Fommento (E) 
Posts & Telestyrelsen (S) 
OFTEL(UK) 
Ministry of  Posts and Telecommunications (PO) 
Ministry of  Economy (CZ) 
Ministry of Transport, Communication and Water Management 
(H) 
•  Ministry of  Communications (R) 
•  Austel (Aus) 
•  Ministry of  Commerce (NZ) 
•  Federal Communications Commission (USA) 
•  Ameritech (USA) 
•  BT (UK) 
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Competitive 
Operators 
User Associations 
Trade Unions and 
Social 
Organisations 
Consumer 
Associations 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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France Telecom (F) 
GTE (USA) 
SPT (CZ) 
Tele Danmark (DK) 
Telef6nica (E) 
Telia (S) 
Cable Communications Association (UK) 
COLT (UK) 
Mercury Communications Ltd (UK) 
MFS (UK) 
Tele2 (S) 
Teleport (USA) 
INTUG 
ECTUA 
TMA(UK) 
AFUTT (F) 
Beltug-TMAB (B) 
BTG(NL) 
Deutsche Telekom eV (D) 
COST 219 
ETUC 
Federation des Metallurgists 
Federation des Journalists 
Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (D) 
Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens (B) 
SUD-Federation Syndicale des PTT (F) 
Communications Workers Union (UK) 
Eurofedop 
IPTT 
Fondation Charles Leopold Mayer pour le Progres de l'Homme 
Telecommunications Action Group 
•  Consumenten Bond (NL) 
•  Consumers Association (UK) 
•  Consumer Association of  Ireland (IRL) 
•  Finnish Consumers Association (SF) 
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•  Konsumentonbudsmannen (S) 
•  Consumer Federation of  America (USA) 
•  BEUC 
•  Ministry of  Consumer Affairs (NZ) 
Development  •  Highlands and Islands Enterprise (UK) 
Agencies and  •  Udanis na Gaeltachta (IRL) 
Banks  •  Welsh Development Agency (UK) 
•  Almi Foretagspartner (S) 
•  Kemi-Tomio Regional Development Agency (SF) 
•  EBRD 
•  EIB 
•  Eurada 
•  Czech Invest (  CZ) 
•  ITB Hungary (H) 
Players in Other  •  OFFER(UK) 
Sectors  •  OFWAT(UK) 
•  OFGAS (UK) 
•  Lyonnaise des Eaux (F) 
•  Gas & Fuel (AUS) 
•  Australia Post (AUS) 
•  Victoria Regulator General (AUS) 
•  Ministry of  Commerce (NZ) 
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Annex B/ Funding Universal Service 
The material in this annex is taken from Analysys's recent publication 1998,  A New Era 
for EU Telecoms Regulation, 
1 and provides an overview of  the two main current proposals 
for funding universal service. 
On the question of how universal service should be funded, the Commission's proposals 
are fairly open, allowing NRAs flexibility in deciding the most appropriate mechanism. 
The approaches outlined in the Interconnection Directive would ensure that: 
•  Member  States  have  the  freedom  to  fund  all  or  part  of any  burden  through  state 
budgets, within the limits permitted by EU law, but this is unlikely to  happen in the 
current economic climate. 
•  NRAs may choose not to set up any mechanism where the cost of universal service is 
either negligible or zero. 
•  where  the  cost of any burden is  to  be shared  among  market players,  this  may be 
achieved either through a system of  additional, but separate, supplementary charges on 
interconnection, or through a national universal service fund.  These two options are 
discussed below. 
Adding supplementary charges to  interconnection charges has the advantage that it does 
not require new structures to be created, is less costly and is easy to administer.  However, 
there are serious shortcomings.  Firstly, there is a conflict of interest because the dominant 
operator will  be collecting  subsidies  from  its  competitors  to  cover  some  of its  costs; 
consequently,  there  is  no  incentive  for  the  dominant  operator  to  reduce  its  costs  in 
providing  universal  service.  Secondly,  because  the  mechanism is  based  on the  TO's 
calculation of  its costs, there is a lack of  transparency and the possibility that such charges 
1  Blackman, C., and Denmead, M., 1998, A New Era for EU Telecoms Regulation, Analysys Publications (January 1996). 
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might be contributing to the TO's profits rather than offsetting costs.  Thirdly, it assumes 
that only dominant operators have universal  service obligations;  new entrants therefore 
have no incentive to compete in high-cost areas and the benefits of  competition will favour 
business rather than domestic users. 
The Commission's favoured  approach is  a universal service  fund  mechanism, which is 
considered to  be the  most transparent  method.  Contributions  to  such  funds  could be 
calculated in a number of  ways, for example on the basis of  market share, gross profits or 
net  transmission  revenues.  Although  such  a  mechanism  is  more  cumbersome  and 
expensive to set up, it would not lead to the distortions described above.  The experience 
in  the  UK,  where  universal  service  has  become  muddled  by  the  debate  over  access 
charges, seems to have been taken on board by the Commission, but not necessarily by all 
the Member States.  In the recent French public consultation document,  for  instance,  a 
hybrid of  the two methods is proposed. 
2 
The  assumption  that  provision  of universal  service  is  necessarily  a  burden  is  being 
challenged: the costs are considerably lower than were previously supposed; and so-called 
uneconomic customers receive telephone calls and may become the economic customers 
of  tomorrow.  While the incumbent TO will retain its universal service obligation, in areas 
where alternative infrastructure is available the incumbent's current obligation could be 
replaced by a system of regional franchises.  Other operators could have the right to take 
on the universal service obligation, waiving their contribution to a universal service fund-
so-called 'pay or play'.  New operators could be given a choice of either reimbursing a 
proportion of  the incumbent's universal service costs, or of  providing universal service in 
that nominated area.  The payments for providing universal service would potentially be 
available to all operators.  Pay or play may, therefore, prove attractive to new entrants. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  likely to  be  areas  or groups  of subscribers which all  operators 
consider to  be uneconomic.  In  such  cases  the  universal  service  obligation  should be 
opened to competitive tendering with the responsibility being allocated to the bidder who 
meets acceptable levels of  quality and requires the lowest public subsidy.  As a last resort, 
a subsidy will be paid to the incumbent TO to provide universal service. 
2  Ministere des Technologies de l'Information et de la Paste (1995). 
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Annex C/ 
Review of  the Literature on Universal Service 
The purpose of this literature review is to consider some of the alternative positions that 
have been adopted in the analysis of universal service, and to identify the foundations on 
which the development of universal service policy can be based.  This annex seeks to set 
out the different perspectives on universal service which lead to often ambiguous, if not 
conflicting universal service policy objectives. 
This literature review is divided into three sections.  Section Cl presents a brief discussion 
of the origins of the concept of universal service and its inherent ambiguity.  Section C2 
sets out two contrasting perspectives on the conceptual underpinnings of  universal service, 
namely a political economy viewpoint and one concerned with economic efficiency and 
network externalities.  Section C3  is concerned with the general issues of affordability. 
This section is  sub-divided, the first  sub-section discusses universal service and welfare 
impacts of tariff rebalancing, the second sub-section discusses the 'untelephoned' and the 
reasons why individuals do not have access to the telephone.  Finally, in Section C4 some 
of  the key threads from this review are drawn together in a summary organised around the 
themes of affordability and the extension of the concept of universal service to  include 
services other than telephony. 
Cl/ BACKGROUND 
In  terms  of the  obligations  which  are  imposed  on  the  telecoms  sector  by  political 
processes, it is  similar to  many other industries.  The activities of many enterprises are 
shaped by policy objectives (social, developmental or industrial) which impose obligations 
that may or may not coincide with narrow 'commercial' objectives.  These obligations are 
variously called  'social objectives",  'public service obligations', or 'community service 
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obligations'.  Whatever  the  terminology  used,  the  policy  typically  has  one  of two 
intentions:  either to  make a service or product widely available at  uniform prices, or to 
implement welfare or redistributional policies by granting price concessions to  specific 
groups  of users.
1  However,  such  obligations  often  lead  to  confusing  and  ambiguous 
definitions of key policy objectives precisely because they are based on non-commercial 
criteria. 
The inherently ambiguous definition of universal service allows the policy debate to be 
continually re-interpreted by various actors in the political economy.  In 1987, the OECD 
commented on the problems which may result from  an  ambiguous  specification of the 
government objectives imposed on those companies with a universal service obligation: 
"There is extensive empirical evidence that the objectives public enterprises are expected 
to pursue are often poorly set out, and that even when set out, they are extensively altered 
and reinterpreted through political processes of negotiation; while this may be useful in 
some  circumstances,  it  frequently  gives  rise  to  inconsistent requirements  being placed 
upon the enterprise [  ...  ] unclear and conflicting objectives make performance difficult to 
define  and  monitor  and  compound  the  problems  created  by the  lack  of any  ongoing 
external assessment.  In some cases, this leads to public enterprises being subject to  little 
effective control or to detailed administrative requirements aimed at ex-ante supervision of 
procedures and decisions [  ...  ] Overall, the problems of  public enterprise arise partly from 
the fact that the 'regulatory contract' between the State and a publicly owned operator of  a 
public utility is a highly implicit one, where the primary guarantee given to consumers is 
often a purely negative one - monopoly profits will not be maximised. "
2 
This re-interpretation of  the concept of  universal service is well illustrated in the telecoms 
sector.  In the early part of this century, the telecoms industry worldwide underwent a 
period of massive restructuring which typically reduced the sector in each country to  a 
monopoly structure.  Milton Mueller (1995)
3  has  argued that the basic policy confusion 
surrounding  universal  service  in  the  telecoms  sector  arose  because  the  concept  was 
developed as a marketing strategy in 1927 by Theodore Vail, the first Chairman of ATT, 
In addition, policy objectives could be associated with cultural integrity or diversity, concepts of  the nation and national identity. 
2  OECD/ICCP (1995), Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications Environment,. No. 38, Paris.  The quote 
is originally from OECD (1987), Trends of  Change in Telecommunications Policy, ICCP Series 13, Paris (p.305-306). 
Mueller, M., (1995), "Universal Service as  an  Appropriability Problem:  a new framework for  analysis", in Brock, G.,  (1995), 
Towards  a  Competitive  Telecommunication  Industry:  selected papers from  the  1994  Telecommunications  Policy  Research 
Conference (Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates). 
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in order to legitimate the dominant (and subsequently monopolistic) market position being 
developed by AT&T in the earlier part of  this century. 
However,  in contrast to  this  view that universal service has  served the interests of the 
dominant  carriers  is  the  view  that  a universal  service  obligation  forces  a  company to 
undertake operations that it otherwise would not undertake in competitive environment, 
and therefore is eligible for some form of  compensation. 
In an environment where the single telecoms service (telephony) was provided by a single 
supplier, universal service was an elegant policy instrument that brought together the two 
elements of equity and efficiency.  In effect, substantial network externalities were being 
realised  and monopoly rents  were  redistributed  through  the  geographical  averaging  of 
pnces. 
However,  in  the  context  of a  multi-vendor,  multi-service  telecoms  environment,  this 
policy elegance has been brought into question.  In a competitive market the interaction of 
supply  and  demand  will  ensure  the  appropriate  delivery  of services,  but  from  the 
perspective of an Information Society the ubiquitous provision of services is axiomatic to 
a cohesive  society.  These inherent tensions  in the  debate  about  universal  service  are 
discussed at greater length in Section C2. 
C2/  CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
This section discusses two broadly-based perspectives which underlie the  discussion of 
conceptual frameworks for universal service policy: 
•  the first seeks to locate the availability, quality and cost of  telecoms services as part of 
broader political economy, with questions of  social, economic and political equity 
•  the second focuses on the questions of  efficiency and network externalities associated 
with the provision of telecoms services "that are supplied to  customers or groups of 
customers at a loss when the firm supplying them is operating efficiently and its past 
investments have been based upon sound business decisions". 
4 
This bifurcation is used to discuss the literature and the debates on two basic issues: 
4  Cave,  M.,  Milne, C.,  and  Scanlan,  M.,  (1994), Meeting  Universal  Service  Obligations  in  a  Competitive  Environment  (ONP-
CCP(95). March 1994 report to DGIV (CEC). 
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•  What is the basis of  universal service? 
•  How can the definition of  universal be extended? 
C2.1  A Political Economy Perspective 
The key concern underlying the political economy perspective is equity.  Given that the 
combined effects of the shift towards an Information Society and the ability of telecoms 
networks to reconfigure geographical patterns of economic activity, questions over equity 
in the provision of  telecoms services have been thrown into stark relief. 
The Information Society is  transforming the nature of work,  work organisation and the 
structure of  organisations.  It is bringing about new debates over the delivery of education 
and training, health care services and the nature of culture in our society, and is focusing 
on new concerns about the nature and delivery of democracy.  At its most fundamental, 
the  emergence  of the  Information  Society  is  transforming  the  underlying  basis  of 
production, with a move away from manufacture towards information activities. 
Within  the  context  of the  European Union  the  Commission  White  Paper on  Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment and the Bangemann Report underlined the importance 
of  both the Information Society to the future prospects of the European economy and the 
importance of the  social dimension.  The DGV High Level Expert Group
5  has used this 
social  perspective  to  argue  for  a redefinition  of the  nature  of universal  service  in  the 
provision of  telecoms and, significantly, to argue for "an active rather than passive concept 
of solidarity". The concern of this High Level Expert Group  is that, for  example in the 
case  of employment within  an  Information  Society,  that "the combined  effect of such 
distributional impacts, and the growing international transparency of markets, will put the 
burden of adjustment even more on the unskilled labour and low wage parts of the labour 
force"  (op.  cit.  p.v).  Such a position has widespread implications for  cohesion- both 
within  families,  and  within  the  labour  market  between  different  cultural  groups  and 
regions within the EU. 
From deep-seated concern about  an  equitable,  fair  and just society  flows  an  argument 
which  concludes  that  policy  should  be  directed  towards  "an  approach  to  access  to 
information  which  goes  beyond  conventional  ideas  about  universal  service  provision 
5  Building the European Information Society for Us All, High Level Expert Group, Interim Report to EC DGV, January 1996 (p.ii). 
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(USP)" (High Level  Expert  Group,  op.  cit.  p.ii).  Thus  the  High Level Expert  Group 
concludes that there are a number of  inter-related steps: 
"•  There  is  a  need  to  develop  much  more  focused  and  targeted  approaches  to 
infrastructure support.  Following this perspective, Community Structural Funds could 
be directed in ways which are much more sensitive to emerging demand, and thus more 
effective and efficient. 
•  Any reformulation of  USP has to take into account new technological possibilities and 
be accepted by all countries in the European Union.  The problem is how to define a 
level of access which is adequate (especially given the proliferation of media), which 
will have some long term viability, and which will be good for all regions, and so any 
programmes and policies adopted should be attuned to variations which exist. 
•  Broader measures are needed, however, which can ensure that different social groups 
(e.g. residential, schools, hospitals, small enterprises, public services) gain access to a 
reasonable service level at a reasonable price. 
•  Satisfying demand for  telecommunications  services is  as  important as  investment in 
infrastructure and services.  Critically important is the modernisation of  enterprises and 
the public sector, and the development of  human resources to increase the development 
impact of  information and communications technologies. 
•  Regional  institutions,  such  as  chambers  of commerce,  regional  innovation  centres, 
collaboration  between  regional  government,  training  institutes  and  enterprises,  are 
important  to  the  innovativeness  of the  region  and  its  capacity  to  respond  to  the 
challenges of the Information Society.  In least-favoured regions, they are often thinly 
developed, rigid and not up-to-date, or not well-integrated." (p.x). 
Discussions over regional cohesion and the centrality of  the universal delivery of  telecoms 
services have two strands.  The first strand is concerned with maintaining, as a minimum, 
the relative position of the regions.  There is  a concern about two  issues:  the  regions' 
ability to capture activities which have become 'footloose' with the advent of  information 
and communications technologies  and  to  create  an  environment which can  attract new 
mobile activities.  The second strand is a concern with 'catching up' and 'leapfrogging'. 
As argued by the High Level Expert Group (op.  cit.): 
"There is a need to investigate in much greater detail whether in order to avoid exclusion 
and preserve regional  cohesion,  the current notion of universal  services  should not be 
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shifted in the direction of a notion of "universal community service", extending universal 
service  provision  to  incorporate  a  basic  level  of access  to  new  information  services 
(functionally  rather  than  technically  defined  so  therefore  articulated,  for  example  as, 
electronic networking, data and mail exchange, access to new business and information 
services  available world-wide  and  in  core regions  etc.),  but limited in its  universality 
obligations  to  educational,  cultural,  medical,  social  or economic  institutions  of local 
communities.  Such a  community USP  concept would in  effect mean  a  return  to  the 
historical notion of "universality" as introduced last century in the US with the advent of 
the telegraph.  It would guarantee open access to the network and the carrier services and 
involve, where necessary, public funding for technical and financial assistance. 
"This proposed limitation of USP does  not imply that we  consider the  availability of 
modern information infrastructure to be of less importance for regional development.  On 
the contrary, connectivity has become a precondition for any regional development today 
[  ...  ]" (pp.41/2) 
Similar arguments exist in other documents which seek to define the delivery of universal 
service within the structure of the Information Society.  In Canada there is an argument 
which says that although the issues of affordable and equitable access to the Information 
Highway are not new, the notion of  convergence which is inextricably interwoven into the 
fabric  of the  Information Society requires  the rethinking of old concepts.  In a report 
prepared for the Canadian Information Highway Advisory Council Secretariat, Gilbert et 
af argue that "societal responsiveness is the fundamental criteria for defining a universal 
service"  (p.2).  The  underlying  assumptive  framework  for  this  report  is  the  1994 
Communications Act which defines universal service in terms of a public interest debate. 
The  public  interest  objectives  include  "to  ensure  that  every  person  has  access  to 
reasonably evolving telecommunications services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates 
taking  into  account  advances  in  telecommunications  and  information  technology" 
(Canadian Communications Act 1994). 
Once a service has been designated as meeting a societal need it must, to be universal, be 
accessible  and  affordable  to  everyone.  This  suggests  that  public  networks  must  be 
immediately accessible to all users without impediment, and content must be free to flow 
to the user wherever he or she is located. 
6  Gilbert,  J.,  Hepburn,  K.,  Renter,  G.  (1995),  Affordable  and  Equitable  Access  to  the  Information  Highway,  Final  Report, 
Information Highway Advisory Council Secretariat (Ottawa, Canada). 
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Gilbert et al develop their argument by suggesting that not many services will meet the 
full criteria for universal service, but that a wide range of services might be required for a 
more limited cross-section of society,  e.g.  telecoms  services in  support of education in 
remote and rural communities.  The authors call these  'requisite' services.  They define 
these as  "those services that meet the requirements of a sector or a special constituency 
which  has  itself a  major  impact  on  society  as  a  whole"  Such  services  cannot  be 
guaranteed to  everyone but public policy could "ensure that they are  available to  those 
who need them at just and reasonable rates" (p.2).  In this discussion the authors seeks to 
post the notions of 'universal accessibility' and 'affordability' to universal service and the 
notions of 'equitable access' and 'just and reasonable rates' to requisite services. 
Having made this distinction the authors then argue that "enhanced telecommunications 
services are unlikely to qualify as universal services without a period of evolution in the 
market place.  However, they can be of  vital concern to certain sectors and may qualify as 
a requisite service."  The authors implicitly recognise that market share, as  a measure of 
the diffusion of a new service and its societal value, is the key factor which determines 
whether a service should be included within the universal service obligation. 
In an Information Society,  the political economy arguments  about the  evolution of the 
definition of  universal service implicitly involve the universal diffusion of  information and 
communication technology.  The universal service provision of telecoms services is seen 
as a way of  fostering the diffusion of  information and communication technology and thus 
of  shaping a more even distribution of  economic activity across the economy. 
In essence these political economy perspectives  support  a  'public good'  model  for  the 
development of universal service.  However, as commented by Cave et al, "the rationale 
behind  the  public  good  model  is  the  belief that  beneficial  externalities  and  intangible 
benefits  associated  with  telephone  services  warrant  a  social  cost  benefit  analysis  to 
telecommunications [  ...  ] the public good model is linked to government social policy.  In 
its pure form  a public good model acts as  a surrogate for  market place forces  such that 
infrastructure investments which are judged to be in the "public interest" are mandated by 
regulators"  (p.22).  In  essence  such  a  view  requires  the  regulator  to  'pick winners'. 
However, where there is a wide choice of  immature technological and service options and 
the perceived utility function is not well defined, there is great scope for poor judgements. 
The policy implications of this political economy perspective are manifold.  At it most 
fundamental,  however,  this  perspective requires  a policy of universal  service  that pre-
empts market-based solutions and thus provides a clear framework  for  the diffusion of 
new technologies and services.  In the current context this perspective would lead to the 
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inclusion  of ISDN  services  in  a universal  service  obligation.  The  political  economy 
perspective  also  provides  a  relatively  complex  decision-making  process  for  universal 
service in which weight is given to a complex array of  factors (e.g. the cohesion of  regions 
and  the  integration  of the  'information  poor'  with  the  broader  economy).  A  policy 
formulated  from  this  political  economy  perspective  is  effectively  seeking  to  redress 
imbalances in the diffusion of  technology and the interactions within a market before they 
occur. 
C2.2  Economic Efficiency and Network Externalities 
In contrast to the political economy arguments, the debate about universal service within 
the framework of 'efficiency' involves a narrower set of  issues, in particular how universal 
service obligations force particular actions and behaviour on a company that it would not 
otherwise undertake,  and  an  assessment of the  consequences  of those  actions  for  other 
suppliers in the marketplace.  As a result, the efficiency debate has sought both to define 
the scope of activities which would not otherwise be undertaken and to measure the costs 
and benefits of  such activities. 
The  measurement  of the  costs  and  benefits  of universal  service  has  been  an  exercise 
conducted  in  many  countries  and  a  preliminary  study  for  EU12  Member  States  was 
undertaken by Analysys  for  the  Bangemann Group.
7  The  general  conclusion of these 
costing  studies  suggest  that  the  costs  of universal  service  obligations  appear  to  be 
relatively low when set against the  total  turnover of the  incumbent operator.  In those 
countries  where  there  has  been  a reasonable  degree  of tariff rebalancing,  and  so  it  is 
possible to make a more accurate calculation of costs and revenues, the cost of universal 
service obligations is between 1% and 2% of  turnover. 
An  important  element  of the  costing  studies  which  have  been  undertaken  is  the 
distribution  of costs  between uneconomic  customers  and  uneconomic  areas.  In  some 
countries,  such  as  the  UK,  costs  are  distributed  relatively  evenly  between  these  two 
elements.  Thus the argument from some regional groups that universal service obligations 
are  solely a question of peripherality are not necessarily supported by universal service 
costings.  It should be noted that the calculation of net cost is heavily dependent on the 
values attributed to  the benefits of being the holder of the universal service obligation. 
However, one consequence of these costing studies has been to clearly separate universal 
7  Provision of  Quantitative Data as Background Material for the Bangemann Group, Analysys Final Report, 18 May 1994. 
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service from the debate over access deficits.  If  the cost of  the universal service obligation 
is relatively low,  it is  not unreasonable to  require the  dominant carrier to  absorb these 
costs. 
A central argument in the economic efficiency debate is that the market would not provide 
telecoms services efficiently.  Privately assessed utility functions  would result in lower 
consumption than if a universal service obligation was in place; in essence,  individuals 
and producers would not take full account of  the benefits of  network externalities.  Where 
such network externalities exist then even if services were provided without distortions 
(such as regulatory action or monopolistic market structure), a market would not deliver 
the optimum solution.  In such circumstances, market failure is said to exist, and the policy 
question  is  therefore  how  to  incorporate  pricing  signals  that  will  allow  individuals' 
decisions to  mimic what would have happened in the absence of market failure. 
8  This 
debate involves an assumption that telecoms services can be seen as  a merit good, i.e.  a 
good  more  of which  the  government  decides  should  be  produced  than  people  would 
choose to consume left to themselves. 
There are two major features of  externalities in the telecoms industry: 
•  call  externalities,  the  asymmetry  between  costs  and  tariffs  which  anses  because 
incoming calls are received free of  charge 
•  network externalities, changes in the engineering efficiency and use value to existing 
users when another user joins the network. 
Building on these perspectives  Cave  et  al argue  that universal  service  can be seen  as 
embracing at least four different policy objectives: 
•  achieving universal geographical coverage 
•  offering residential services at geographically averaged prices 
•  pursuing universal access through widely subsidised residential access 
•  offering targeted telephone subsidies. 
The authors argue that there are four overlapping stages in the development of universal 
service  which  have  several  common  characteristics.  They  present  the  four  stages 
(illustrated in Table C 1)  rather hesitantly:  "we describe some of these characteristics in 
broad and deliberately over-simplified terms" (p.23). 
8  For a discussion of  these issues see for example Cave et al, op.  cit., or Capello, R. (1994). 
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TABLE Cl:  Four Stages of  Universal Service [Source: Cave et a/]
9 
Stage 1: Network  Stage 2:  Wide  Stage 3: Mass  Stage 4: Network 
establishment  Geographic Reach  Market Takeup  Completion 
Notional  0-30%  20-80%  70-100%  100% 
business 
penetration 
Notional  0-10%  5-30%  20-85%  75-100% 
residential 
penetration 
Telephone  entrepreneurial  administrative  operational (huge  commercial (may 
company  (government  workforce)  be privatised) 
culture  department) 
Management  large scale capital  technical network  growing the  growing call 
preoccu- investment in new  improvements,  network,  revenues 
pations  technology  public service  investment in new  marketing 
technology 
TABLE Cl:  Four Stages of  Universal Service (continued) 
Stage 1: Network  Stage 2: Wide  Stage 3: Mass  Stage 4: Network 
establishment  Geographic Reach  Market Takeup  Completion 
Constraints to  investment funds,  limited demand  manpower for  affordability of 
network  appropriate  due to high cost  plant installation  service to poorer 
expansion  technology and  and prevalence of  to meet mass  households; 
skills  alternative  demand (waiting  cultural 
communication  lists)  acceptability of 
methods  telephony 
Typical  investment  close government  installation and  cost oriented 
government  incentives  control for  rental charges kept  tariffs, targetted 
policy  security and  low to stimulate  subsidies 
measures  economic reasons;  line demand 
geographically 
uniform charges 
Universal  primarily tech- primarily geo- primarily  primarily social 
service goals  no  logical (acquire  graphic (maintain  economic  (achieve political 
new technology)  regional parity)  (stimulate  cohesion) 
provide long  make telephone  economy)  telephone 
distance service  service available  widespread  affordable to all; 
linking all major  in all population  residential take-up  telephone service 
centres provide  centres; wide- of  telephony; meet  adaptable to 
public telephones  spread adoption of  all reasonable  special needs (e.g. 
where demand  telephony in  demands for  of  disabled 
warrants  business  telecoms  people) 
Cave et at, op. cit. Reproduced with the kind permission of  the Commission. 
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In conclusion, Cave eta! argue that they have set out a "general framework for thinking 
about the evolution of  universal service goals [  ...  ] At the stage of  mass market take-up the 
main goal is economic, to stimulate the economy.  Externalities are large.  At the stage of 
network completion, the main aim is social.  In the former states access charges may need 
to be kept low.  In the latter, targeted subsidies are appropriate" (p.25). 
However, Cave eta! are prepared to accept the nation of  universal service as all-embracing 
in terms of technological, economic, social and regional objectives,  and so  they do  not 
necessarily provide a consistent framework within which these policy objectives can be 
delineated.  What  appears  to  be needed  is  the  ability to  distinguish between universal 
service policy (which concerns the ultimate roll-out of technology and the protection of 
the interests of  consumers who are disadvantaged as a result of  the complete diffusion of a 
technology  across  a  population),  and  a  policy  which  facilitates  the  roll-out  of new 
technologies and gives consumers and investors a better understanding of the utilities and 
costs associated with new services.  The unbundling of these two  elements which have 
until now been inextricably interlinked with universal service provides a way to develop 
distinct policies.  An initial framework for this can be derived from the work of Eli Noam. 
This framework is set out in Exhibit C 1 below. 
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EXHIBITCJ:  Average Cost and Utility of  a Telecoms Network, Plotted Against 
Increasing Numbers of  Subscribers [Source: Noam,  1994] 
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Eli Noam (1994)
10  provides  a framework  for  analysing universal service which can be 
used to bridge the conflicting positions of  the private good and public good models.  This 
framework,  which  is  described  below,  can  be  used  to  clearly  distinguish  the  policy 
initiative of 'public access' from the concerns of a universal service policy.  We argue that 
these two policies are different and that it is wrong to present them as  a continuum.  In 
essence,  universal  service  concerns  the  completion  of a  network  where  the  costs  are 
known and the utility function is well defined.  Public access is a policy measure which 
can be seen to have value in directly contrasting situations, where the utility curve is not 
well known and the shape of  the cost curve is unclear. 
The definition of universal service offered by Noam is  articulated in terms of a public 
policy objective to spread telecoms to most members of society and to make available the 
necessary funds,  either directly or indirectly.  Noam comments that "competitive inroads 
into segments of telecommunications have limited the ability to  generate funds  for  such 
internal cross-subsidies.  Since the demands  for  funds  for maintaining universal service 
have not declined, the old system has been propped up with great complexity" (p.687  /8). 
10  Noam, E., (1994), "Beyond Liberalization III: reforming Universal Service", Telecommunications Policy 18(9) pps 687-704. 
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The  basis  of the  framework  offered  by Noam  is  set  out  in Exhibit  Cl  above.  The 
underlying assumption of the framework is that costs are  shared equally by all network 
members, in which case four stages of  network growth can be identified.  The first and last 
of  these are fuelled by external subsidy, while the middle two stages are propelled initially 
by self-sustained growth and then by entitlement (directed) growth.  These four stages of 
growth are delineated by the achievement of  specific network characteristics: 
•  critical mass, the point at which the private assessment of utility fuels the growth of 
the network 
•  private optimum, the point at which average costs begin to increase, utility reaches a 
plateau, and marginal average net benefits are zero 
•  social  optimum,  the  point  at  which  a  societal  view  of the  economic  optimum  is 
reached 
•  exit point, the point at which the average cost outweighs the utility and the advantages 
of  joining an alternative but interconnected network. 
The ability of customers to move from one network to another and still enjoy the benefits 
of  the larger, incumbent operator's, network puts the issue of interconnection at the heart 
of the debate about the development of competitive markets.  Given that within a single 
large  network  there  are  substantial  redistributions  brought  about  by basing  tariffs  on 
averaged costs,  customers have a substantial  incentive to  migrate to  an  interconnected 
network, particularly if  they still enjoy the benefits of network externalities without being 
subject to the redistribution burden.  The tension created by this outcome of  regulatory and 
pricing  policy  explains  why  interconnection  is  the  main  battleground  between  new 
entrants and incumbent operators.  If  the transfer of customers from one network becomes 
particularly strong then the first network moves close to 'tipping', and as a consequence an 
additional network is  created.  As  observed by Noam,  "thus a redistributory universal 
policy is connected to  a market structure policy, so  when the latter changes, the former 
must adjust too."(p.691). 
In defining those services which should be included in the universal service obligation 
Noam makes the following observations: 
"It is for those services which 
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•  have reached, through self sustained growth, a private optimum, beyond which further 
growth is not internally generated because marginal average net benefits are zero, but 
where 
•  average net benefits are positive (and therefore encourage demand for entry), and 
•  the number of those excluded is sufficiently large to  lead to  an opening by political 
means." (p.689) 
As is clear from the analysis the extension of  universal service is related to the completion 
of the roll-out of a technology, and the key measure of this appears to be market share. 
Universal  service  therefore  applies  in those  conditions  where  the  utility  and  costs  of 
service are known (on Exhibit C 1, those circumstances which lie to the right of  the private 
optimum).  Conversely, public access  applies to those points to  the left of the  'critical 
mass' transition point. 
An alternative view is  put forward by Milton Mueller.  Mueller (1995)
11  argues that a 
public finance perspective is typically used to interpret the universal service problem.  He 
cites  the  following  to  demonstrate  the  key  issues  surrounding  the  current  debate  on 
universal service: 
"The current system of  affordable and widely adopted telephone service is based upon rate 
averaging and cross subsidies among routes, users and locations.  Competing networks 
undermine this support system because they are able to undercut the incumbents' prices in 
routes and services that are  generating surpluses, while benefiting from  access to  areas 
controlled by the incumbent.  This "cream skimming competition" will inexorably lead to 
unbundling of routes and services of the public network, and a deaveraging of the rates 
associated with each service component.  As this happens, many end users, forced to bear 
the "full cost" of their particular network components, will not be able to afford it.  So 
how will the subsidy system be maintained in the new, competitive environment." 
Therefore,  within this  public  finance  framework  the  key issue  is  to  identify the  most 
efficient and equitable mechanisms for generating and distributing the subsidies needed to 
finance uneconomic use of the telecoms infrastructure.  However, Mueller argues that an 
alternative framework is available, namely to use theories of  property rights and recast the 
universal service debate as  a problem of appropriability.  In essence Mueller argues that 
telecoms firms should be able to adopt pricing policies and control access to their products 
in a way which allows them to capture the full economic value.  Mueller argues that "most 
11  See Mueller, M., (1995). 
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of the alleged incompatibility between universal service and competition is a predictable 
result of a property structure that does not allow telecommunication networks to benefit 
from increasing their scope.  With the right property structure, universality ceases to be a 
costly liability and instead becomes a valuable asset." (p.2). 
Mueller offers four major critiques of  the prevailing view: 
•  the underlying assumption is that a universal telecoms network is a costly liability and 
carriers receive no competitive advantage by enlarging its scope 
•  there is no way of  distinguishing between high-cost and inefficient ways of  operating in 
a subsidy-based environment 
•  universal  service  subsidies  are  incompatible  with  a  free,  open  and  competitive 
marketplace 
•  subsidy requires the government to  define the nature of basic service rather than the 
market. 
A central feature of Mueller's argument is the absence of a property structure in public 
telecoms networks.  Where networks are interconnected a supplier can provide access to 
the whole system regardless of  the scope of  individual networks, thus smaller firms enjoy 
a substantial range of benefits without the costs or risks involved in creating the entire 
system. 
Mueller draws a parallel with the problem of  intellectual property in information markets, 
pointing up  the distinction between the costs of producing information and the costs of 
reproducing information: "[  ...  ] a competing network provider who purchases access to the 
established telephone network for its customers is physically enabled to resell access to all 
of  the users of  the latter system.  Just as the information reseller need not worry about the 
costs of  producing information but only the cost of  reproducing it, so the telephone access 
reseller need not worry about the cost of reconstructing the established network, but only 
the cost of acquiring access into it to  handle the traffic between the two systems" (p.6). 
Moreover, Mueller argues that telephone access is not a homogenous good, each user and 
each group of  subscribers is unique. 
Mueller argues  that  a number of implications  arise  if the  issue of universal  service is 
considered from the perspective of  appropriability: 
•  The primary resource which is sold by a telephone network is access to subscribers, not 
simply a set of physical facilities and functions.  Moreover, it is the size of the access 
bundle offered by a network that increases its value. 
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•  The price of access should be based on the market value of access, not just on the cost 
of  physical facilities required to provide it. 
•  The  problem  of appropriability  makes  it  necessary  and  legitimate  for  owners  of 
information resources to vary the prices charged for access depending on whether or 
not the user intends to resell it. 
In conclusion, Mueller argues that competition and network universality can be reconciled 
if  the telecoms industry adopts a property structure that allows networks to appropriate the 
increasing value generated when their scope is enlarged.  Given that this is not possible in 
the  current  regime,  Mueller  comments  that:  "it  is  not  surprising  that  the  growth  of 
competition seems to corrode the economic foundations of  universal services" (p.l  0). 
From a policy perspective the economic efficiency viewpoint paves the way for  three 
interrelated sets of  initiatives: 
•  the design and implementation of  public access policies.  Such policies are particularly 
important where the costs of provision and the utilities of consumption are not well 
known and thus  sub-optimal  decisions  may be taken which would  slow  down the 
introduction and diffusion of  new services. 
•  universal service policies based on the argument that under pure market conditions 
individual decisions do not result in sub-optimum development of  the network because 
they do not take full account of  network externalities. 
•  a universal service policy which addresses the diffusion of services to those relatively 
few households which are unable to afford the service under normal market conditions. 
This policy of network completion seeks to rectify the behaviour of the market in the 
light of  actual rather than anticipated behaviour. 
C3/  UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND AFFORDABILITY 
Inextricably interwoven with the debate on universal service are the related issues of  tariff 
structures and affordability.  This section addresses these two  issues by looking at the 
welfare implications associated with tariff rebalancing (towards cost causative models as 
anticipated by the ONP framework) and then reviewing the limited literature available on 
the  'untelephoned'.  Here  the  issue  of affordability  is  best  interpreted  in  terms  of 
controllability; the evidence suggests that it is not the costs of calls which are the greatest 
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deterrent to use of  the telephone network but rather the lack of  control over expenditure in 
those households which have to budget all items of  expenditure very carefully. 
C3.1  Estimation of  Welfare Implications of  Tariff Rebalancing 
In the process of tariff rebalancing, which is inextricably interwoven with the emergence 
of competitive markets and the implementation of ONP rules, there is a debate about the 
distribution  of changes  in  individual  welfare. 
12  Even  if it  can  be  shown  that  the 
distributional effects of liberalisation are Pareto optimum, they may still be regarded as 
unacceptable by some groups of consumers.  In his work on the perceptions of economic 
justice, Zajac argues that economic welfare analysis ignores the behaviour and values of 
individuals.  He argues  that  individuals,  in their economic  and  social judgements, use 
different criteria of mutual material self-interest and of equity from those used by welfare 
economists.  Even if  it could be shown that everyone would benefit from a redistribution 
of welfare this would not necessarily be regarded as  equitable since the  overall  social 
distribution  of welfare  benefits  may  be  considered  to  be  as  important,  if not  more 
important, than the absolute level. 
In early work, Perl (1986)
13  argued that while the net welfare of consumers increased as a 
result  of changes  in  tariffs  these  benefits  were  unevenly  distributed,  with  the  lowest 
income groups witnessing a reduction in their welfare.  In his discussion of  the distribution 
of welfare  Perl  demonstrates  that the  gains  from  cost-based tariffs  will  be  distributed 
unevenly, with the poorest 30% of households actually being worse off with cost-based 
tariffs (see Table C2 below). 
TABLE C2: 
Income 
group 
$6000 or less 
Distribution of  Welfare Gains from Cost-Based Pricing [Source: 
14  Perl, 1986} 
Percentage  Cost-based  Access  Income-based 
of  pricing  charge  access charge 
households  annual gain 
11.35  -68.28  10.00  56.50 
12  Zajac, E., (1983), "Perceived Economic Justice: The Example of  Public Utility Regulation" in Peyton Young, H., Cost Allocation: 
Methods, Principles, Applications (Elsevier). 
13  Perl (1986), The Consequences of  Cost-Based Pricing, in Miller, J., Telecommunications and Equity, North Holland. 
14  Perl (1986).  We have requested permission to reproduce this information. 
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$6001 to  19.15  -7.83  15.30  62.47 
$12 500 
$12 501 to  19.97  48.93  20.40  65.52 
$17 500 
$17 501 to  16.03  99.03  25.00  66.44 
$25 000 
Above  33.80  181.95  32.00  88.83 
$25 000 
Average  77.13  22.90  71.95 
Although Perl supports cost-based tariffing, he argues that income-based charging should 
be adopted as a means of  allocating the distributional effects more equitably (see Table C3 
below). 
TABLEC3: 
Income Group 
(US$) 
$6000 or less 
$6001-12 000 
$12 001-$17 500 
$17 501-$25 000 
Above $25 000 
Average 
Telephone Penetration under Alternative Rate Regimes [Source: 
15  Perl, 1986} 
Status Quo  Cost-Based  Income-Based 
Pricing  Access Charges 
80.60  71.42  79.09 
89.00  83.08  86.07 
94.15  90.49  90.97 
96.60  94.29  93.65 
98.30  97.04  95.67 
93.05  89.19  90.35 
Perl's work rests on assumptions about the price elasticity of demand for services and on 
the marginal costs (which in turn are based on operators' own cost estimates).  This raises 
two concerns about the results produced by Perl.  The first relates to  the way in which 
relatively high levels of  joint and common cost are allocated among different services (e.g. 
the US  Justice Department has estimated such costs at between 70%  and 90%).
16  The 
second concern about Perl's results relates to the difficulty which appears to remain over 
the actual nature of costs in telecoms networks.  Because of these concerns, we believe 
15  Perl (1986).  We have requested permission to reproduce this information. 
16  US Justice Department, The Geodesic Network, 1986, para 3.49. 
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that specific results produced by Perl should be treated with reasonable caution (although 
the general direction of  the results may still be appropriate). 
This line of work has been extended by Wolak.
17  He has assessed the likely impacts of 
proposed price  changes  (i.e.  the  rebalancing  of local  and  long-distance  tariffs)  on the 
consumption of both local and long-distance phone service and consumer welfare, at the 
individual  household  level.  His  starting  point  is  the  observation  that,  in  the  USA: 
"between 45 to 49 per cent of  the total cost of an inter-LATA long distance call is paid to 
the local exchange carriers at the originating and terminating points of  the call.  According 
to  Sievers (1994), 
18  approximately half of these payments are  in excess of the costs of 
local access.  A major rationale  for  these subsidies is  to  maintain a low price of local 
residential services in order to achieve goals of  universal service" (p.l). 
Wolak used  an  econometric modelling  framework  that  specifies  a complete  system of 
consumer demand functions derived from an assumption of 'household-level static utility 
maximisation'.  This  framework  was  populated  with  data  from  the  Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics' Survey of  Consumer Expenditure.  Wolak's analysis signals the importance of 
modelling telephone demand in conjunction with demand for all other goods, in order to 
make an accurate measurement of  price and income elasticities and perform theoretically 
valid welfare calculations.  Wolak summarised the results of  his study as follows: 
"We find  that  for  price  changes  scenarios  that  balance  the  percent  increase  in  local 
services with a corresponding reduction in long distance services,  for  instance a twenty 
percent increase in the price of local service coupled with a twenty percent decrease in 
long distance, the mean compensating variation is negative, which implies that the mean 
amount that must be paid to each household to make it indifferent to this combination of 
prices changes in negative.  This result follows from the estimated price-inelastic demand 
for local service and the price-elastic demand for long distance service coupled with the 
very small income elasticity for local service and substantially higher income elasticity of 
demand for long distance service.  For local price increases unaccompanied by decreases 
in the price of  long distance service, although the mean compensating variation is positive 
(implying that consumers must be compensated a positive amount to be indifferent to this 
price change), it is  still a very small fraction of the consumers'  total expenditure.  For 
example, a forty percent increase in the price of local service only results in an average 
17  Wolak, F.  A.,  (1994), Can  Universal Service Survive in  a Competitive Telecommunications Environment?  Evidence from  the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of  Stanford, California, USA. 
18  Sievers, M.  (1994), "Should  the  InterLATA  Restrictions  Be Lifted?  Analysis  of the  Significant Issues", paper presented  at 
Rutgers University Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Public Utility Economics, 6-8 July 1994. 
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quarterly compensating variation of$16.35 in January 1988 dollars for the translog model. 
This  figure  is  approximately  0.5  percent of the  sample  mean  of household  total  non-
durable expenditure, ie $2961.25 in January 1988 dollars[  ...  ] The 5th and 95th percentile 
range of compensating variations  for  this  price  change  for  the  translog  model  for  our 
sample of  households is $11.19 to $20.82 so that even for the extremes of  the sample, the 
welfare losses associated with these price changes seem relatively minor.  Even for a price 
increase  of this  magnitude  (  40%)  we  do  not  find  any  households  in  the  population 
consuming  a  positive  amount  of local  service  before  the  price  change  reducing  their 
consumption of telephone service to  zero, which would equate with disconnecting from 
the local exchange network.  All of  these results point to the conclusion that there appears 
to  be  little  loss  in  consumer  welfare  and  little,  if any,  reduction  in  the  fraction  of 
households connected to the local telephone network due to the projected increases in the 
price  of local  service  brought  about  by  an  increasing  amount  of competition  in  all 
telecommunications markets." (p.4) 
The  key  conclusion  from  Wolak's  work  in the  USA  is  that  as  cost-based  tariffs  are 
introduced and  subsidies between long-distance  and  local calls are  eliminated with the 
introduction of competition, there appears to  be a net gain in consumer welfare for  the 
majority of  households.  However, as commented by Wolak, these results "do not overturn 
the conventional belief that local increases more than proportionately burden low-income 
(or  in  our  case  low  total-expenditure  households),  older  headed  households,  or  rural 
households.  Nevertheless, our estimation results suggest that for  the price changes we 
consider  this  burden  is  not  sufficiently  large  to  merit  disconnection  from  the  local 
telecommunications loop". 
C3.2  The Untelephoned 
The key measure used in the universal service debate has tended to be the percentage of 
households with a telephone.  Such figures  are  typically quoted at  a national level,  and 
indicate that in most OECD  countries the  universal provision of 'basic telephony'  is  a 
problem of diminishing scale.  As  illustrated in Table C4,  there was  a relatively rapid 
increase in the residential penetration of  telephony between 1975 and 1993: 
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TABLEC4: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
TABLEC4: 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Residential Telephony Penetration Across the EU,  1975 vs 1993 
19  [Source: ITU} 
1975  1993 
40%  88% 
42%  87% 
68%  104% 
63%  104% 
26%  100% 
43%  92% 
43%  92% 
22%  72% 
42%  95% 
63%  103% 
Residential Telephony Penetration Across the EU,  1975 vs 1993 
(continued) 
1975  1993 
52%  97% 
21%  76% 
29%  93% 
108%  121% 
53%  94% 
However, these figures do not accurately reflect the extent to which telephone access is 
available in those households and areas where theory suggests that penetration would be 
lower.  For example we know that telephone penetration in the UK is  correlated with 
income, as shown in Table C5. 
19  ITU Stars Database, July 1996 release.  Reproduced with the kind permission of  the ITU. 
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TABLEC5:  Adoption of  Technologies by Income Groups in the UK [Source: 
cso 1995]
20 
Gross Income Decile Group  Telephone 
All households  91.1% 
Lowest 10%  69.6% 
Second decile  80.8% 
Third decile  86.7% 
Fourth decile  92.3% 
Fifth decile  93.3% 
Sixth decile  93.9% 
Seventh decile  97.5% 
Eighth decile  98.4% 
Ninth decile  99.3% 
Highest 10%  99.7o/o 
Data from the same source (CSO 1995) gives a regional breakdown for the adoption of 
particular household technologies.  In the UK as  a whole 91.1% of households have a 
telephone, but the figure varies from region to region, ranging from 86.4% in Wales to 
93.9% in South East England (excluding Greater London).  1988 data from Milne (1990)
21 
shows that although 85% of  UK households had a telephone, there were large variations in 
penetration by region and household type: 
•  40o/o among council estates in Northumberland coalfield areas 
•  45% among unfurnished tenants 
•  72% among furnished tenants 
•  72% among single pensioners 
•  62% among lone-parent families. 
Further examples of variations in penetration come from Comford (1993),
22  who found 
penetration rates as low as 26% on a housing estate in Newcastle Upon Tyne, and a BT 
2°  CSO (1995), Family Spending Survey 1994-95 (HMSO, London).  We have requested permission to reproduce this information. 
21  Milne,  C.,  "Universal  Telephone  Service  in  the  United  Kingdom:  An  Agenda  for  Policy  Research  and  Action",  in 
Telecommunications Policy, October 1990. 
22  Cornford,  J.,  et  al,  Universal  Service  in  a Liberalised Environment,  Centre  for  Urban  and  Regional  Development  Studies, 
University ofNewcastle Upon Tyne (1993). 
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estimate from 1988 showing household penetration rates of over 122% in the old City of 
London District. 
23  This  data on penetration rates raises  important questions  about the 
nature of affordability and the terms under which individuals gain access to the telecoms 
network. 
A  major  study  of the  untelephoned  was  conducted  by  the  Policy  Studies  Institute 
(Callender 1995), involving 373  respondents.
24  This research indicated that cost is the 
main factor preventing individuals from  having a telephone;  almost two thirds of those 
without a telephone reported that they could not afford one.  Table C6  summarises the 
main reasons which respondents gave for not having a telephone. 
TABLEC6:  Underlying Reasons for Not Having a Telephone [Source: Callender 
(1995)]
25 
Main reason  % 
Concerns over telephone bills  39% 
Initial cost of  a telephone  29% 
Perceived need for a telephone  19% 
Total  87% 
Although only 20% of all  respondents  said the  main  reason why they did  not  have  a 
telephone was that they could not afford an extra bill, 46% of  respondents mentioned it as 
one of  the reasons.  Table C7 summarises the responses given. 
TABLEC7:  Sources of  Concern Over Telephone Bills [Source: Callender 
(1995)]
26 
Concern Over Telephone Bills  % 
Cannot afford extra bill  20 
23  Data provided by BT from historical records from the old City of  London District for the year 1988. 
24  Callender,  C.,  (1995),  in  Barriers  to  Universal  Service:  Initial  Findings  in  USO  in  a  Competitive  Environment,  Analysys, 
Cambridge. 
25  Callender,  C.,  (1995),  in  Barriers  to  Universal  Service:  Initial Findings  in  USO  in  a  Competitive  Environment,  Analysys, 
Cambridge.  We have requested permission to reproduce this information. 
26  Callender,  C.,  (1995),  in  Barriers  to  Universal  Service:  Initial  Findings  in  USO  in  a  Competitive  Environment,  Analysys, 
Cambridge.  We have requested permission to reproduce this information. 
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Worried about another bill  7 
Worried about large bills  5 
Previous telephone disconnection  3 
Previous bills too high  2 
Cost of  calls  1 
Level of  charge/rental  1 
Total  39 
Callender observed that "over a quarter (26 per cent) of all households surveyed with no 
telephone were experiencing some difficulty in managing their finances at the time of the 
survey.  A further 46 per cent were just 'getting by', which suggests that they may well 
have been experiencing problems.  Nearly a third (31  per cent) had been in arrears with 
their bills for rent, council tax and utilities at some time over the past year" (p.148). 
The second most common reason for not having a telephone was the cost of installation 
(47% of all respondents cited it and 29% said it was the main reason).  The question of 
deposits was seen as a relatively minor issue, with only 1% citing it as the main reason for 
not having a telephone. 
What emerges from this detailed study of the untelephoned is that affordability is the key 
factor which inhibits access to the telephone.  The study reveals that there are a number of 
dimensions to affordability- not only the balance of  total expenditure within a household 
but also the costs of  gaining access to telecoms services and the control of  expenditure.  In 
terms of individuals' perceived need for the telecoms service 86% of survey respondents 
claimed they had relatively easy access to the network either through the use of friends' 
telephone or from a public call box.  Of the 44% who had access via family or friends 
there is evidence that access was often provided at no cost. 
The recommendations from this study focus on both the nature of funding access to the 
network through lump sums and the lack of  control available to individuals in determining 
the financial risks associated with using the telephone.  It appears that these two features 
of  the debate on affordability could be addressed within a telecoms policy debate. 
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C4/  SUMMARY 
This chapter has addressed key questions about the nature of  affordability and the basis for 
extending the services which are included within the universal service obligation.  In terms 
of affordability  it  seems  that  the  policy  debate  should  focus  on  the  design  and 
implementation  of innovative  policies  to  increase  consumer  control  over  telecoms 
expenditure  and  changes  to  the  rather  limited  tariff structures  and  credit  agreements 
available  from  the dominant carriers.  Thus  it  is  clear that  some of the  key issues  of 
affordability which lie at the heart of  the universal service debate can be addressed within 
the telecoms policy framework. 
Several observations can be made in terms of  extending the concept of  universal service to 
include services other than voice telephony.  The first is that universal service policy in a 
competitive market depends on the existence of network externalities and a recognition 
that  telecoms  is  a  'merit good' .
27  The  current  structure  of property rights  means  that 
market failure exists, and so consumption (based on private assessments of  utility) will not 
be the Pareto optimum. 
A related issue in this debate is the conceptual understanding of the technologies being 
discussed.  In the case of telephony and the PSTN the technology can be argued to  be 
discrete, in the sense that provision of  the service includes all that is required to enjoy the 
full benefits of  the technology; in effect, a handset is the gateway to telephony.  However, 
in the  case  of other services  ranging  from  ISDN up  to  full  broadband technologies  a 
fundamental shift occurs in our conceptualisation of  the technology; it moves from being a 
discrete  technology to  a  configurational technology.  Such  technologies  are  not  only 
critically dependent on other technologies, but also on changes in the economic and social 
institutions surrounding the diffusion and use of  the technology. 
Theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  in  the  case  of  configurational 
technologies broader technological and institutional adaptations are critical to the diffusion 
of  novel technologies.  As a result, if  the concept of universal service is extended without 
due regard to the parallel and necessary diffusion of other equally critical components of 
the technological system, the benefits of  policy developments are unlikely to be secured. 
27  However, it can be argued that network externalities have been substantially realised where penetration rates are in excess of  90%. 
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AnnexD/ 
Primary Research Data on Universal Service 
The  following  tables  reproduce  the  findings  of  a  survey  of National  Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs)  on aspects  of telecoms  services  relating to  universal  service.  This 
survey was carried out by Directorate General XIII of the European Commission in late 
1995  and  early  1996.  These  tables  were  included  in  a  Communication  on  universal 
service  from  the  Commission to  the other institutions of the  EU.
1  Some of the tables 
included in this communication are reproduced here (Tables Al to A6 and Table AlO) as 
valuable  background  information  to  the  debate  on  universal  service.  The  tables  are 
presented here exactly as they appeared in the March Communication.  In some cases the 
information in these  tables has been superseded by changes  in legislation  and  practice 
since the survey ofNRAs was carried out by the Commission. 
Universal service for telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalised environment - Communication to 
the European Parliament,  The  Council, the  Economic  and  Social  Committee and the  Committee of the Regions, 
COM(96)73 Brussels 13 March 1996. 
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TABLEAJ:  Telephone Penetration Rates within the European Community 
Country  Percentage of households with 
·  a telephone1 
Residential Main Lines per 
100 Households2 
1990  1994  1990  1994 
B  n/a  n/a  81  92 
DKj  94.3  n/a  103  106 
D4  80  89  81  93 
EL  n/a  n/a  80  96 
E  n/a  n/a  80  89 
F  94  96.4  104  111 
IRL  66  80  60  75 
I  n/a  n/a  90  99 
L  n/a  n/a  88  105 
NL  93  96.5  96  96 
AUT  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
P'  47.1  74.8  43  64 
FIN  95°  97°  103  104 
SWED1  98.7  98.7  121  121 
UK  88  91.1 ~  89  99 
EC Average  - - 87  96 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities (1995). 
n!a  indicates that the NRA does not have this data available.  EC average excludes Austria. 
Notes 
1.  All data provided in this section of  the table relates to the most recent period for which information is available 
(normally 1994).  Where available, additional data is given in these notes. 
2.  This indicator of  residential telephone penetration is imperfect as it is not the same as the number ofhouseholds 
which have a telephone; the latter indicator would have an upper value of 100. 
3.  Source: Tele Danmark. 
4.  Figure includes the new BundesHinder. 
5.  Figures refers to penetration rate for Portuguese mainland (excluding Madeira and the Azores).  The household 
penetration figure in 1994 including those islands was 74.8%. 
6.  Estimated figures for 1990 and 1995 
7.  % relates  to  1989  which was  the  last  year for  which  figures  were  calculated,  given the  very high  level  of 
penetration achieved 
8.  Data relates to March 1995  (Source: UK Family expenditure survey). 
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TABLEA2: 
Country 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
AUT 
p 
FIN 
SWED 
UK 
EC Average 
Penetration of  Fixed and Cellular Telephones per 100 Population 
and Payphones per 1000 Population in the EC 
Main Lines  Cellular  Payphones 
subscribers 
per 100  perlOO  per 1000 
1990  1994  1990  1994  1990  1994 
39  45  0  0.7  1.3  1.5 
57  60  2.9  9.7  1.3  1.6 
40  48  0.4  3.0  1.7  2.1 
39  48  0  1.4  2.1  3.5 
32  38  0.1  1.0  1.1  1.4 
50  55  0.5  1.4  3.2  3.5 
28  35  0.4  1.7  1.5  1.8 
39  43  0.5  3.9  7.7  6.8 
48  55  0.2  3.2  0.8  0.9 
46  51  0.5  2.0  0.5  0.7 
42  47  0.5  3.5  4.3  4.3 
24  35  0.1  1.8  2.6  3.3 
54  55  5.2  13.3  4.1  4.6 
68  68  5.6  16.0  4.3  3.7 
45  49  2.1  6.1  1.6  2.1 
43  49  0.9  3.6  2.9  3.1 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities; (1995) 
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TABLEA3:  Target Periods for Network Connection and Supply Times Achieved 
in the EC1 
Information  Target  Actual supply time 
Published 
B  Yes  90% within 20 working days"  90.9% within 20 working days 
61.3% within 5 working days3 
DK  Yes  95% on installation date agreed  98% within target 
upon with customer.  Remaining 
5% within 10 days. 
D  Yes  80% within 20 working days  87.1% within 20 working days in 
Western Lander 
42.3% within 20 working days in 
Eastern Lander 
98.3% oflines provided on date 
agreed with user4 
EL  n/a  80% of  new connections within 30 
days5 
220 days on averagd' 
E  No 1  n/a  5 working days on average 
F  Yes  Within 5 working days15  8 days on averageY 
IRL  Occasionally10  n/a  11  working days on average 
75% of customer orders completed 
within 2 weeks  11 
I  n/a  For new connections: 60 days  97.8% of connections within targets 
For take-overs: 30 days 
L  n/a  n/a  60% within 30 days 
89% within 3 months 
11% over 3 months 
NL  n/a  1 month  96% within target 
AUT  n/a  n/a  45 days on average 
p  Yes  Target: 2 months (95)/1.5 m(96)/1 
m(97)12  Minimum level: 
0.4 months average (Sept. 95) 
2. 8/2.4/2 months 
FIN  Yes  n/a  5.4 days on average  1  3 
SWED  n/a  Within 5 days14  Less than 1 day on average 
UK  Statistics published  BT:  For residential customers:  BT: For residential 85.3% satisfied 
regularly by BT  and  within 8 working days.  target 
Mercury only  For business customers: within 6  For business customers 76.4% 
working days  satisfied  target15 
Mercury: Access for indirectly 
connected customers: within 2 days  Mercury: 72.8% of  connections on 
of  order16  date agreed  17 
n/a=data not available 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities (1995). 
NOTES 
All data provided in the table relates to the most recent period for which information is available (normally 1994  ).  Where available, 
additional data is given in these notes. 
2  Target set in Belgacom's Management Contract.  The target set for 1995 is 80% of  connections within 5 working days. 
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3  In 1993: 26.6% within 5 working days and 83.9% within 20 working days. 
4  These figures relate to the second half of 1994.  In first half of 1994 83% of  lines provided within 20 days in Western Lander. 
5  Target set for 1995 
6  Data relates to 31.12.94 
7  Information provided to the Spanish Advisory Telecommunications Council.  Public can obtain information given to that body. 
8  Target set in France Telecom's contract with the Direction Generate de Postes et Telecommunications (DGPT Annual Report 
(1994)). 
9  Figure as at 31  December 1993 (Source: DGPT Annual Report (1994)). 
10  The last set of  information was published on 21  March 1994. 
11  In 1993: 19 days on average. 
12 Target and minimum acceptable level set in contract between ICP and Portugal Telecom and covers period 1995/1996/1997 
13  In 1993: 5.3 days on average; in 1992: 5.5 days on average 
14  Target forms part ofTelia's service warranty. 
15  In addition to requesting a direct connection to the Mercury Network, users can access Mercury's long-distance/international 
network indirectly via BT or other local connection.  Access is obtained by dialling a specific preface (132) after subscribing to 
Mercury. 
16  Figures relate to October 1994 to March 1995.  For Aprill995 to September 1995, corresponding figures are 86.9% and 78%. 
17  Mercury completed on average 82.5% of  connections on date agreed with the customer in 1993. 
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TABLEA4: 
Country 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
AUT 
plO 
Analysys Final Report  for DGXIIIIAJ 
Target Periods for Fault Repairs, Repair Times Achieved and 
Compensation Schemes Available in the ECi 
Fault repair times  Compensation 
Target.L:  Actual repair time  Schemes 
71%  before end of  next  81.3% of  repairs within  nla 
working day3  targets 
100% within 12 working  91% within target.  IfTele Danmark defaults on the time 
hours  of  execution concerning the change of 
an existing connection to the public 
telecommunications network, or if 
faults occur in the telecommunications 
network leading to interruptions of  the 
connection, Tele Danmark shall make 
a proportional reduction in the 
subscription charge for the period in 
question, provided that the amount 
exceeds DKK 25.  The amount shall 
be deducted on the subsequent invoice 
for subscription charges. 
Graduated system of  discounts (up to a 
fulllOO% discount) for network 
80% within 3 working days  82.5% of  repairs within  connection delays and compensation 
target  schemes for network connection and 
fault repair delays depending on 
60% within 24 hours5 
nature of  service and length of  delay4 
57% within target  Basic charge reimbursed if  repair time 
target not satisfied 
Within 6 days6  98.4% of  faults attended to  Reimbursement of  a proportionate part 
within  24 hours  of  the monthly line rental for repairs 
exceeding repair time target 
92% before end of  next  86.3% of  repairs within  0/a 
working day  7  target8 
n/a  90% within 2 days9  No schemes in operation 
nla  67.3% same day  n/a 
97.1% within 2 days 
Within 5 days6  86.2% same day  Rental charge reimbursed if  repair 
100 % within 10 days  time target not fulfilled 
Within 12 working hours  98% of  repairs within target  Twice the monthly rental will be 
reimbursed if  repair targets not met 
Within 1 day6  93% within 24 hours 
Reimbursement of 1/30 of  monthly 
line rental for every day of  delay to 
line repair in excess of  repair time 
target 
Objective : within 2 working 92% within 2 working  Reimbursement of  the monthly 
days 83%(95)/ 85%(96)/  days(September 1995)  subscription corresponding to the 
90%(97)  number of  days for which service was 
Minimum level:  interrupted 
75o/o/80%/85% 
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Country  Fault repair times  Compensation 
Target~  Actual repair time  Schemes 
FIN  n/a  66.4% within 24 hours  11  There is a reimbursement of  a monthly 
basic fee if  the line is out of  order for 
more than 48 hours within one month. 
Within l working day12 
Discount of  quarterly fee if  new 
SWED  93% of  repairs within target  connection not within 5 days or if 
fault not repaired within repair time 
target 
BT: by end of next working  98.9% of  business customer  Compensation available for various 
day6 Special services  faults 95.2% ofresidential  service failings either on the basis of  a 
UK  guaranteeing a quick  customer faults repaired  daily rate or actual fmancialloss, up to 
response are offered at an  within 2 working days  13  maximum of£  1  ooo14 
PVtret fptp 
Mercury: For 2100 service,  68.3% within 4 hours  Compensation available for late 
within 24 hours; for indirect  94.1% within 48 hours  delivery of  service depending on 
service, 90% of  faults within  nature of  service and length of  delay, 
24 hours  up to maximum of  £5000 
n!a: data not available 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities (1995) 
NOTES 
1  All data provided in this table relates to the most recent period for which information is available (normally 1994).  Where 
available, additional data is given in these notes. 
2  Where possible and where no specific target has been provided repair time targets have been adduced from time limits used in the 
corresponding compensation scheme for the purposes of  determining entitlement to compensation.  See footnote 6 below. 
3  Target set for 1994 by management contract between Belgacom and the Belgian Government.  The target has been set at 76% for 
1995. 
4  For example, a network connection delay of  up to 10 working days will entitle the subscriber to a discount of up to 30% on the 
connection fee and a delay of over 2 working days in repairs to basic telephone services entitles the subscriber to 50 DM. 
5  The Special Circular of  24 July 1995 amending the Greek Telephone Regulation imposed a target of  5 working days for 1995 and 
of3 working days for 1996. 
6  Target adduced from time limits adopted in compensation scheme for purposes of  determining entitlement to compensation. 
7  Target set in France Telecom's general contract with the Direction Generate de Postes et Telecommunications (Source: DGPT 
Annual Report (1994)). 
8  Figure as at 31  December 1993 (Source: DGPT Annual Report (1994)). 
9  This figure relates to customer reported faults.  With regard to line faults 88% are repaired within 2 days. 
10  Target and minimum acceptable level set in contract between ICP and Portugal Telecom and covers period 1995/199611997 
Compensation available after 3 days without if  fault is operators responsibility and after 10 days without service if  force majeure. 
11  In 1993, 73.5% of  faults were repaired within 24 hours. 
12  Target forms part ofTelia's service warranty. 
13  Figures relate to period April to September 1994.  In the same period, 87.6% ofbusiness and 75.5% ofresidential faults were 
repaired within 5 working hours or 9 working hours respectively or on a date agreed with the customer. 
14  On the daily rate basis, the customer is entitled to claim one month's rental for each day of  delay. 
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TABLEA5:  Average Percentage of  Public Payphones in  Working Order in 
Member States in 19941 
B  DK  D  EL  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  AUT  p  FIN  SWED  UK 
n/a  92L  n/a  95  n/a4  n/aJ  Over  n/a  ver 9  95  97  99.9  n/a  +/- 98  94.6b 
973  93 
n/a: data not available 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities (1995). 
NOTES 
1  All data provided in the table relates to the most recent period for which information is available (normally 1994).  Where available, 
additional data is given in these notes. 
2  Coin operated payphones. 
3  Card operated payphones. 
4  The average repair time in public telephones of  all types (that is in public and private places) is 2.8 hours; for public telephone 
boxes it is 10.6 hours. 
5  France Telecom's general contract with the Direction Generate de Pastes et Telecommunications stipulates that only 5% of  public 
payphones should remain out of  order for more than 24 hours.  As at 31  December 1993 4.8% remained out of  order for a longer 
period (Source: DGPT Annual Report (1994)). 
6  This figure relates to BT public payphones for the period October 1994 to March 1995.  For the preceding 6 month period the figure 
was 95.9%. 
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TABLEA6:  Availability of  Advanced Telephone Facilities in the EC 
Dual~tone  Call  can·  Voice~mail  Calling Line 
Country  Multi~  Waiting  Forward  in the public  ldentifi-
Frequency  network  cation 
(DTMF) 
Dialling 
B  Yes 1  YesL.  YesL.  Yes  Yes" 
DK  Yes  Yes=>  Yes=>  Yes'  No0 
D  Yes  Yes  No 15  Yes  Yes 
EL  Yes'  Yes=>  Yes'  No  No 
E  Yes  Yes,  Yes,  No  Nolu 
F  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IRL  Yes=>  Yes=>  Yes=>  Yes=>  No 
I  Yes=>  Yes  Yes  Noll  Yes, 
L  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
NL  Yes  No
1
"'  Yes  Noll  NoD 
AUT  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes10  Yes, 
p  Yes 115  Yes 115  Yes 115  Yes10  Yes 
FIN  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SWED  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
UK  Yes  Yes  Yes  Noll  Yes 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities (1995). 
NOTES 
1  For 93.5% ofPSTN lines. 
2  For 60% ofPSTN lines. 
3  Available on ISDN 
4  Call barring available to block access to kiosk services. 
Call Barring 
Facilities 
Yes"' 
Yes 1 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 1L 
Yesu 
Yes 
Yes 11 
Yes
115
"' 
Yes 1, 
Yes 
Yes 
5  Commercially availability linked to whether subscriber is connected to a digital exchange (percentage of  subscribers for those States 
indicated in brackets): DK (55%),  EL (3%), IRL (75%) and Italy (67%) 
6  Gradual introduction from February 1996. 
7  Commercially available blocking access to specific value-added services; per line or per call barring of  call facilities (such as call 
identification) will be introduced in  December 1995. 
8  Technical possibility on ISDN but this is not commercially available for the moment. 
9  47.8% of  the subscribers have the possibility to access this service. 
10  There is a plan to offer such a service in 1996 for subscribers connected to digital switches. 
11  Voice-mail was on trial in 1995. 
12  Call barring facilities for trunk traffic and kiosk billing services. 
13  Customers have the possibility of  per line barring of  call facilities. 
14  Pilot in 1995 and introduction in 1996. 
15  Pilot in 1995. 
16  Available for mobile telephone (GSM). 
17  Barring access available only to specific value-added services (not per line or call blocking facilities) 
18  Available whenever it is technically feasible and for CLI, available on ISDN whenever it is technically feasible. 
19  Customers are offered the possibility of  per line barring of  call facilities and barring access to specific value-added services. 
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Annex E/  Comparison of  ISDN and PSTN Pricing in 
Member States 
The pricing policies adopted by European TOs  for  basic rate ISDN vary considerably. 
There has been a tendency to charge at rates similar to PSTN charges for each B-channel 
used.  However,  connection  and  rental  charges  have  tended  to  be  higher  than  the 
equivalent charges for PSTN. 
This annex presents an analysis of the different components of ISDN tariffs and presents 
these  as  a  proportion  of the  equivalent  PSTN  tariff components.  For  accuracy  of 
comparison the following restrictions apply to the tariffs chosen: 
•  all calls at peak rates 
•  all rentals are the most expensive rental available 
•  all lines are rented (rather than owned) 
•  all calls to other EU countries are to the most expensive other EU country 
•  no discounts have been applied 
•  connection charges are for a new line (rather than reconnection of  an existing line) 
•  all lines are residential lines. 
The graphs included in this annex were generated from data provided by Phillips Tarifica. 
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EXHIBITE2: 
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Local ISDN calls in Ireland are charged at national ISDN call rates. 
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Basic Rate ISDN National Usage Tariff  as a Proportion of  PSTN 
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Basic Rate ISDN International Tariff  to a Distant EU  Member State 
as a Proportion of  the Equivalent PSTN Tariff [Source: Analysys  J 
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In France and Greece the charges per B-channel fall below PSTN rates, because international ISDN tariff is a single 24-hour tariff 
rather than a cheaper off-peak tariff and a more expensive peak tariff. 
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Annex F/  The Effect of  Increased Local Loop Utilisation 
on the Cost of  Universal Service 
Exhibits  Fl  and  F2  show  the  hypothetical  relationships  between  avoidable  cost  and 
revenue foregone, solely depending on traffic volume.  The area under the avoidable cost 
curve  and  above  the  revenue  foregone  curve  is  equal  to  the  cost  of universal  service 
provision (the area denoted by the triangle A, Band C).  As shown in Exhibit Fl, this area 
will decline if there  is  even take-up  of Internet services  (assuming that local  calls  are 
profitable at the margin) to the triangle denoted by A', B' and C'.  However, as Exhibit F2 
shows, under non-even take-up the effect on the total area will be negligible (ignoring the 
effect of  economies of  scale), declining to A", B" and C". 
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EXHIBITFJ: 
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Analysys Final Report for DGXJIII  A 1 
Avoidable Costs, Revenues Foregone and Implied Cost of  Universal 
Service Provision: Even Take-up of  Internet Services (Illustrative) 
~---------------------------------------------------
Total Volume of  Traffic 
Revenue foregone 
- - Avoidable cost 
--Additional revenue (assume even take up) 
-Additional cost (assume even take up) 
---------------------------------------~A~n~a~Iy~s---THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE  Page 179 
EXHIBITF2: 
A=A" 
Avoidable Costs, Revenues Foregone and Implied Cost of  Universal 
Service Provision: Non-Even Take-up of  Internet Services 
(Illustrative) 
Total Volume of  Traffic 
Revenue foregone 
- - Avoidable cost 
--Additional revenue (assume non - even take up) 
-Additional  cost (assume non-even take up) 
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